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The notion of a universal basic income (UBI) has captivated academics, entre-
preneurs, policymakers, and ordinary citizens in recent months. Pilot studies of a 
UBI are underway or in the works on three continents. And prominent voices from 
across the ideological spectrum have expressed support for a UBI or one of its vari-
ants, including libertarian Charles Murray, Facebook cofounder Chris Hughes, la-
bor leader Andy Stern, and—most recently—former President Barack Obama. 
 Although even the most optimistic advocates for a UBI will acknowledge that na-
tionwide implementation lies years away, the design of a basic income will require 
sustained scholarly attention. This Article seeks to advance the conversation among 
academics and policymakers about UBI implementation. 
Our prior work has focused on the philosophical foundations of a basic income; 
here, we build up from those foundations to identify the practical building blocks of 
a large-scale cash transfer program. After canvassing the considerations relevant to 
the design of a UBI, we arrive at a set of specific recommendations for policymakers. 
We propose a UBI of $6,000 per person per year, paid to all citizens and lawful per-
manent residents via direct deposit in biweekly installments. We argue—contrary to 
other UBI proponents—that children and seniors should be included, that marriage 
penalties and cost-of-living adjustments should be rejected, that recipients should 
have a limited ability to use future payments as collateral for short- and medium-
term loans, and that the Social Security Administration should carry out the pro-
gram. We also explain how a UBI could be financed through the consolidation of 
existing cash and near-cash transfer programs as well as the imposition of a rela-
tively modest surtax on all earners. 
Importantly, the building blocks of a UBI do not necessarily determine its out-
ward face. By this, we mean that economically identical programs can be described 
in very different ways—for example, as a UBI with no phaseout, a UBI that phases 
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out with income, and a “negative income tax”—without altering any of the essential 
features. To be sure, packaging matters to the public perception of a UBI, and we 
consider reasons why some characterizations of the program may prove more popu-
lar than others. Our Article seeks to sort the building blocks of a UBI out from the 
cosmetic components, thereby clarifying which elements of a UBI shape implemen-
tation and which ones affect only the outward appearance. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The notion of a universal basic income, or UBI, has capti-
vated academics, entrepreneurs, policymakers, and ordinary citi-
zens in recent years. Across the globe, countries ranging from 
Brazil to Finland, the Netherlands, Italy, Kenya, Uganda, and 
Canada are conducting or have recently concluded pilot studies of 
a UBI.1 Here in the United States, the city of Stockton, California, 
has partnered with a nonprofit organization to give checks of $500 
a month—no strings attached—to several dozen families; 2  a 
mayoral task force in Chicago has recommended a similar pilot 
program that would pay one thousand people $1,000 a month;3 
and the Hawaii legislature has launched a working group to evalu-
ate a UBI in the Aloha State.4 A tech-funded nonprofit has hatched 
a plan to give $1,000 a month to one thousand families in two as-
yet-unannounced states,5 with the stated goal of taking a “first 
step toward defining a new social contract for the 21st century.”6 
And prominent voices from across the ideological spectrum have 
taken up the UBI idea as well: libertarian Charles Murray, 7  
Facebook cofounder and Obama campaign strategist Chris Hughes,8 
 
 1 See Karla Lant, Universal Basic Income Pilot Programs (Futurism), online at 
https://futurism.com/images/universal-basic-income-ubi-pilot-programs-around-the-
world (visited Jan 25, 2020) (Perma archive unavailable). See also Leonid Bershidsky, In 
Finland, Money Can Buy You Happiness (Bloomberg, Feb 9, 2019), archived at 
https://perma.cc/QUW2-8AZ5 (noting the completion of Finland’s UBI pilot); Gretchen 
Frazee, Ontario Is Canceling Its Basic Income Experiment (PBS NewsHour, Aug 6, 2018), 
archived at https://perma.cc/SS3K-7ZL2 (noting the premature end of Ontario’s UBI pilot 
after a conservative political party took over the province’s government). 
 2 See Sam Harnett, A California City Is Planning on Giving Money to Some Resi-
dents, No Strings Attached (Marketplace, Feb 27, 2018), archived at https://perma.cc/ 
3BTN-TNNL. 
 3 See Fran Spielman, Plan to Pay 1,000 Residents $1,000 a Month—No Strings At-
tached—Pitched by Panel (Chicago Sun-Times, Feb 7, 2019), archived at https://perma.cc/ 
U43F-UF7B. 
 4 See Hawaii House Concurrent Resolution No 89-17, Hawaii House of Representa-
tives, 29th Legis (May 5, 2017), archived at https://perma.cc/K4PT-FK8W. 
 5 In addition to the one thousand families receiving $1,000 a month, a control group 
of two thousand families will receive $50 a month. See Basic Income Project Proposal: 
Overview for Comments and Feedback *13–14 (Y Combinator Research, Sept 2017), ar-
chived at https://perma.cc/XT9Z-56H9; Nitashka Tiku, Y Combinator Learns Basic Income 
Is Not So Basic After All (Wired, Aug 27, 2018), archived at https://perma.cc/9N4S-B4RX. 
 6 The First Study of Basic Income in the United States (Y Combinator Research, 
2018), archived at https://perma.cc/75YB-EB8J. 
 7 See Charles Murray, In Our Hands: A Plan to Replace the Welfare State 6–10 (AEI 
rev ed 2016). 
 8 See Chris Hughes, Fair Shot: Rethinking Inequality and How We Earn 91–95 
(St. Martin’s 2018). 
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and former labor leader Andy Stern9 all have offered proposals for 
nationwide programs that resemble a UBI. 10  Former President 
Obama floated the idea of a universal income in a July 2018 speech 
in South Africa;11 Hillary Clinton now says she seriously consid-
ered adding a basic income plank to her 2016 presidential cam-
paign platform;12 and entrepreneur Andrew Yang—who made a 
UBI the primary plank of his bid for the 2020 Democratic presi-
dential nod—attracted more support in fundraising and polls 
than many well-established politicians, including several sitting 
senators.13 
All the while, the mechanics of how a nationwide UBI would 
work have drawn relatively little attention. Most experiments, for 
example, are designed to test the effects of unrestricted cash 
transfers on health, educational attainment, workforce participa-
tion, and subjective measures of well-being among a small popu-
lation—not to gauge whether such programs are scalable to a 
country of 330 million. Those who have offered concrete nation-
wide UBI proposals have skipped over details that could deter-
mine the success or failure of a UBI—such as precisely how it 
would phase out, whether benefits would be assignable, and 
which agency would administer what would likely be the largest 
program of periodic cash transfers in human history. Some 
 
 9 See Andy Stern with Lee Kravitz, Raising the Floor: How a Universal Basic Income 
Can Renew Our Economy and Rebuild the American Dream 201–02 (Public Affairs 2016). 
 10 In addition to those of Hughes, Murray, and Stern, a number of other UBI books 
have garnered significant publicity. See generally, for example, Annie Lowrey, Give People 
Money: How a Universal Basic Income Would End Poverty, Revolutionize Work, and Re-
make the World (Crown 2018); Rutger Bregman, Utopia for Realists: How We Can Build 
the Ideal World (Little, Brown 2017) (Elizabeth Manton, trans); Philippe Van Parijs and 
Yannick Vanderborght, Basic Income: A Radical Proposal for a Free Society and a Sane 
Economy (Harvard 2017). 
 11 See Obama’s Full Speech About the ‘Politics of Fear and Resentment’ (CNN, July 
17, 2018), archived at https://perma.cc/C7TJ-4Z58 (“[W]e’re going to have to consider new 
ways of thinking about these problems, like a universal income. . . . [W]e’re going to have 
to worry about economics if we want to get democracy back on track.”). 
 12 See Hillary Rodham Clinton, What Happened 238–39 (Simon & Schuster 2017). 
See also Dylan Matthews, Hillary Clinton Almost Ran for President on a Universal Basic 
Income (Vox, Sept 12, 2017), archived at https://perma.cc/KUX3-KTM5. 
 13 See Joe Garofoli, Andrew Yang Doing Better Than Many Veteran Politicians in 
First White House Run (SF Chron, July 17, 2019), archived at https://perma.cc/ 
D9RP-DVJB. Yang withdrew from the race in February 2020 after qualifying for all of the 
2019 Democratic debates but failing to win delegates in the Iowa caucuses or New  
Hampshire primary. See Matt Stevens, Andrew Yang Drops Out: ‘It Is Clear Tonight from 
the Numbers That We Are Not Going to Win’ (NY Times, Feb 11, 2020), archived at 
https://perma.cc/W5MP-DLQV. 
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insights can be gleaned from academic studies in the late 1960s 
and early 1970s regarding the design of a “negative income tax,”14 
but technological transformations and several decades’ worth of 
social science research render much of that work in need of up-
dating. 
To be sure, even the most optimistic advocates for a UBI will 
acknowledge that nationwide implementation lies years—if not 
decades—ahead. And accordingly, one might argue that hashing 
out the nitty-gritty programmatic specifications of a UBI puts the 
cart before the horse. But as we seek to show below, these design 
details in many cases are the horse. What might seem like tech-
nical aspects of a UBI (for example, whether it is paid weekly, 
monthly, annually, or once in a lifetime; whether an individual’s 
future stream of UBI payments can be posted as collateral for a 
loan; and whether a spouse’s income is factored into the calcula-
tion of a phaseout) turn out to be essential elements that affect 
whether a future UBI will live up to the high expectations that 
supporters have set. 
Moreover, while we hazard no predictions as to the immi-
nence of a UBI, we note that if and when a UBI comes, it could 
come fast. A predecessor to the UBI—the negative income tax—
went from academic idea to presidential policy priority in seven 
short years in the 1960s.15 In April 1970, the House of Represent-
atives voted overwhelmingly to adopt a bill providing a minimum 
 
 14 See generally, for example, Michael R. Asimow and William A. Klein, The Negative 
Income Tax: Accounting Problems and a Proposed Solution, 8 Harv J Legis 1 (1970) (dis-
cussing accounting, timing, and income-averaging issues related to designing a negative 
income tax); William D. Popkin, Administration of a Negative Income Tax, 78 Yale L J 388 
(1969) (analyzing administrative concerns with existing welfare programs and their im-
plications for a negative income tax); James Tobin, Joseph A. Pechman, and Peter M. 
Mieszkowski, Is a Negative Income Tax Practical?, 77 Yale L J 1 (1967) (offering specific 
recommendations about various technical issues related to a negative income tax such as 
defining the family unit, defining income, and crafting a payment schedule); Sheldon S. 
Cohen, Administrative Aspects of a Negative Income Tax, 117 U Pa L Rev 678 (1969) (crit-
icizing Professors Tobin, Pechman, and Mieszkowski’s proposal on administrative 
grounds); Comment, A Model Negative Income Tax Statute, 78 Yale L J 269 (1968) (pro-
posing a model negative income tax statute while addressing policy considerations and 
whether complementary welfare strategies should be pursued). 
 15 Professor Milton Friedman coined the term “negative income tax” in Milton  
Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom 192 (Chicago 1962). In August 1969, President Rich-
ard Nixon delivered a televised address to the nation in which he unveiled a proposal for 
a “Family Assistance Plan” that was loosely modeled on Friedman’s negative income tax 
idea. On the history of the negative income tax and the Family Assistance Plan, see Daniel 
P. Moynihan, The Politics of a Guaranteed Income: The Nixon Administration and the 
Family Assistance Plan 50–59, 136–46 (Random House 1973). 
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income of $500 per parent and $300 per child for families in the 
United States—the equivalent of more than $10,000 for a family 
of four in today’s dollars.16 And while the bill ultimately failed in 
the Senate, the very notion that such a scheme could command 
bipartisan support in one house of Congress would have seemed 
virtually unimaginable only a few years earlier. The path from 
political implausibility to national policy is sometimes quite 
short. 
If and when such support does coalesce into law, the imple-
mentation of a UBI may prove to be the most important domestic 
policy endeavor of our time. If it succeeds, it could mean the end 
of extreme poverty—at least in advanced industrialized econo-
mies. Yet if it does not deliver on its promise to improve the lives 
of recipients or if it causes massive departures from the workforce 
that undermine economic growth, then the failure of a UBI could 
cast a long shadow over cash-assistance efforts for decades to 
come. In sum, the stakes involved in the implementation of a UBI 
are potentially enormous, making attention to implementation 
details all the more essential. 
This Article seeks to advance the conversation among aca-
demics and policymakers about UBI implementation. Our prior 
work has focused on the philosophical foundations of a UBI;17 
here, we build up from those foundations to identify the practical 
building blocks of a large-scale cash transfer program. Specifi-
cally, we focus on six building blocks of a UBI. By “building 
blocks,” we refer to core components of any UBI that will shape 
policy outcomes significantly. To preview, our six 18  building 
blocks are: 
• Size: How much will the basic income be? 
 
 16 See US Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Historical Consumer 
Price Index for All Urban Consumers (CPI-U) *4, archived at https://perma.cc/B7BW 
-MR7Z (ratio of July 2019 CPI to April 1970 CPI is 256.571 / 38.5, or 6.664, times $1,600 
value of proposed minimum income for a family of four is approximately $10,662). 
 17 See Miranda Perry Fleischer and Daniel Hemel, Atlas Nods: The Libertarian Case 
for a Basic Income, 2017 Wis L Rev 1189, 1203–44. 
 18 One might ask: Why six? Why not, for example, split the “eligibility” block into two 
(citizenship and age) so there are seven? Fair question. We have found—after workshops 
and numerous drafts—that the six-block structure creates a manageable framework for 
studying and discussing UBI implementation. We do not claim that there is anything mag-
ical to the number six though, and we acknowledge that a list of this sort entails an inev-
itable dose of arbitrariness. That said, the content of these six blocks is neither arbitrary 
nor unique to a UBI; it reflects design decisions inherent to any program of redistribution. 
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• Eligibility: To whom will the basic income extend, and 
what eligibility criteria (if any) must potential recipients 
satisfy? 
• Uniformity: Will payments vary based on geographic lo-
cation, household size, or wealth? 
• Assignability: Can individuals transfer their right to fu-
ture payments (for example, as collateral for a loan)? 
• Payment Mechanism: How will the actual cash transfer to 
UBI recipients work? How often will payments be made? 
Which agency or agencies will be tasked with implement-
ing the program? and 
• Funding Mechanism: Will a UBI be funded by the elimi-
nation of other social welfare programs (and if so, which 
ones?), by additional taxes, or by a combination of both? 
Our analysis draws from studies of the existing tax-and-
transfer system and from ethical and political theory. In most in-
stances, our analysis yields a set of specific recommendations for 
policymakers. For example: 
• Size: While no number is magic, a basic income of $500 
per person per month would bring an end to extreme pov-
erty in the United States and would be feasible given the 
current size of the US economy; 
• Eligibility: A comprehensive basic income should cover 
citizens and lawful permanent residents of all ages; 
• Uniformity: Marriage penalties, asset tests, and geo-
graphic differences in payment amounts are all best 
avoided; 
• Assignability: Adult UBI recipients should be able, within 
limits, to use future payments as collateral for short- and 
medium-term loans—either from private lenders or from 
the government; 
• Payment Mechanism: Payments should be made via di-
rect deposit on a biweekly basis and delivered through the 
Social Security Administration; and 
• Funding Mechanism: The cost of a UBI should be offset 
by, at minimum, the consolidation of some or all current 
cash and near-cash transfer programs as well as a surtax 
layered on top of the existing tax structure and adminis-
tered by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). 
Importantly, the building blocks of a UBI do not necessarily 
determine its outward face. By this, we mean that economically 
identical programs can be described in very different ways 
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without altering any of the essential features. For example, a 
basic income for all individuals funded by an additional income 
tax can—without any substantive change—be recast as a “nega-
tive income tax” that only provides benefits to individuals or 
households below a certain income threshold. Likewise, a 
monthly or annual UBI that can be posted as collateral for a loan 
also can be redescribed as a once-in-a-lifetime “stakeholder 
grant”—again without much more than a cosmetic change. Of 
course, packaging does matter to the public perception of a UBI, 
and we consider reasons why some characterizations of the pro-
gram may prove more popular than others. A key contribution of 
this Article is to sort the building blocks of a UBI out from the 
cosmetic components, thereby clarifying which elements of a UBI 
shape implementation and which ones affect only the external  
appearance. 
We approach these questions from a distinct disciplinary per-
spective—as tax law scholars—and our own views as to how the 
building blocks of a UBI ought to be assembled are colored by our 
observations of the federal income tax system in operation. The 
federal income tax serves as a model for a UBI in many respects 
but certainly not in all. The definition—or rather, definitions19—
of income in the Internal Revenue Code provide a starting point 
for any calculation of the surtaxes that would be used to finance 
a UBI. Experiences with the earned income tax credit (EITC) over 
the past four decades and with the child tax credit over the past 
twenty years yield insights regarding the implementation of cash-
transfer programs. Challenges related to bubble rates and mar-
riage penalties—familiar from the income tax context—loom over 
the design of any UBI scheme. And the IRS stands as one, but not 
the only, agency that might have the capabilities and expertise to 
administer a program of a UBI’s size and scope. 
Our analysis also is informed by our engagement with ethical 
and political theory. How the building blocks of a UBI should be 
assembled will depend in large part on the philosophical founda-
tions upon which a UBI rests. A variety of philosophical ap-
proaches—including welfarism, resource egalitarianism, and lib-
ertarianism—potentially lend support to the idea of a UBI, but 
translating the abstract idea of a UBI into a concrete proposal 
exposes the junctures at which these various approaches diverge. 
 
 19 See John R. Brooks, The Definitions of Income, 71 Tax L Rev 253, 253 n 2 (2018) 
(noting the alternative definitions of “income” within various sections of the Internal Rev-
enue Code). 
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These differences go beyond the questions of size, eligibility, and 
funding mechanisms: for example, welfarists and libertarians 
may find that they arrive at very different answers to the ques-
tion of whether rights to future UBI payments should be assign-
able. While we believe that a successful UBI movement will need 
to adopt an open-tent attitude toward supporters from different 
philosophical perspectives, thinking through the design details of 
a UBI will shed some light on whether this intellectually divided 
house can stand. 
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I provides a brief over-
view of the UBI idea, distinguishes it from traditional welfare 
programs, and explains the essential similarities among UBI pro-
posals with different labels. Part II bores down into the founda-
tions of a UBI with the aim of identifying the ethical and philo-
sophical premises upon which a UBI rests. Part III canvasses the 
considerations that inform the design of a UBI and then provides 
policymakers with a set of specific recommendations influenced 
by both tax policy and ethical theory. Part IV looks toward the 
outward appearance of a UBI: How should the program be pre-
sented to the public? We weigh the political advantages and dis-
advantages of various framings (UBI vs. negative income tax; 
phaseout vs. no phaseout), and we explain how the outward fram-
ing of a UBI can be separated from its inner workings. We con-
clude by considering the ways in which the UBI debate can inform 
the design of antipoverty programs in the here and now, before 
support for a UBI achieves critical mass (if it ever does). A UBI, 
we argue, is not all-or-nothing, and many of the innovations dis-
cussed here can be repurposed to improve upon existing an-
tipoverty and cash-transfer programs. 
I.  THE BASICS OF A UBI 
A universal basic income, or UBI, refers to a program that 
ensures that all members of a polity have access to at least a min-
imum sum of money.20 At bottom, it is a method for distributing 
resources among individuals within a given society. It could—but 
need not—replace existing welfare programs. It also could—but 
 
 20 A UBI would almost certainly not be paid in physical currency. Instead, debit cards, 
direct deposit, or virtual currency are the most likely delivery mechanisms (although physi-
cal checks also remain a possibility). See Dom Galeon, Universal Basic Income Could Be-
come a Reality, Thanks to This Technology (Futurism, Mar 10, 2017), archived at 
https://perma.cc/9B6J-4P2H (discussing UBI experiments that rely on blockchain-based 
payments). We discuss payment mechanisms at greater length in Part III.E. 
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also need not—be cast as a response to automation-induced job 
losses. What distinguishes a UBI from other transfers is that it is 
unconditional and unrestricted: that is, receipt of a UBI is not 
contingent upon a particular characteristic (for example, age or 
disability) or a particular activity (for example, work), and bene-
fits are not restricted to any particular use. 
Unconditional and unrestricted cash-transfer programs go by 
various names, such as a “basic income guarantee,” a “guaranteed 
income,” a “citizens income,” a “negative income tax,” and a “so-
cial dividend.”21 Although these names may reflect different phi-
losophies or objectives, they do not change the program’s core fea-
tures or dictate distributional outcomes. Any given name or 
frame, however, may affect the level of political support. For ease 
of exposition, we use the term “universal basic income,” or “UBI,” 
in Parts I–III and then discuss alternative framings in Part IV. 
A. UBI vs. the Welfare State 
A UBI resembles existing welfare programs insofar as it en-
tails the redistribution of resources from higher-income to lower-
income individuals and households. This is true even if a UBI is 
characterized as being “universal” in the sense of being distrib-
uted to all individuals regardless of need.22 This is because virtu-
ally every UBI proposal envisions that the UBI will be funded, 
implicitly or explicitly, with additional revenues from taxes that 
increase with income. Higher-income individuals will pay more in 
additional taxes than they receive from the UBI; lower-income in-
dividuals will pay less.23 
 
 21 See Carole Pateman and Matthew C. Murray, Introduction, in Matthew C. Murray 
and Carole Pateman, eds, Basic Income Worldwide: Horizons of Reform 1, 2 (Palgrave 
Macmillan 2012); Van Parijs and Vanderborght, Basic Income at 8 (cited in note 10). 
 22 We address whether a UBI should be limited to citizens, adults, or other non-need-
based categories in Part III.B. 
 23 Professors Philippe Van Parijs and Yannick Vanderborght have written that, as a 
definitional matter, a truly “universal” basic income must not be “subjected to an income 
or means test.” Van Parijs and Vanderborght, Basic Income at 8 (cited in note 10). As we 
discuss below, this is true only if it refers to the outward appearance of a UBI and not the 
inner workings. Any UBI that is financed by an income tax can be redescribed as a cash 
transfer subject to an income test because high-income individuals will contribute more 
through income taxes than they receive in the form of a UBI. Likewise, any UBI financed 
by a carbon tax can be redescribed as a cash transfer subject to a personal carbon emis-
sions test because individuals whose carbon emissions exceed the mean will pay more 
through carbon taxes than their UBI. 
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But a UBI differs from existing welfare programs in several 
key respects. First, a UBI is unconditional in the sense that it is 
not contingent upon an individual showing of deservedness. Re-
cipients need not work nor demonstrate that they are unable to 
participate in the labor force. In this respect, a UBI contrasts with 
most current programs. For example, the federal Supplemental 
Security Income (SSI) program requires non-elderly recipients to 
demonstrate that they are blind or disabled.24 The Supplemental 
Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) requires able-bodied 
adults without dependents to work or to participate in training or 
education for at least eighty hours per month in order to continue 
to receive benefits.25 Temporary Assistance for Needy Families 
(TANF) is available only to pregnant women and individuals who 
care for minor children.26 A UBI, at least in its purest form, would 
not be conditional upon disability, work effort, volunteering, care-
giving, the presence of dependents, pregnancy, or any other indi-
vidual factor. Also, a truly unconditional UBI—unlike many cur-
rent programs27—would not exclude beneficiaries because of drug 
use or past criminal activity. 
Second, a UBI—unlike many current welfare programs—is 
delivered via unrestricted cash or cash-like payments. This con-
trasts with programs that provide in-kind benefits (such as the 
National School Lunch Program) and programs that provide 
vouchers for specific goods and services (such as SNAP and Sec-
tion 8 rental assistance). A UBI—again, at least in its purest 
form—also does not restrict the range of goods and services that 
recipients can purchase. By contrast, the TANF program gener-
ally delivers aid through debit-like “electronic benefit transfer” 
cards, 28  and federal law mandates that states take steps to 
 
 24 See Social Security Administration, Understanding Supplemental Security Income 
SSI Eligibility Requirements—2019 Edition, archived at https://perma.cc/77P5-K5S8. 
 25 See US Department of Agriculture, Food and Nutrition Service, Able-Bodied 
Adults Without Dependents (ABAWDs), archived at https://perma.cc/M6GN-E23N (last up-
dated July 17, 2018) (explaining that unemployed individuals without dependents may 
continue to receive SNAP benefits by complying with a state workfare program or by com-
pleting a SNAP Employment and Training Program). 
 26 See 42 USC § 608(a). 
 27 See Drug Testing for Welfare Recipients and Public Assistance (National Confer-
ence of State Legislatures, Mar 24, 2017), archived at https://perma.cc/MF8Y-LDLJ (not-
ing that, as of March 2017, fifteen states had passed legislation requiring drug screening 
for public assistance applicants and twenty more states had proposed similar programs). 
 28 See, for example, New York State Office of Temporary and Disability Assistance, 
Electronic Benefits Transfer (EBT) Card, archived at https://perma.cc/T34Z-HA63. See 
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prevent beneficiaries from using those cards at any liquor store, 
gambling establishment, or strip club.29 Many states impose ad-
ditional restrictions; Kansas, for example, prohibits the use of 
electronic benefit cards for tobacco, tattoos, and body piercings, 
and at sporting events, jewelry stores, nail salons, movie theaters, 
and swimming pools.30  A true UBI would contain no such re-
strictions on use. 
A final feature of a UBI is that it comes in the form of regu-
larly recurring periodic payments. The payment period could be 
weekly, monthly, annually, or any other stretch. Most current 
welfare programs have a similar periodic-payment feature, deliv-
ering benefits monthly (for example, SNAP and SSI) or annually 
(for example, the EITC). A UBI differs, however, from the idea—
rooted in the writing of Thomas Paine 31  and popularized in  
the legal academy by Professors Bruce Ackerman and Anne  
Alstott32—of providing individuals with large lump-sum grants 
upon entering adulthood. As we discuss in Part III.D, the differ-
ence between periodic payments and lump-sum grants may be 
largely cosmetic if individuals can assign their future stream of 
periodic payments as collateral for a lump-sum loan. Without free 
assignability, however, the choice between periodic payments and 
a lump-sum grant has important implications for the operation 
of—and outcomes from—a comprehensive cash-transfer scheme. 
In theory, a UBI can act as a substitute for the existing wel-
fare system or as a complement to it. There is much to be said for 
both approaches, and we review the main arguments in the  
substitute-versus-complement debate as part of our discussion of 
funding mechanisms in Part III.F. Many of the key design details 
of a UBI—such as how and how frequently payments would be 
made, whether future benefits would be assignable, and who 
would administer it—do not depend upon the answer to the 
 
also Restrictions on Use of Public Assistance Electronic Benefit Transfer (EBT) Cards (Na-
tional Conference of State Legislatures, May 8, 2015), archived at https://perma.cc/HZD3 
-F75V (noting that as of 2015, at least thirty-seven states use EBT cards to issue TANF 
benefits). 
 29 See 42 USC § 608(a)(12)(A)(i)–(iii). The law does not use the term “strip club” but 
instead refers to “any retail establishment which provides adult-oriented entertainment 
in which performers disrobe or perform in an unclothed state for entertainment.” 42 USC 
§ 608(a)(12)(A)(iii). 
 30 See Kan Stat Ann § 39-709(b)(14). 
 31 See Thomas Paine, Agrarian Justice 27 (J. Adlard 2d ed 1797).  
 32 See Bruce Ackerman and Anne Alstott, The Stakeholder Society 3 (Yale 1999) (pro-
posing a stake of $80,000 for each American at maturity and attributing the idea to Paine). 
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substitute-versus-complement question. Others—such as size 
and eligibility—almost certainly do. 
B. UBI vs. Negative Income Tax 
While the differences between a UBI and the existing welfare 
state are significant, the differences between a UBI and a so-
called negative income tax are not. Moreover, some of the distinc-
tions drawn between different UBI variants—for example, a UBI 
with a phaseout and a UBI that never phases out—turn out to be 
alternative ways of accounting for the same flow of funds. 
To illustrate: Imagine a UBI of $6,000 per year ($500 per 
month) that extends to all individuals regardless of income, cou-
pled with an income tax of 20 percent on all non-UBI income. 
Thus: 
• A, who earns $0, receives a UBI of $6,000 and pays no 
income tax, for a net transfer from the government of 
$6,000; 
• B, who earns $30,000, receives a UBI of $6,000 and pays 
income tax of $6,000, for a net transfer to/from the gov-
ernment of zero; and 
• C, who earns $60,000, receives a UBI of $6,000 and pays 
income tax of $12,000, for a net transfer to the govern-
ment of $6,000. 
Now imagine that instead of the above-described system, we 
implement a UBI of $6,000 that phases out at a 20 percent rate 
starting with one’s first dollar of non-UBI income, and that we 
couple that with a tax of 20 percent on non-UBI income over 
$30,000. Thus: 
• A, who earns $0, receives a UBI of $6,000 and pays no 
income tax, for a net transfer from the government of 
$6,000; 
• B, who earns $30,000, receives no UBI (because her UBI 
has fully phased out) and pays no income tax, for a net 
transfer to/from the government of zero; and 
• C, who earns $60,000, receives no UBI (again, on account 
of the phaseout) and pays income tax of $6,000, for a net 
transfer to the government of $6,000. 
The first example involved a UBI with no formal phaseout; 
the second UBI phased out explicitly. But as should be evident, 
the first and second arrangements are identical in economic 
terms. 
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Now imagine that instead of a UBI, we implement an ar-
rangement involving a negative income tax. Specifically, the  
income tax is 20 percent × (income − $30,000), with individuals 
whose tax is negative (that is, whose pre-tax income is less than 
$30,000) receiving a payment from the government of 20 percent 
times the difference between $30,000 and their pre-tax income. 
Thus: 
• A, who earns $0, faces an income tax of 20 per-
cent × ($0 − $30,000), which is to say, receives a net 
transfer from the government of $6,000; 
• B, who earns $30,000, owes nothing and is owed  
nothing; and 
• C, who earns $60,000, pays a tax of 20 per-
cent × ($60,000 − $30,000) = $6,000. 
As should be apparent, this third regime is the exact same in 
economic terms—resulting in the exact same net transfers be-
tween individuals and the government—as the first and second. 
That is, the same arrangement can be described as a UBI with no 
phaseout, or as a UBI with a phaseout, or a negative income tax.33 
The various framings may affect the political popularity of a UBI 
proposal, but they do nothing to change its essential features. 
II.  THE FOUNDATIONS OF A UBI 
Our discussion so far has focused on the basic workings of a 
UBI. In this Part, we shift from questions of mechanics to ques-
tions of morality and ethics. We present a brief survey of the nor-
mative foundations for a UBI in philosophy and political theory. 
These justificatory arguments will—as we illustrate in Part III—
prove significant to the design of a basic income program. 
The argument for a UBI boils down to three premises: (1) so-
ciety should redistribute from the rich to the poor; (2) redistribu-
tion should come (largely or exclusively) in the form of unre-
stricted cash transfers; and (3) those cash transfers should be 
unconditional—that is, available to all regardless of age, disabil-
ity, work history, or other individual characteristics. These argu-
ments, in turn, derive varying levels of support from at least three 
main ethical theories: welfarism, egalitarianism, and libertarianism. 
 
 33 While these examples all involve a flat tax rate, the equivalence extends to tax 
systems with graduated rate structures. 
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We focus on these three theories because of their predominance 
in debates over tax-and-transfer policy in the United States and 
abroad.34 We note, though, that these three perspectives do not 
exhaust the possible philosophical justifications for a UBI. One 
author has offered an argument for a UBI rooted in the capabili-
ties approach associated with Professors Martha Nussbaum and 
Amartya Sen;35 others have defended a UBI on communitarian 
grounds.36 Our focus on welfarism, egalitarianism, and libertari-
anism ought not be interpreted as an implicit judgment regarding 
alternative ethical theories or on their amenability to a UBI. 
Before proceeding, we note that none of the arguments for a 
UBI outlined below imply any claim about automation and the 
future of work. Some advocates of a UBI, including labor leader 
Andy Stern,37 Tesla founder Elon Musk,38 and former presidential 
candidate Andrew Yang,39 emphasize the potential role of a UBI 
as a safety net in the event that automation leads to large-scale 
job losses. Many UBI skeptics seize upon that argument as a 
 
 34 See, for example, Marc Fleurbaey and François Maniquet, Optimal Income Taxa-
tion Theory and Principles of Fairness, 56 J Econ Lit 1029, 1031 (2018) (considering wel-
farist, egalitarian, and libertarian perspectives on optimal taxation); Michael Pressman, 
“The Ability to Pay” in Tax Law: Clarifying the Concept’s Egalitarian and Utilitarian Jus-
tifications and the Interactions Between the Two, 21 NYU J Legis & Pub Pol 141, 147–48 
(2018) (stating that utilitarianism [welfarism] and egalitarianism “are two of the main 
principles thought to underlie our determination of how to distribute the tax burden,” 
while also considering libertarian perspectives); Dorothy Van Soest, Strange Bedfellows: 
A Call for Reordering National Priorities from Three Social Justice Perspectives, 39 Soc 
Work 710, 713–15 (1994) (considering utilitarian [welfarist], egalitarian, and libertarian 
perspectives on fiscal policy). 
 35 See Edward R. Teather-Posadas, Universally Basic: An Ethical Case for a Univer-
sal Basic Income *12–14 (Colorado State University Department of Economics Working 
Paper, Mar 26, 2017), archived at https://perma.cc/6KBG-G9J8. 
 36 See Philippe Van Parijs, Competing Justifications of Basic Income, in Philippe Van 
Parijs, ed, Arguing for Basic Income: Ethical Foundations for a Radical Reform 3, 23–24 
(Verso 1992). On “community” and “fraternity” as justifications for a government guaran-
tee of material well-being, see Thomas C. Grey, Property and Need: The Welfare State and 
Theories of Distributive Justice, 28 Stan L Rev 877, 894–97 (1976). 
 37 See Stern with Kravitz, Raising the Floor at 166 (cited in note 9) (stating that 
Stern’s main reason for supporting UBI is “its potential to deliver economic justice and 
security at a time when globalization and technological progress make it harder for  
Americans to find jobs that pay a living wage”). 
 38 See Catherine Clifford, Elon Musk Says Robots Will Push Us to a Universal Basic 
Income—Here’s How It Would Work (CNBC, Nov 18, 2016), archived at 
https://perma.cc/G5SF-BXAV (quoting Musk’s belief that the United States will “end up 
with a universal basic income, or something like that, due to automation. . . . I’m not sure 
what else one would do”). 
 39 See What Is the Freedom Dividend? (Yang2020), archived at https://perma.cc/ 
2AEC-NA65 (stating that Yang supports a UBI because of technological change). 
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reason not to back a UBI. For example, former vice-presidential 
candidate Senator Tim Kaine told a reporter in October 2017 that 
“[t]he premise of UBI is that work will be destroyed so much that 
you will need something like that [to replace it].” He added: “I 
don’t completely accept that that’s the way things are going.”40 
Professor Jason Furman, who chaired the Council of Economic 
Advisers under President Obama, has attacked the premise that 
automation will lead to large-scale unemployment and criticized 
a UBI as “giving up on work and giving up on people.”41 
As will become apparent, one can support a UBI without be-
lieving that work will wither away. For example, one need not 
place faith in forecasts of widespread job losses in order to believe 
that some individuals will be locked out of labor markets (for ex-
ample, on account of undiagnosed disability) and that a UBI 
serves as a normatively attractive means of guaranteeing a min-
imum level of well-being and autonomy for all members of society. 
One also can oppose a UBI while crediting the most pessimistic 
predictions about future job losses. An argument along these lines 
might posit that targeted in-kind transfers (for example, Medi-
caid and food stamps for the unemployed), along with job retrain-
ing, represent more effective uses of resources than a UBI. 
This is not to say that technological change is irrelevant to 
the UBI debate. For example, insofar as technological change su-
persizes the rewards for certain skills and reduces the demand for 
manual labor, it may contribute to widening inequality and 
thereby strengthen the case for redistribution.42 But even if the 
case for redistribution is undisputed, the case for a UBI still de-
pends upon claims about the scope of redistribution (universal ra-
ther than conditional) and the form of redistribution (unrestricted 
cash transfers rather than restricted transfers or transfers in 
kind). Accordingly, the coming of automation-induced 
 
 40 Haley Byrd, Democrats Tiptoe Around Universal Basic Income (Independent J 
Rev, Oct 2, 2017), archived at https://perma.cc/PY9H-X2RD. 
 41 Kathleen Pender, Why Universal Basic Income Is Gaining Support, Critics (SF 
Chron, July 15, 2017), archived at https://perma.cc/9WLA-7HPC. 
 42 As Professors Hilary Hoynes and Jesse Rothstein note, debates about a UBI’s po-
tential work-disincentive effects potentially do depend upon predictions regarding  
automation-induced unemployment. If one believes that automation will lead to wide-
spread job losses, then the concern that a UBI may discourage entry into—or encourage 
exit from—the workforce becomes less salient. See Hilary Hoynes and Jesse Rothstein, 
Universal Basic Income in the United States and Advanced Countries, 11 Ann Rev Econ 
929, 932–33 (2019). 
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unemployment is neither a necessary nor a sufficient element of 
the case for a UBI. For reasons explained at greater length else-
where, we are skeptical of automation-based arguments for a 
UBI.43 For the purposes of this Article, we adopt an attitude of 
agnosticism toward claims about a coming “robot apocalypse,”44 
and we note instances in which automation-induced unemploy-
ment would be especially relevant to a UBI’s design. 
A. The Case for Redistribution 
1. Welfarism. 
One possible case for a UBI proceeds from welfarism, which 
is—at least within the academic fields of economics and law—the 
dominant approach to the normative analysis of taxes and trans-
fers.45 Under welfarism, the proper role of political institutions is 
to maximize some conception of “welfare,” “utility,” “well-being,” 
or “happiness.”46 Arguments that redistribution increases overall 
welfare generally rely on the premise that the marginal utility of 
income or wealth is declining.47 According to this view, taking a 
dollar from a rich person decreases her utility less than it in-
creases the utility of the poor person who receives that dollar, 
thereby increasing overall utility.48 
 
 43 See Daniel Hemel, Book Review, Bringing the Basic Income Back to Earth (The 
New Rambler, Sept 19, 2016), archived at https://perma.cc/7TJJ-TRM6, reviewing Stern 
with Kravitz, Raising the Floor (cited in note 9) and Murray, In Our Hands (cited in note 7). 
 44 See Lowrey, Give People Money at 7, 32 (cited in note 10). 
 45 On the dominance of welfarist approaches, see Sarah B. Lawsky, On the Edge: 
Declining Marginal Utility and Tax Policy, 95 Minn L Rev 904, 910–11 (2011). 
 46 See, for example, Will Kymlicka, Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Introduc-
tion 10 (Oxford 2d ed 2002) (“[U]tilitarianism . . . claims that the morally right act or policy 
is that which produces the greatest happiness for the members of society.”); Liam Murphy 
and Thomas Nagel, The Myth of Ownership: Taxes and Justice 51 (Oxford 2002) (defining 
the goal of utilitarianism as “maximiz[ing] the total happiness of the members of a soci-
ety”); John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 20 (Belknap rev ed 2003) (identifying the “main 
idea” of utilitarianism as the idea that a just society achieves “the greatest net balance of 
satisfaction”). 
 47 See, for example, Joseph Bankman and Thomas Griffith, Social Welfare and the 
Rate Structure: A New Look at Progressive Taxation, 75 Cal L Rev 1905, 1947 (1987);  
Miranda Perry Fleischer, Charitable Giving and Utilitarianism: Problems and Priorities, 
89 Ind L J 1485, 1506–07 (2014); Lawsky, 95 Minn L Rev at 915–17 (cited in note 45). 
 48 See David F. Bradford, Untangling the Income Tax 153 (Harvard 1986); Bankman 
and Griffith, 75 Cal L Rev at 1947–48 (cited in note 47); Nancy C. Staudt, The Hidden 
Costs of the Progressivity Debate, 50 Vand L Rev 919, 939–42 (1997). 
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This premise of diminishing marginal utility of income draws 
support from intuition as well as empirical evidence. Intuitively, 
it seems almost axiomatic that an extra $500 per person per 
month would mean a great deal to a family in poverty but would 
be unnoticeable in the life of Jeff Bezos (who as of this writing 
was the world’s richest person).49 Empirically, cross-national hap-
piness studies find that additional income leads to a larger in-
crease in self-reported happiness among citizens of poorer nations 
than among citizens of wealthier ones.50 A similar phenomenon 
emerges from within-nation studies conducted in the United 
States: while rich people tend to be happier than their lower- 
income counterparts, the relationship between income and hap-
piness ebbs as income rises.51 The more money one already has, 
the less an additional dollar contributes to well-being. 
Although welfarists tend to support redistribution,52 welfar-
ism does not translate into total egalitarianism. If, at the  
extreme, a country imposed a 100 percent tax on income above 
the median, then presumably no one (or virtually no one) would 
 
 49 See Natasha Frost, Jeff Bezos Just Lost $38 Billion. He’s Still the Richest Person 
in the World (Quartz, July 6, 2019), archived at https://perma.cc/6NH9-EUSF. 
 50 On the relationship between income and happiness in cross-national studies, see 
Thomas D. Griffith, Progressive Taxation and Happiness, 45 BC L Rev 1363, 1372–74, 
1378–79 (2004) (citing a study that found “[a]n extra dollar of income in a poor nation . . . 
produced thirty-seven times as much utility as an extra dollar in a middle nation and 
seventy times as much utility as an extra dollar in a rich nation”). 
 51 See id at 1379–81. 
 52 We should note that there is a subtle—but substantive—distinction between the 
claim that “the marginal utility of income is diminishing” and “the redistribution of income 
from the rich to the poor increases overall utility.” Let’s assume, at least arguendo, that 
total utility is lower in Scenario 1, where A earns $90x and B earns $10x, than in Sce-
nario 2, where A earns $80x and B earns $20x. It does not necessarily follow that if we 
start from Scenario 1, impose a $10x tax on A, and transfer $10x to B, we will thereby 
raise total utility. First, A’s utility if she starts with $90x and then loses $10x to a tax may 
be lower than if she started with $80x in the first place. This could be a function of the 
well-documented phenomenon of loss aversion, or it might result from A being particularly 
averse to taxation. See, for example, Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, Loss Aversion 
in Riskless Choice: A Reference-Dependent Model, 106 Q J Econ 1039, 1040 (1991) (loss 
aversion); Abigail B. Sussman and Christopher Y. Olivola, Axe the Tax: Taxes Are Disliked 
More than Equivalent Costs, 48 J Marketing Rsrch S91, S91–S92 (2011) (aversion to tax-
ation). Second, B’s utility if he starts with $10x and then receives an additional $10x trans-
fer may be lower than if he earned $20x in the first place. This result might obtain if, as 
suggested by some sociological work, earning income generates greater utility (for exam-
ple, through self-esteem effects) than does receipt of an equivalent transfer. On self-esteem 
and earned income, see, for example, Katherine S. Newman, No Shame in My Game: The 
Working Poor in the Inner City 104 (Knopf 1999). While welfarism still probably can sup-
port income redistribution, the path from the diminishing-marginal-utility premise to the 
redistribution prescription requires an additional step. 
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earn above the median amount, and gross domestic product would 
decline precipitously. Most welfarists would thus agree that the 
welfare gains generated by redistributing from low-marginal- 
utility to high-marginal-utility individuals (that is, from the rich 
to the poor) must be balanced against the welfare losses gener-
ated by the disincentive effects of high income taxes. A rich liter-
ature on optimal taxation seeks to identify the mix of taxes and 
transfers that best balances these two effects.53 We do not seek to 
reproduce that literature here, except to note that the optimal tax 
literature will ultimately have much to say about the size of a UBI. 
2. Resource egalitarianism. 
Resource egalitarianism is an increasingly prominent alter-
native to welfarism in tax-policy discussions.54 While welfarists 
generally believe that the ex post transfer of income or wealth 
from the rich to the poor enhances overall utility, resource egali-
tarians—in the words of Professor Alstott—“tend to emphasize ex 
ante equality” in the distribution of wealth and opportunities.55 
Resource egalitarians further argue that the financial circum-
stances of one’s birth are arbitrary and should not limit one’s abil-
ity to develop skills and talents. To that end, resource egalitari-
anism supports ex ante redistribution in order to level the playing 
field.56 
Two key aspects of resource egalitarianism are a belief in 
“neutrality” and the so-called choice-chance principle.57 “Neutral-
ity,” according to Alstott, entails the view that “society should not 
endorse any particular way of life or underwrite any particular 
 
 53 See, for example, J.A. Mirrlees, An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income 
Taxation, 38 Rev Econ Stud 175, 206–07 (1971). See also Bankman and Griffith, 75 Cal L 
Rev at 1946–47 (cited in note 47) (discussing Professor Mirrlees’s model and its consider-
ation by other tax scholars). 
 54 See, for example, Anne L. Alstott, Equal Opportunity and Inheritance Taxation, 
121 Harv L Rev 469, 474–75 (2007) (noting the dominance of utilitarianism in tax analysis, 
advocating resource egalitarianism as an alternative, and analyzing inheritance taxes 
through a resource egalitarian lens); Lawrence Zelenak, Taxing Endowment, 55 Duke L J 
1145, 1172 (2006) (identifying Professors Ronald Dworkin, Daniel Markovits, Liam  
Murphy, and Thomas Nagel as standard-bearers of the egalitarian position); Miranda 
Perry Fleischer, Equality of Opportunity and the Charitable Tax Subsidies, 91 BU L Rev 
601, 627 (2011) (identifying and describing “resource egalitarians” and offering a resource 
egalitarian analysis of the charitable tax subsidies). 
 55 Alstott, 121 Harv L Rev at 471 (cited in note 54). 
 56 See id at 476–77; Fleischer, 91 BU L Rev at 627 (cited in note 54). 
 57 Alstott, 121 Harv L Rev at 477 (cited in note 54). 
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tastes or vision of the good, because each person is a moral agent 
whose life plan is worthy of equal respect.”58 The choice-chance 
principle, according to Alstott, “holds that distributions of soci-
ety’s resources among individuals ought to reflect individual 
choices . . . but not ‘pure’ bad luck.”59 Because of the choice-chance 
principle, resource egalitarianism is often referred to as “luck 
egalitarianism.”60 As Professor Samuel Scheffler explains: 
This theory has different variants, but the central idea is 
common to all of these variants. The core idea is that inequal-
ities in the advantages that people enjoy are acceptable if 
they derive from the choices that people have voluntarily 
made, but that inequalities deriving from unchosen features 
of people’s circumstances are unjust.61 
In theory, this principle could be implemented by dividing in-
itial resources equally among individuals, so that the later distri-
butions reflect individual choice and not the chance circum-
stances of birth.62 Professors Ackerman and Alstott’s stakeholder 
proposal reflects this ideal by attempting to limit the role that 
chance plays in the financial resources available to one upon en-
tering adulthood.63 The choice-chance distinction also can be im-
plemented by redistributing ex post to those in unfortunate cir-
cumstances due to luck (but not to those in unfortunate 
circumstances due to choice). Perhaps A was born into a finan-
cially disadvantaged family in a poor neighborhood that lacks de-
cent schools, and B’s business goes bankrupt due to unforeseen 
political circumstances beyond his control and for which there is 
no insurance market, while C grows up amidst grand wealth but 
 
 58 Id. 
 59 Id. 
 60 See, for example, Elizabeth S. Anderson, What Is the Point of Equality?, 109 Ethics 
287, 289 (1999) (coining the term and criticizing the emphasis on luck); Richard J. 
Arneson, Luck Egalitarianism Interpreted and Defended, 32 Phil Topics 1, 1, 13–15 (2004) 
(defending the theory); Samuel Scheffler, What Is Egalitarianism?, 31 Phil & Pub Affairs 
5, 5, 31 (2003) (critiquing luck egalitarians for not rooting luck egalitarianism in a “more 
general conception of equality as a moral value”). 
 61 Scheffler, 31 Phil & Pub Affairs at 5 (cited in note 60). 
 62 This assumes perfect insurance markets, which would enable individuals to insure 
against future bad luck. Imagine that a series of storms causes crop failure. Whether to 
insure against that possibility is a choice. If D does not insure and goes bankrupt but E 
does and survives the bad season, insurance has transformed the result to one of choice 
from one of weather-dependent luck. For more on the role of insurance, see Ronald 
Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue: The Theory of Practice and Equality 76–77 (Harvard 2000). 
 63 Ackerman and Alstott, The Stakeholder Society at 25–26 (cited in note 32). 
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squanders his inheritance. The choice-chance principle suggests 
that A and B—but not C—merit redistribution. Here, resource 
egalitarianism and utilitarianism potentially diverge: inequali-
ties that arise from different individual choices do not justify 
transfers from the rich to the poor according to the resource egal-
itarian view, even if those transfers would increase overall utility. 
Not surprisingly, one criticism of luck egalitarianism is that 
distinguishing between choice and chance is a fraught exercise.64 
If a smoker contracts lung cancer, is that a function of choice or 
chance?65 What about an individual who contracts skin cancer af-
ter failing to wear long sleeves or apply sunscreen in young adult-
hood? Critics of luck egalitarianism argue that implementation of 
the choice-chance principle ultimately requires “moralizing judg-
ments” of individual choices and prioritizes some people’s judg-
ments over others. The result, critics contend, is a profoundly 
anti-egalitarian regime that ranks individuals as more or less de-
serving of state assistance based on the subjective beliefs about 
deservedness held by the majority or by those in power.66 
The philosopher Professor Elizabeth Anderson has argued for 
a version of egalitarianism that, in her view, avoids some of the 
pitfalls of the choice-chance principle. 67  She posits that the 
“proper . . . aim of egalitarian justice is not to eliminate the im-
pact of brute luck from human affairs” or “to ensure that everyone 
gets what they morally deserve,” but instead to “end oppression” 
and “to create a community in which people stand in relations of 
equality to others.”68 On this view, each individual—regardless of 
her choices—should have “effective access to enough resources to 
avoid being oppressed by others and to function as an equal in 
civil society.”69 This includes access to adequate nutrition, shelter, 
clothing, medical care, and education, along with a range of other 
civil, economic, and political rights.70 
 
 64 See, for example, Anderson, 109 Ethics at 310–11 (cited in note 60). 
 65 See id at 310 (discussing the smoker example). 
 66 Id. 
 67 Id at 289. The contributions of Ackerman and Alstott, Scheffler, and Anderson are 
but a portion of the rich “equality of what” debate in the philosophical literature. Although 
we address the aspects of that debate most crucial to UBI programs, a full exploration of 
it is beyond the scope of this Article. For a more expansive treatment, see Fleischer, 91 
BU L Rev at 623–35 (cited in note 54) and sources cited therein. 
 68 Anderson, 109 Ethics at 288–89 (cited in note 60). 
 69 Id at 320. 
 70 See id at 317–20. 
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We will have more to say about the implications of Anderson’s 
view in Parts II.B and II.C. The key point for present purposes is 
that egalitarians of all stripes accept (and indeed, embrace) a pro-
gram of robust redistribution from rich to poor, either ex ante or 
ex post. The more difficult questions for egalitarians will be what 
form such redistribution should take (cash vs. in-kind) and 
whether it should be conditional upon age, work, disability, or 
other individual characteristics. 
3. Libertarianism. 
Perhaps surprisingly, some of the most outspoken proponents 
of a UBI—such as Charles Murray and Milton Friedman—have 
grounded their support in libertarian theory.71 We say that this is 
somewhat surprising—or rather, may seem somewhat surprising 
to many readers—because libertarianism is often thought to be 
particularly hostile to the first premise underlying the pro-UBI 
argument: that society should redistribute resources from the 
rich to the poor.72 Elsewhere, we have argued at length73 that 
many (but not all) strands of libertarianism can accommodate a 
system of progressive resource transfers and may even require 
some amount of redistribution.74 We briefly recapitulate those ar-
guments here. 
By libertarianism, we refer to a set of ethical and political 
theories sharing a belief that individuals have a right to be free 
from coercion, that free markets with well-defined property rights 
are preferable to government command-and-control arrange-
ments, and that the results of market interactions presumptively 
should remain undisturbed.75 Underlying all of these principles, 
 
 71 See Fleischer and Hemel, 2017 Wis L Rev at 1191–92 & nn 2–7 (cited in note 17). 
 72 This misconception likely stems from Robert Nozick’s assertion that only “a mini-
mal state . . . is justified” and that “[t]axation . . . is on a par with forced labor.” Robert 
Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia ix, 169 (Basic Books 1974). 
 73 See generally Fleischer and Hemel, 2017 Wis L Rev 1189 (cited in note 17). 
 74 To be clear, we are not arguing that all strands of libertarianism support redistri-
bution. We emphasize that libertarianism is a spectrum of views, some of which support 
redistribution and some of which do not. See id at 1204–05. 
 75 For overviews of libertarian thought, see Harry Brighouse, Justice 86–94 (Polity 
2004); Kymlicka, Contemporary Political Philosophy at 102–65 (cited in note 46); Eric 
Mack and Gerald F. Gaus, Classical Liberalism and Libertarianism: The Liberty Tradi-
tion, in Gerald F. Gaus and Chandran Kukathas, eds, Handbook of Political Theory 115, 
124–29 (Sage 2004); Peter Vallentyne and Bas van der Vossen, Libertarianism (Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, July 1, 2014), archived at https://perma.cc/YA2T-86M6. See 
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according to philosopher Professor Eric Mack, is a belief in “the 
separate value of each person’s life and well-being.”76 This princi-
ple potentially poses a challenge for libertarians who believe that 
property holders have a right to protect their holdings by force (or 
who believe that the state should provide such protection): How 
can a property holder—or the state—justify the application of 
force against an individual who, at no fault of his own, finds him-
self in such dire circumstances that he must steal or trespass to 
find life-saving food or shelter? Requiring such an individual to 
sacrifice his or her life to honor the property holder’s rights would 
be to deny the former’s value as a separate person. Mack therefore 
concludes that libertarianism mandates some system for ensur-
ing that no member of society finds himself or herself in a position 
that requires such self-sacrifice. The provision of a minimal in-
come to all members of society serves that purpose.77 
Mack’s argument offers one (self-described) libertarian ap-
proach to justifying redistribution, but not the only one. A second 
argument, advanced by philosopher Professor Matt Zwolinski and 
further developed by the two of us,78 takes as its starting point the 
“Lockean proviso” at the heart of much of libertarian thought. The 
Lockean proviso states that individuals can justly acquire prop-
erty rights by mixing their labor with unowned natural resources 
so long as “enough, and as good” is left for others.79 The problem 
for libertarians in a world of scarce natural resources is that pri-
vate appropriation might not satisfy this condition. When, for ex-
ample, X claims desirable beachfront property for herself, Y loses 
access to that same land, and while Y and Z might snap up the 
adjoining lots, that still leaves A, B, and C out of luck. 
How, then, can libertarians who accept the Lockean proviso 
as an ethical constraint ever justify the appropriation of natural 
resources? One response is to say that a rising tide lifts all boats—
for example, A, B, and C may be rendered better off by X, Y, and 
Z’s appropriation of beachfront property because X, Y, and Z will 
 
also generally John Tomasi and Matt Zwolinski, A Brief History of Libertarianism (forth-
coming) (manuscript on file with author). 
 76 Eric Mack, Non-Absolute Rights and Libertarian Taxation, 23 Soc Phil & Pol 109, 
119 (2006). 
 77 See id at 140. 
 78 See Matt Zwolinski, Property Rights, Coercion, and the Welfare State: The Liber-
tarian Case for a Basic Income for All, 19 Indep Rev 515, 523 (2015); Fleischer and Hemel, 
2017 Wis L Rev at 1211–17 (cited in note 17). 
 79 John Locke, Second Treatise of Government 21 (Hackett 1980) (C.B. Macpherson, 
ed) (originally published 1689). 
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build hotels and resorts that then provide A, B, and C with addi-
tional opportunities for employment and leisure. But if A can’t 
find work and can’t afford a room or a meal or a spa treatment at 
any of the new beachfront properties, then A would seem to have 
a strong argument that “enough and as good” have not been left 
for him. 
And here is the role for redistribution. By imposing some 
(perhaps small) tax on X, Y, and Z while redistributing the reve-
nues to A, B, and C, we can potentially ensure that A, B, and C 
are compensated for their loss of access to the ocean. Whether 
that tax ought to fall on property, income, or some other base—
and how much the tax and the corresponding transfer should be—
are questions that lie beyond the scope of this brief discussion. 
And, of course, embedded within this entire argument are a num-
ber of contestable empirical premises (for example, that A, B, and 
C really are better off with the transfer than with unimpeded ac-
cess to the beach). The point here is simply to illustrate that in a 
world of scarce resources, some redistribution may be required to 
satisfy the Lockean proviso, after which X, Y, and Z can (accord-
ing to the libertarian view) justly dispose of their property as they 
wish. 
A number of other arguments for redistribution emerge from 
the branch of libertarianism known as classical liberalism. One 
such argument, fleshed out by Professors Gerald Gaus and Loren 
Lomasky, is based on consent: In a just society that treats all in-
dividuals as free and equal, any coercion (such as in the form of a 
state) must be justified.80 A just state is therefore one that each 
member concludes is better than none. Gaus thus argues that “[i]f 
the system of property rights is to be publicly justified, it must be 
the case that everyone has reason to accept it and no one has rea-
son to reject it.”81 He concludes: “Since some people inevitably are 
left out of the general abundance of modern economies, it seems 
that the [Lockean] Proviso would require that they be provided 
with sufficient property so that they too are, manifestly, not dis-
advantaged by a system of private property rights.”82 
 
 80 See Fleischer and Hemel, 2017 Wis L Rev at 1228–31 (cited in note 17). 
 81 Gerald F. Gaus, Social Philosophy 170 (M.E. Sharpe 1999). 
 82 Id. Lomasky, who conceptualizes individuals as simultaneously project pursuers 
and social creatures, offers a similar argument. He argues that individuals who lack basic 
necessities therefore lack the prerequisites for project pursuit and have no “rational stake 
in the moral community established by [a] system of [private property] rights.” Loren E. 
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A second argument arises from classical liberalism’s  
acceptance of a role for the state as a producer of public goods.83 
Redistribution is plausibly a public good for at least two reasons. 
One is that redistribution may reduce crime and thus serve a sim-
ilar function to state-provided police services.84 Another is that 
poverty—in the words of economist Mark Pauly—“offends the es-
thetic and moral sensibilities” of individuals who encounter it,85 
and thus redistribution to alleviate poverty might be justified on 
the same basis that classical liberals justify expenditures on 
street cleaning and public parks. 
As discussed below, these various rationales for redistribu-
tion will have divergent implications as to the amount of redistri-
bution that might be required or desired. We defer discussion of 
that issue to Part III.A. Before that, we turn toward the second 
premise underlying the case for a UBI: that redistribution ought 
to take the form of unrestricted cash transfers. 
B. The Case for Cash Transfers 
Assuming that redistribution to the poor is justified, why 
should that redistribution occur through unrestricted cash trans-
fers? Why not instead transfer benefits in kind, or through vouch-
ers for specific goods and services? As above, we consider these 
questions from welfarist, egalitarian, and libertarian perspec-
tives, explaining how each approach might justify the cash- 
transfer aspect of a UBI. 
1. Welfarism. 
While the welfarist case for redistribution is relatively 
straightforward, the welfarist claim that redistribution should 
take the form of unrestricted cash transfers is more tentative. The 
 
Lomasky, Persons, Rights, and the Moral Community 127 (Oxford 1987). Lomasky con-
cludes that a basic safety net is justified to give them such a stake: 
If a person is otherwise unable to secure that which is necessary for his ability 
to live as a project pursuer, then he has a rightful claim to provision by others 
who have a surplus beyond what they require to live as project pursuers. In that 
strictly limited but crucial respect, basic rights extend beyond liberty rights to 
welfare rights. 
Id at 126. For a critique of this argument, see generally Tibor R. Machan, Against  
Lomaskyan Welfare Rights, 14 Reason Papers 70 (1989). 
 83 See Fleischer and Hemel, 2017 Wis L Rev at 1224–28 (cited in note 17). 
 84 See Mark V. Pauly, Income Redistribution as a Local Public Good, 2 J Pub Econ 
35, 37–38 (1973). 
 85 Id at 37. 
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challenge for welfarist proponents of a UBI is to prove that unre-
stricted cash transfers increase utility by more than a well- 
designed and equally expensive program of redistribution in-
kind. Intuition and empirical evidence can bring us some of the 
way toward validating this proposition, but not all of the way. 
Start with the intuition. Most of us would prefer to receive 
one dollar in cash rather than either one dollar’s worth of goods 
in kind or a one-dollar voucher to purchase particular goods and 
services. Imagine that you have the choice between a dollar in 
cash, a one-dollar candy bar, and a one-dollar voucher allowing 
you to purchase certain kinds of food in a grocery store (for exam-
ple, fruits and vegetables but not soda). With a dollar in cash, you 
can choose whichever of the candy bar, fruits and vegetables, and 
soda that you desire the most. Just as importantly, you can also 
walk across the street and spend the dollar at a record store if you 
prefer.86 For this reason, most of us prefer to receive our salaries 
in monetary form rather than as bundles of goods and services 
selected by our employers (except perhaps when tax incentives 
encourage us to choose the bundle of goods and services over the 
cash).87 
Indeed, imagining a world in which individuals are paid in 
fruit-and-vegetable vouchers rather than cash serves to illustrate 
the inefficiency of restricted transfers. The individual who prefers 
soda over fruits and vegetables might use her vouchers to buy ba-
nanas, sell her bananas on the secondary market for cash, and 
spend that cash on soda. While ultimately the individual can buy 
the soda she desires, this series of exchanges generates unneces-
sary transaction costs that deplete the value of the transfer. An-
ecdotal evidence suggests that some SNAP recipients already en-
gage in these sorts of transactions to translate their benefits into 
cash that they then use to purchase goods and services that SNAP 
 
 86 Assuming record stores still exist. See Number of Independent Record and CD 
Stores in the United States from 2003 to 2013 (Statista, Apr 8, 2016), online at 
https://www.statista.com/statistics/192691/independent-cd-and-record-stores-in-the-us/ 
(visited Jan 25, 2020) (Perma archive unavailable) (noting that the number of independent 
record and CD stores in the United States declined by more than 50 percent from 2003  
to 2013). 
 87 Many in-kind fringe benefits are not taxed. Thus, for example, an employee facing 
a 35 percent tax rate might prefer $100 of untaxed employer-provided meals over $100 in 
wages because the wages will be reduced to $65 after taxes. The employee would likely be 
willing to forgo $100 of food in exchange for $100 of cash (which she could, if she wanted 
to, use to buy $100 of food), but she may prefer $100 of employer-provided meals over $65 
of cash. 
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does not cover.88 From a welfarist perspective, these transaction 
costs are pure waste that society should strive to avoid. 
Yet intuition and anecdote get the welfarist only so far. The 
welfarist presumably cares not only about short-run utility but 
about long-run utility: Perhaps today we would prefer the dollar 
in cash so that we can buy a soda, but years from now we might 
for health reasons prefer that our choice had been restricted to 
fruits and vegetables. And while some recipients of restricted or 
in-kind transfers might engage in secondary market transactions 
to convert their benefits into cash, others will stick with what 
they are given. Moreover, the welfarist cares not only about the 
welfare of the redistribution recipient but also the welfare of oth-
ers. For example, the recipient might choose to spend a dollar on 
soda, but the welfarist cares as well about the negative external-
ities from the obesity epidemic. Externality concerns apply with 
even greater force when the transfer goes to an adult who cares 
for children.89 
At this point, the welfarist argument turns from intuition to 
empirical evidence. And existing evidence from cash-transfer pro-
grams suggests that such transfers increase measurable out-
comes associated with welfare in the long term. Studies in domes-
tic contexts suggest that cash transfers are associated with 
improvements in infant health, increased test scores, additional 
years of schooling, and a lower rate of arrests among young 
adults.90 More evidence is available from studies in the developing 
 
 88 See, for example, Kevin D. Williamson, The White Ghetto (National Review, Dec 
16, 2013), archived at https://perma.cc/S5P3-EEAH (describing trading soda purchased 
with SNAP benefits for cash and other items). 
 89 We believe, however, that the common concern that parents who are negligent 
(perhaps due to drug addiction or mental illness, for example) will waste their children’s 
UBI by spending it on themselves instead of their children is overblown. First, empirical 
studies of cash-transfer programs consistently find that these transfers do not result in 
more spending on alcohol and other drugs (and may indeed have the opposite effect). See 
David K. Evans and Anna Popova, Cash Transfers and Temptation Goods, 65 Econ Dev & 
Cultural Change 189, 204–07 (2017). Second, current aid programs often exclude parents 
suffering from addiction and mental illness because of employment requirements, compli-
cated application procedures, drug tests, and bans on participation by drug felons. For the 
children of these parents, “something” from a UBI will be better than the “nothing” they 
may get under the current system. Third, a UBI would not replace the existing legal sys-
tem that addresses abuse and neglect (even if imperfectly). See Fleischer and Hemel, 2017 
Wis L Rev at 1247–48 (cited in note 17). 
 90 See Hilary Hoynes, Doug Miller, and David Simon, Income, the Earned Income 
Tax Credit, and Infant Health, 7 Am Econ J: Econ Pol 172, 195–96 (2015) (finding that the 
EITC increases mean birth weight and reduces the incidence of low birth weight); Gordon 
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world, which show that cash transfers lead to reductions in child 
hunger and increased consumption of vitamin- and protein-rich 
foods such as fruits, vegetables, and meat.91 Importantly, these 
studies also suggest that recipients do not increase spending on 
goods associated with lower welfare, such as alcohol, cigarettes, 
or gambling.92 Instead, beneficiaries in the developing world gen-
erally either make capital investments (such as acquiring live-
stock or replacing a thatched roof with an iron roof) or increase 
spending on education, food, and medical care.93 
These studies strongly suggest that unrestricted cash trans-
fers can be welfare enhancing. They do not, however, establish 
that such transfers enhance welfare more than equally expensive 
programs of restricted transfers enhance welfare. Frustratingly, 
most UBI pilot experiments also do not include a separate treat-
ment group receiving in-kind or restricted transfers.94 For this 
reason, the welfarist case for unrestricted cash transfers remains 
uncertain. These studies and experiments should help assuage 
skeptics who wonder whether recipients will waste cash transfers 
on frivolous expenditures, but they do not establish the superior-
ity of cash transfers over other forms of redistribution. 
2. Resource egalitarianism. 
For resource egalitarians such as Alstott, the argument that 
redistribution should take the form of unrestricted cash transfers 
is much more straightforward. The neutrality principle suggests 
that society should not compel individuals to purchase particular 
 
B. Dahl and Lance Lochner, The Impact of Family Income on Child Achievement: Evidence 
from the Earned Income Tax Credit: Reply, 107 Am Econ Rev 629, 630 (2017) (looking at 
EITC recipients and finding that increased incomes lead to statistically significant in-
creases in reading and math test scores); Randall K.Q. Akee, et al, Parents’ Incomes and 
Children’s Outcomes: A Quasi-Experiment Using Transfer Payments from Casino Profits, 
2 Am Econ J: Applied Econ 86, 101–08 (2010) (finding that teens raised in households that 
received UBI-like cash transfers of approximately $4,000 per year were 22 percent less 
likely to have been arrested at ages sixteen to seventeen than teens in a comparison group 
whose families did not receive transfers). 
 91 See, for example, Johannes Haushofer and Jeremy Shapiro, Policy Brief: Impacts of 
Unconditional Cash Transfers *17–18 (Oct 24, 2013), archived at https://perma.cc/RT8X 
-2WSQ. See also Esther Schuering, Social Cash Transfers in Zambia: A Work in Progress, 
in Degol Hailu and Fábio Veras Soares, eds, Cash Transfers: Lessons from Africa and 
Latin America, 15 Poverty in Focus 20, 20 (2008). 
 92 See Evans and Popova, 65 Econ Dev & Cultural Change at 190 (cited in note 89). 
 93 See, for example, Haushofer and Shapiro, Policy Brief at 16–17 (cited in note 91); 
Schuering, 15 Poverty in Focus at 20 (cited in note 91). 
 94 See, for example, Harnett, A California City Is Planning on Giving Money to Some 
Residents (cited in note 2); Basic Income Project Proposal at *3 (cited in note 5). 
2020] The Architecture of a Basic Income 653 
 
baskets of goods or services; if individuals choose to spend their 
basic income at, say, liquor stores, gambling establishments, or 
strip clubs, then who are we to say that their version of the good 
life is wrong? And since individuals who enjoy the benefit of in-
herited wealth already have the opportunity to choose their own 
consumption basket, equality-of-opportunity principles suggest 
that others ought to have the same option. Otherwise, some indi-
viduals enjoy greater consumption choices than others solely due 
to the luck of being born into wealthier families. To be sure, re-
source egalitarians might be concerned about negative externali-
ties arising from consumption decisions, but those negative exter-
nalities can be addressed through regulations or regulatory taxes 
that affect all individuals alike—heirs and heiresses as well as 
redistribution recipients. 
The case for cash rather than in-kind transfers is not uni-
formly accepted by self-described egalitarians, however. Consider 
Anderson’s critique: 
The preference for income rather than in-kind transfers . . . 
gives no special priority to freedom from disease over the 
freedom to idle: freedom is freedom. As an account of what 
we owe to one another, that seems misguided. . . . We owe 
each other the rights, institutions, social norms, public goods, 
and private resources that people need to avoid oppression 
(social exclusion, violence, exploitation, and so forth) and to 
exercise the capabilities necessary for functioning as equal 
citizens in a democratic state. From a social point of view, 
then, we should grant higher priority to securing certain 
goods, such as education, over others, such as surfing opportu-
nities, even if some individuals prefer surfing to schooling.95 
The schooling-versus-surfing distinction is, to our ears, a rhe-
torically powerful one: surely education is more essential for func-
tioning as an equal citizen than wave riding is. Yet egalitarian 
proponents of cash transfers can make two compelling counterar-
guments to Anderson’s critique. First, many of the decisions in-
volved in crafting an in-kind transfer scheme entail much more 
contestable value judgments than the prioritization of schooling 
over surfing. For example, should subsidies be available for tui-
tion at an unaccredited vocational training school? If we rule out 
surfing, what about gym membership? If we allow a specific 
 
 95 Elizabeth Anderson, A Basic Income for All: Optional Freedoms (Boston Rev, Oct 
1, 2000), archived at https://perma.cc/2YZJ-KX4X (citation omitted). 
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amount as a housing allowance, then what about an adult who 
would prefer to crash on a friend’s couch for a couple of months 
while saving up so she can start a small business or afford college? 
More generally, many of the personal financial decisions that low-
income individuals must make do not have obvious right or wrong 
answers. The government might say, for example, that tuition 
subsidies should be available only for attendance at an accredited 
institution, that gym membership should remain an unsubsidized 
recreational activity rather than a subsidized component of per-
sonal health, and that individuals should not skimp on decent 
housing in order to save up for other purposes. It is not so clear, 
though, that these judgments are any “better” (in the sense of fa-
cilitating one’s functioning as an equal citizen) than the decisions 
that individuals would make if left to their own devices. 
A second resource-egalitarian response to the Anderson cri-
tique of cash transfers is that empowering individuals to make 
their own personal financial decisions is itself part of what it 
means to respect them as equal citizens. Let’s say that the indi-
vidual who chooses to attend the unaccredited beauty school 
would have been better off financially if he had spent the money 
on community college courses; even so, giving the individual the 
ability to make the decision between beauty school and commu-
nity college allows him to more meaningfully determine his own 
destiny. Equal citizenship, on this view, entails not only the op-
portunity to participate in collective governance but also the op-
portunity to engage in self-governance. Cash transfers facilitate 
self-governance to an extent that restricted or in-kind transfers 
cannot. 
3. Libertarianism. 
The case for cash rather than restricted or in-kind transfers 
is most straightforward for libertarians. First, libertarians who 
are skeptical of state capacity will, we think, be especially doubt-
ful that the government can “choose better” than individuals can. 
Second, and similarly to resource egalitarians, we expect that lib-
ertarians will prefer cash-transfer programs that show respect for 
individual autonomy over in-kind or restricted transfer schemes 
that seek to dictate an individual’s consumption basket.96 They 
will react negatively to the paternalism inherent in in-kind 
 
 96 See Fleischer and Hemel, 2017 Wis L Rev at 1234 (cited in note 17). 
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transfer programs that dictate how much individuals can allocate 
to nutrition versus shelter versus other priorities. 
This is not to say that the libertarian case for cash rather 
than in-kind transfers is open and shut. One counterargument—
and a counterargument that may appeal to some libertarians—is 
that in-kind benefits serve as a screening mechanism that distin-
guishes the truly needy from others. For example, if offered a UBI 
of $500 per month, individuals of all ability levels might gladly 
accept. If offered soup kitchen meals and a bed in a homeless shel-
ter that cost $500 per month to provide, an able-bodied adult who 
is fully capable of finding a job might decline. The lower quality 
of goods and services provided in kind—combined with the stigma 
associated with acceptance of such benefits—may reduce take-up 
among those not in dire straits and, as a result, reduce the cost of 
the transfer program or leave more resources available for the 
very neediest.97 
We address this screening argument at greater length else-
where.98  Here, we briefly recapitulate two potential rebuttals. 
First, the claim that in-kind benefits screen out “non-needy” indi-
viduals is highly uncertain. Insofar as the provision of aid in kind 
rather than in cash makes some individuals more likely to take 
up benefits than others, there is no guarantee that those who are 
screened out are the ones we might want to screen out. Soup 
kitchen meals might screen out the gourmands who have no par-
ticular need for state aid, or they might screen out the individuals 
whose caregiving obligations make them unable to take their 
meals at a particular time and location. Homeless shelter beds 
might screen out the surfers whose low incomes are a function of 
a strong preference for leisure, or they might screen out the as-
sault victims who assign particular value to privacy as a result of 
past trauma.99 Second, even for libertarians, minimizing the cost 
of transfer programs is not the only goal. Whatever screening 
 
 97 See Timothy Besley and Stephen Coate, Public Provision of Private Goods and the 
Redistribution of Income, 81 Am Econ Rev 979, 983–84 (1991) (discussing the quality ar-
gument without addressing effects from stigma); Hoynes and Rothstein, 11 Ann Rev Econ 
at 948–49 (cited in note 42) (finding that stigma associated with eligibility-restricted pro-
grams “reduces program take-up and the potential reach and benefits of the programs” 
but “may also help target the programs, maximizing impact by reaching those who stand 
to benefit the most”). 
 98 See Fleischer and Hemel, 2017 Wis L Rev at 1236–37 (cited in note 17). 
 99 For a summary of studies suggesting that in-kind benefit programs may screen 
out needier individuals and families in many circumstances, see Janet Currie, The Take-
Up of Social Benefits, in Alan J. Auerbach, David Card, and John M. Quigley, eds, Public 
Policy and the Income Distribution 80, 112–15 (Russell Sage 2006). 
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benefits come from in-kind transfers must be weighed against the 
loss of individual autonomy that comes with them. The as-yet-
unproven screening benefits from in-kind transfers would have to 
be quite powerful to overcome the libertarian case for redistribu-
tion in cash. 
C. The Case for Unconditional Transfers 
The third and final component of the case for a UBI is the 
claim that redistributive cash transfers should be uncondi-
tional—not limited to individuals of a particular age (for example, 
the young and the elderly), or to individuals with a demonstrable 
disability, or to individuals who participate in the workforce. This 
is probably the most controversial component of the case for a UBI 
and the point on which welfarism and resource egalitarianism are 
most equivocal in their support. (Libertarians may find the claim 
less problematic.) Again, we consider each theory in turn, high-
lighting the ways in which lack of conditionality can be justified 
and evaluating potential counterarguments. 
1. Welfarism. 
Conditionality generates winners and losers. The winners 
are individuals who meet the conditions for aid (for example, by 
participating in the workforce or demonstrating disability). The 
losers are, of course, those who do not. The game is arguably zero-
sum insofar as there is a fixed pie of resources available for redis-
tribution: more recipients means less for each one. For welfarists, 
the trade-off between the scope of benefits (that is, reaching more 
people by removing conditions) and the size of benefits (that is, 
increasing the transfer per beneficiary) is one of the greatest chal-
lenges in the design of a cash-transfer regime. 
Conditionality would be more attractive if we knew who was 
capable of work and who was faultlessly in need. What we do 
know, by contrast, is that understandings of disability and de-
servedness are ever evolving. Before the 1960s, for example, few 
in the United States understood alcoholism to be a disease.100 By 
the 1990s, alcoholism and drug abuse were considered to be disa-
bilities that potentially qualified an individual for benefits under 
the Social Security Disability Insurance (DI) and Supplemental 
 
 100 See Anjali Talcherkar, Timeline: History of Addiction Treatment (Recovery.org, 
Dec 7, 2018), archived at https://perma.cc/XH8Q-Y88Y. 
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Security Income (SSI) programs—though Congress reversed 
course in 1996 and barred the Social Security Administration 
(SSA) from considering alcoholism and drug addiction as factors 
qualifying individuals for benefits.101 Prior to the 1980s, individu-
als suffering from mental illnesses such as major depressive dis-
order struggled to qualify for DI and SSI benefits;102 today, more 
than a third of DI beneficiaries and more than six in ten nonel-
derly SSI beneficiaries fall into the “mental disorders” diagnostic 
category.103 Individuals unable to work on account of substance 
abuse disorders or depression might have been branded as “at 
fault” for their circumstances in an earlier era. Awareness of our 
own epistemic limitations should make us think twice before set-
ting conditions that exclude individuals from aid today; it may be 
our own lack of knowledge—or lack of sympathy—that causes us 
to conclude that they are to blame for their circumstances. 
Aside from the problem of defining disability in the abstract, 
any conditional cash-transfer program that denies benefits to 
able-bodied nonworkers encounters the additional challenge of 
applying the definition of disability in individual cases. Internal 
and external audits of SSA disability determinations find high er-
ror rates, with studies suggesting that anywhere from 20 percent 
to 60 percent of disability benefit rejections are “false nega-
tives.”104 Whatever the precise figure, welfarists must weigh the 
inevitability of error in a conditional transfer program against the 
putative upside of limiting aid to those who are “truly” in need. 
The same welfarist logic that justifies redistribution in the 
first place would suggest that these error costs are asymmetric: 
providing nothing to disabled individuals who are erroneously 
classified as “work capable” is worse than providing somewhat 
 
 101 Contract with America Advancement Act of 1996, Pub L No 104-121, § 105, 110 
Stat 847, 852–53. The ban remains in force to this day. See 42 USC §§ 422(e), 423(d)(2)(C). 
 102 See Jennifer L. Erkulwater, Disability Rights and the American Social Safety Net 
102–05, 129–31 (Cornell 2006). 
 103 Social Security Administration, Annual Statistical Report on the Social Security 
Disability Insurance Program, 2016 *25 tbl 6 (Oct 2017), archived at https://perma.cc/ 
278E-SGQ3; Social Security Administration, SSI Annual Statistical Report, 2016 *76 
tbl 38 (Nov 2017), archived at https://perma.cc/Z9ZY-33ZZ; Social Security Administra-
tion, SSI Annual Statistical Report, 2017 *76 tbl 38 (Sept 2018), archived at 
https://perma.cc/SPN9-883L. 
 104 See Hugo Benitez-Silva, Moshe Buchinsky, and John Rust, How Large Are the 
Classification Errors in the Social Security Disability Award Process? *5–6, 48 (National 
Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No 10219, Jan 2004), archived at 
https://perma.cc/2ASR-XU3E (summarizing past research and reestimating false negative 
rate based on new methodology). 
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less to disabled individuals who are correctly classified as such. 
This, again, is a function of the diminishing marginal utility of 
income: the first dollar matters more than the thousandth and 
the millionth. The welfarist who is worried about false negatives 
in disability determinations might well conclude that ensuring a 
subsistence-level income for all individuals is more important 
than trying to channel somewhat more in benefits to a subset of 
disabled individuals by excluding others from aid. 
The trade-off between scope and size is not the only factor 
that a welfarist might consider when wrestling with the condi-
tionality question. Proponents of making cash transfers condi-
tional upon workforce participation or a demonstration of disabil-
ity also worry about the effect of a UBI on labor supply. A UBI—
so the argument goes—may lead to widespread exit from the 
workforce and thus to a reduction in total resources and overall 
welfare.105 
There are two ways in which a UBI may affect labor supply: 
an “income effect” and a “substitution effect.” The term “income 
effect” refers to the effect on labor supply of making someone 
richer or poorer. If an individual becomes richer and therefore can 
meet more of her material needs or desires, then she may allocate 
more time to leisure; conversely, if she becomes poorer, then she 
may allocate more time to labor. The term “substitution effect” 
refers to the effect on labor supply of changing the terms of the 
labor-leisure trade-off. Labor becomes more attractive relative to 
leisure when after-tax wage rates rise (and, conversely, less at-
tractive when after-tax wage rates fall). 
A UBI financed through income or consumption taxes will in-
crease the income of individuals at the low end of the income lad-
der (who will receive more in benefits than they pay in additional 
taxes) and will reduce the income of individuals at the high end 
(who will pay more in additional taxes than they get back). We 
would expect the income effect on labor supply to be negative for 
low-income individuals (who now have more income) and positive 
for high-income individuals (who now have less). The substitution 
effect on labor supply of higher tax rates is negative across the 
board. 
 
 105 For a tentative argument along these lines, see Robert A. Moffitt, The Negative 
Income Tax and the Evolution of U.S. Welfare Policy, 17 J Econ Perspectives 119, 124–31 
(2003) (noting that the effects of a UBI on labor supply may be different for different 
groups, leaving the net effect uncertain). 
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Past experiences with cash-transfer programs shed some 
light on the magnitude of these effects. One well-examined pro-
gram involved members of the Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians 
in western North Carolina who began to receive annual disburse-
ments of casino profits starting in 1996.106  The disbursements 
amounted to approximately $4,000 per year for each adult tribal 
member. A study comparing households with children that did 
and did not receive the casino-profits payments found no econom-
ically or statistically significant effect on labor supply for mothers 
or fathers.107 Another program—the Alaska Permanent Fund Div-
idend—has used the state’s substantial oil revenues to pay ap-
proximately $2,000 per resident per year since 1982.108 A study 
comparing Alaska to other states with roughly similar de-
mographics and industry compositions again found that introduc-
tion of the dividend had no significant effect on overall employ-
ment, labor-force participation, or hours worked.109 Note, though, 
that in both cases the cash-transfer program would have affected 
labor supply only through the income effect—there was no substi-
tution effect, as tax rates (and after-tax wage rates) did not 
change. An inflow of casino profits or oil revenues is about as close 
as one can get to money dropping like manna from the heavens. 
The Eastern Cherokee and Alaska natural experiments thus sug-
gest that the income effects on labor supply of a cash-transfer pro-
gram in the range of $2,000 to $4,000 per person are small or non-
existent, though they tell us nothing about the substitution effect. 
Studying the substitution effect of a UBI is somewhat more 
complicated. Much is likely to depend on the rate of the tax (or 
tax plus phaseout) used to fund a UBI—the higher the rate, the 
larger the labor-supply effect. Much will also hinge on whether 
the UBI supplements or replaces existing cash-transfer pro-
grams. Some of those programs entail very high implicit tax rates. 
For example, a nonblind individual who earns more than $1,220 
per month in 2019 will lose DI benefits, which can mean a loss of 
 
 106 See Akee, et al, 2 Am Econ J: Applied Econ at 91 (cited in note 90) (describing the 
casino dividend program). 
 107 See id at 108–09 & tbl 9. 
 108 See Damon Jones and Ioana Marinescu, The Labor Market Impacts of Universal 
and Permanent Cash Transfers: Evidence from the Alaska Permanent Fund *2 (National 
Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No 24312, Feb 2018), archived at https:// 
perma.cc/CYK4-7MSY. 
 109 See id at *30 tbl 2. 
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up to $771 per month for a single individual.110 The marginal tax 
rate on the 1,221st dollar is thus as high as 77,100 percent. Re-
placing DI with a UBI and a less cliff-like marginal tax rate sched-
ule may increase labor supply among former DI beneficiaries. 
Finally, it is not obvious whether the labor-supply effects of a 
UBI—even if negative—should be considered a bug of a basic in-
come or a feature. The aim of a “sufficient social income,” wrote 
the late Austrian-French philosopher André Gorz, “is not to force 
the recipients to accept any kind of work on any terms whatso-
ever, but to free them from the constraints of the labor market.”111 
A UBI, Gorz emphasizes, potentially will allow individuals to opt 
out of low-paying and otherwise unrewarding market labor and 
instead to devote their time to their families, their communities, 
or to other ennobling pursuits. While Gorz does not frame his ar-
gument in welfarist terms, the welfarist could make a similar 
point: The objective of welfarism is to maximize well-being, not to 
maximize output. Some amount of labor-market leakage may be 
tolerable and even desirable if it allows individuals to live more 
fulfilling lives. 
Work requirements for able-bodied adults are not the only 
sorts of conditions that might be attached to a cash-transfer pro-
gram. Conditional cash transfer (CCT) programs in low- and  
middle-income countries often require that beneficiaries—as a 
string attached to aid—ensure that children attend school, re-
ceive medical and nutrition examinations, maintain vaccinations, 
or satisfy other education and health requirements. While several 
of these studies have yielded encouraging results,112 relatively few 
studies have compared CCTs to unconditional cash transfers. 
Thus, it is difficult to know which aspect of the CCT program—
the conditionality or the cash—is driving positive outcomes. In 
the few studies that compare conditional and unconditional cash-
transfer arrangements, results are ambiguous. For example, one 
study targeting families with adolescent girls in Malawi com-
pared cash transfers conditional upon school attendance with 
 
 110 See Social Security Administration, SSI Federal Payment Amounts for 2019, ar-
chived at https://perma.cc/8BSM-A2WW; Social Security Administration, Substantial 
Gainful Activity, archived at https://perma.cc/9SK7-EEHB. 
 111 André Gorz, Beyond the Wage-Based Society, in Karl Widerquist, et al, eds, Basic 
Income: An Anthology of Contemporary Research 297, 298 (Wiley & Sons 2013). 
 112 For a literature review, see Mylene Lagarde, Andy Haines, and Natasha Palmer, 
Conditional Cash Transfers for Improving Uptake of Health Interventions in Low- and 
Middle-Income Countries: A Systematic Review, 298 JAMA 1900, 1904–08 (2007). 
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unconditional cash transfers. Girls whose families received any 
cash transfer (conditional or unconditional) were less likely to 
drop out of school than girls whose families received no transfer, 
and the effect was strongest in the conditional-cash-transfer arm 
of the study, but only girls whose families received an uncondi-
tional cash transfer saw a reduction in teenage pregnancy.113 
Comparisons of conditional and unconditional cash-transfer pro-
grams in other low-income countries have arrived at similarly 
mixed results.114 Not only are the lessons from low-income coun-
tries uncertain, but those lessons also are difficult to generalize 
to higher-income countries such as the United States where base-
line rates of school attendance are higher and teenage pregnancy 
rates are lower.115 
Unfortunately, ongoing and proposed UBI experiments will 
do little to adjudicate the debate between unconditional and con-
ditional cash transfers. For example, the Stockton program—
$500 a month to several dozen families with no strings at-
tached116—will not tell us whether total welfare would be higher 
if instead those several dozen families received $500 with at-
tached strings (for example, a work requirement or a requirement 
that children remain in school or receive health and nutritional 
examinations). Y Combinator’s proposal similarly includes no 
comparison group subject to a cash-transfer arrangement condi-
tional upon work or other criteria.117 The “Family Rewards” ex-
periment in New York and Memphis, billed as “the first test of a 
 
 113 See Sarah Baird, Craig McIntosh, and Berk Özler, Cash or Condition? Evidence 
from a Cash Transfer Experiment, 126 Q J Econ 1709, 1732–36 (2011). 
 114 See, for example, Laura Robertson, et al, Effects of Unconditional and Conditional 
Cash Transfers on Child Health and Development in Zimbabwe: A Cluster-Randomised 
Trial, 381 Lancet 1283, 1290–91 (2013) (finding that conditional cash transfers had larger 
average effect on school attendance but unconditional cash transfers had larger average 
effect on vaccination rates). 
 115 As of about a decade ago, the pregnancy rate in Malawi was 154 per 1,000 females 
ages fifteen to nineteen and just 57 per 1,000 females in this age range in the United 
States. See Gilda Sedgh, et al, Adolescent Pregnancy, Birth, and Abortion Rates Across 
Countries: Levels and Recent Trends, 56 J Adolescent Health 223, 226 tbl 1 (2015) (using 
2009 data for Malawi and 2010 data for the United States). The female secondary school 
enrollment rate is 98 percent for the United States and 37 percent for Malawi. See 
UNESCO Institute for Statistics, School Enrollment, Secondary, Female (% Gross) (World 
Bank), archived at https://perma.cc/7UY9-LGC7 (using 2016 data for the United States 
and 2017 data for Malawi). 
 116 See Harnett, A California City Is Planning on Giving Money to Some Residents 
(cited in note 2). 
 117 See Basic Income Project Proposal at *13–15 (cited in note 5). 
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comprehensive CCT in the United States,”118 likewise included no 
unconditional cash-transfer comparator. 119  Welfarists might 
rightly wish for further data on the relative performance of con-
ditional and unconditional cash-transfer programs before em-
bracing one or the other wholeheartedly. In the meantime, 
though, there is no compelling evidence that cash transfers con-
ditional upon educational and health criteria consistently yield 
larger welfare improvements than equivalent unconditional cash 
transfers.120 In the absence of such evidence, the fact that condi-
tional cash transfers entail higher administrative costs supplies 
an argument—though a tentative one—for favoring uncondi-
tional programs on welfarist grounds. 
2. Resource egalitarianism. 
Resource egalitarianism generates a strong case for uncondi-
tional rather than conditional cash transfers, though counterar-
guments rooted in egalitarian principles remain. Recall that re-
source egalitarians generally believe that society should strive to 
eliminate inequalities due to chance and then should adopt an 
attitude of neutrality toward individuals’ free choices. Work re-
quirements and other behavior-dependent conditions on the re-
ceipt of cash transfers run up against this neutrality principle. If 
A and B are both initially entitled to a cash transfer so as to equal-
ize the initial distribution of society’s resources, but then A 
chooses to work while B chooses not to, why should B thereby lose 
her entitlement to the transfer? According to Alstott, “voluntary 
unemployment in a well-functioning market is not a matter for 
concern” for resource egalitarians so long as “[e]very individual is 
free to decide whether to work for the wage she commands, or to 
 
 118 Cynthia Miller, et al, Testing a Conditional Cash Transfer Program in the U.S.: 
The Effects of the Family Rewards Program in New York City, 4 IZA J Labor Pol *22 (2015). 
 119 See id at *5–7; Cynthia Miller, et al, Effects of a Modified Conditional Cash Trans-
fer Program in Two American Cities: Findings from Family Rewards 2.0 *6–11 (MDRC, 
Sept 2016), archived at https://perma.cc/8WRV-FJYX. 
 120 Indeed, the Family Rewards program, which offered a range of educational, 
health, and work incentives to families with children, found that CCTs raised household 
income and reduced poverty but had more ambiguous effects on children’s education, 
health care utilization, and parents’ work and training. See Miller, et al, Findings from 
Family Rewards 2.0 at *ES-8 (cited in note 119). These findings arguably suggest that it 
is the cash transfer—rather than the conditionality—that matters most. 
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use her time elsewhere if the wage seems too low.”121 And if the 
individual chooses to use her time elsewhere, why should society 
strive to penalize her for that decision? 
One possible answer comes from resource egalitarians who 
believe that disabilities should be taken into account. As Anderson 
writes, “disabled people typically require more resources to 
achieve equivalent freedoms—to move around, to get access to in-
formation, and so forth—than those who are not disabled.”122 
Most luck egalitarians similarly account for disabilities on the 
theory that such individuals require more resources in order to 
have the same life choices open to them as others.123 And holding 
total cost constant, a disabled individual would receive a larger 
benefit under a cash-transfer regime that is conditional upon a 
demonstration of disability than under an unconditional cash-
transfer program. This reasoning might suggest that cash trans-
fers should be available only to those who can demonstrate disa-
bility or who for other reasons require more resources. But as for 
the latter, Anderson notes that “[p]eople who engage in unpaid 
dependent care work also require more resources to achieve 
equivalent freedoms.”124 Thus, even the egalitarian argument for 
conditionality would not seem to justify a requirement that recip-
ients be engaged in formal-economy labor. 
There are at least two responses that a resource egalitarian 
committed to unconditional cash transfers might make to those 
who would account for disabilities—one a counterargument, the 
other a concession. The counterargument is that denying benefits 
to work-capable dependent-less adults is defensible only if society 
is itself capable of identifying disability. The fact that federal law 
 
 121 Anne L. Alstott, Work vs. Freedom: A Liberal Challenge to Employment Subsidies, 
108 Yale L J 967, 1006 (1999). 
 122 Anderson, A Basic Income for All (cited in note 95). 
 123 See, for example, Bruce A. Ackerman, Social Justice in the Liberal State 115–20, 
129–33 (Yale 1980) (concluding that equality requires giving relatively more resources to 
disabled individuals); Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue at 77–81 (cited in note 62) (same); Eric 
Rakowski, Equal Justice 120–21, 142 (Oxford 1991) (same); Richard J. Arneson, Equality 
and Equal Opportunity for Welfare, 56 Phil Stud 77, 78 (1989) (describing Dworkin’s ar-
gument that disabilities should be accounted for in considering equality of resources); G.A. 
Cohen, On the Currency of Egalitarian Justice, 99 Ethics 906, 917–21 (1989) (describing 
the egalitarian view of justice for those born with disabilities and offering a criticism of 
it); Amartya Sen, Equality of What?, in The Tanner Lectures on Human Values 195, 218–
19 (May 22, 1979) (arguing for equality of “basic capabilities”), archived at https:// 
perma.cc/WMF2-A6BA. 
 124 Anderson, A Basic Income for All (cited in note 95). 
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still requires the SSA to deny that addiction is a disability should 
call into question our faith in our country’s capacity to implement 
a system of accurate and compassionate disability determina-
tions.125 This skepticism is deepened by the fact that various fed-
eral agencies and courts cannot arrive at a consensus as to which 
medical professionals are qualified to diagnose disability.126 The 
concession is that the case for a UBI need not imply the elimina-
tion of additional benefits for disabled individuals and/or individ-
uals who care for dependents. As we discuss in Part III.F, the 
combined cost of DI and SSI programs is sufficiently low in com-
parison to the total potential cost of a national UBI that main-
taining or eliminating those programs will not dramatically affect 
a UBI’s financial feasibility.127 
3. Libertarianism. 
The case for unconditional rather than conditional cash 
transfers is perhaps easiest to make on libertarian grounds. First, 
cash transfers show respect for individual autonomy, whereas in-
kind or restricted transfers that seek to dictate consumption de-
cisions limit individuals’ ability to control important aspects of 
their own lives.128 In-kind and restricted cash transfers exemplify 
the sort of paternalistic government-imposed value judgments 
that libertarians abhor, just as resource egalitarians generally es-
chew such judgments under the neutrality principle. Second, 
while most libertarian arguments would in theory render trans-
fers conditional upon a demonstration of work or inability to 
work,129 the difficulties in implementing such a condition run up 
against the deep-seated libertarian skepticism regarding the 
state’s ability to carry out social programs. Do we want armies of 
government bureaucrats deciding who is and isn’t “deserving” of 
a cash payment? For some of us, this scenario is unexceptional 
(and more or less describes the current DI and SSI programs). For 
committed libertarians, though, this intrusiveness is anathema. 
 
 125 See 42 USC §§ 422(e), 423(d)(2)(C). 
 126 On the disagreement among the SSA, the IRS, and the courts, see Letter from Karen 
L. Hawkins, Chair, Section of Taxation, American Bar Association, to David Kautter, Acting 
Commissioner, Internal Revenue Service, Comments on Information Collection Under 
Revenue Procedure 99-21 *13–17 (Feb 1, 2018), archived at https://perma.cc/3FLP-U3JV. 
 127 See notes 262–264 and accompanying text (discussing the cost of the DI and SSI 
programs). 
 128 See Fleischer and Hemel, 2017 Wis L Rev at 1234 (cited in note 17). 
 129 See id at 1209–10, 1239–40. 
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Likewise, the inevitability of error in these determinations means 
that a conditional safety net would not be tight enough to abso-
lutize and legitimize property rights. In order to ensure that a 
UBI is therefore serving the purpose that libertarian theories en-
vision, it will probably have to be unconditional.130 
As a general matter, we expect that libertarians will be ame-
nable to the claim that if transfers are to occur at all, they should 
be unconditional and unrestricted—and more skeptical of the 
claim that any redistribution (regardless of form) is consistent 
with libertarian principles. In this respect, the libertarian case 
for a UBI is the opposite of the welfarist case for a UBI: whereas 
welfarists are generally comfortable with the notion of redistribu-
tion but less convinced that such redistribution should come in 
the form of unconditional and unrestricted transfers, libertarians 
are generally more skeptical of redistribution but easily con-
vinced that—if there is to be redistribution—it ought to be UBI-
like in character. 
III.  BUILDING BLOCKS FOR A UBI 
Having highlighted why one might pursue a UBI, we now 
turn to the heart of this Article: How should policymakers design 
such a program? More specifically, we identify and scrutinize the 
design decisions that determine a UBI’s ultimate shape: size, eli-
gibility, uniformity, assignability, payment mechanism, and 
funding mechanism. Our approach is informed both by the philo-
sophical literature on the foundations for a UBI and by research 
in economics and law on the design of tax-and-transfer policies. 
A. Size: $500 a Month as a Starting Point 
In discussions about the size of a UBI in the United States, 
two focal points have emerged: $500 per month (the figure sug-
gested by Facebook cofounder Chris Hughes131 and used in the 
Stockton experiment132) and $1,000 per month (the figure pro-
posed by a Chicago mayoral task force, 133  labor leader Andy 
 
 130 This argument may or may not apply to welfarism. A welfarist would compare the 
welfare gains and losses from being overinclusive (that is, providing a basic income to all) 
and from being underinclusive (leaving some individuals behind). 
 131 See Hughes, Fair Shot at 92 (cited in note 8). 
 132 See Harnett, A California City Is Planning on Giving Money to Some Residents 
(cited in note 2). 
 133 See Spielman, Plan to Pay 1,000 Residents $1,000 a Month (cited in note 3). 
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Stern,134  entrepreneur and former 2020 presidential candidate 
Andrew Yang, 135  and basic-income activist Scott Santens, 136 
among others). 137  The $500-a-month figure happens to corre-
spond, almost precisely, with the US Census Bureau’s threshold 
for “deep poverty” for a single individual.138 The Census Bureau 
estimates that more than 18 million Americans—including 
nearly 6 million children—currently live in “deep poverty”;139 a 
$500-a-month UBI would bring deep poverty (almost)140 to an end. 
The $1,000-a-month figure corresponds almost precisely with the 
Census Bureau’s overall poverty threshold for single individuals; 
more than 40 million Americans—nearly an eighth of the coun-
try’s population—lives below the poverty threshold today.141 
There is, to be sure, nothing magical about the deep poverty 
and poverty thresholds. The poverty level is set at three times the 
cost of a “minimum food diet,” updated to reflect inflation since 
 
 134 See Stern with Kravitz, Raising the Floor at 201 (cited in note 9). 
 135 See Andrew Yang, The War on Normal People: The Truth About America’s Disap-
pearing Jobs and Why Universal Basic Income Is Our Future 165–66 (Hachette 2018). 
 136 See Scott Santens, What If You Got $1,000 a Month, Just for Being Alive? I Decided 
to Find Out (Vox, Nov 14, 2016), archived at https://perma.cc/2L3G-K5D5. 
 137 Professors Van Parijs and Vanderborght propose a UBI set at 25 percent of a coun-
try’s per capita gross domestic product, which according to their calculations, translated 
to almost $1,200 per month in the United States using 2017 data. Van Parijs and  
Vanderborght, Basic Income at 11 (cited in note 10). 
 138 See Liana E. Fox and José Pacas, Deconstructing Poverty Rates Among the 65 and 
Older Population: Why Has Poverty Increased Since 2015? *15 (US Census Bureau, Social, 
Economic & Housing Statistics Division Working Paper No 2018-13, Apr 6, 2018), ar-
chived at https://perma.cc/6XW2-GCUC (defining “deep poverty” as below 50 percent of 
the federal poverty level). See also Kayla Fontenot, Jessica Semega, and Melissa Kollar, 
Income and Poverty in the United States: 2017—Current Population Reports *47 (US Cen-
sus Bureau, Sept 2018), archived at https://perma.cc/YJ84-AKVM (stating that the federal 
poverty level for a one-person unit is $12,752 per year for individuals under age sixty-five 
and $11,756 for individuals age sixty-five and over). 
 139  Fontenot, Semega, and Kollar, Income and Poverty in the United States at *17 
(cited in note 138). Ongoing work by University of Chicago economist Bruce Meyer and 
collaborators casts doubt on some of these Census Bureau poverty statistics. See generally 
Bruce D. Meyer, et al, The Use and Misuse of Income Data and Extreme Poverty in the 
United States (National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No 25907, May 
2019), archived at https://perma.cc/RA2K-NT5N. Very little of our argument depends upon 
the precise number of people living in Census-defined deep poverty. 
 140 Almost but not entirely. As we discuss in Part III.D, assignability and garnish-
ment would mean that some individuals eligible for a UBI do not in fact receive a periodic 
check. 
 141 See US Census Bureau, Number in Poverty and Poverty Rate: 1959 to 2016 (2017), 
archived at https://perma.cc/PC4T-K259. 
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1963,142 and the deep poverty level is simply half that. Those fig-
ures do not account for geographic differences in the cost of living 
or for person-to-person differences in health-care and dependent-
care expenses.143 A full-time college student with cash income of 
less than $12,000 per year might live quite comfortably and yet 
technically be below the poverty level. A single adult who pays 
out of pocket to maintain an ailing parent at a long-term care fa-
cility may fall well above the poverty level and yet still live a 
hand-to-mouth existence. 
Calculations of poverty status also account for only some in-
come sources. The definition of money income used to calculate 
poverty status includes Social Security’s Old-Age and Survivors 
Insurance (OASI), DI, and SSI benefits, workers’ compensation, 
and unemployment compensation, but excludes noncash benefits 
such as SNAP and housing subsidies as well as refundable tax 
credits such as the EITC and the child tax credit.144 Replacing 
noncash benefits and refundable tax credits with a cash UBI of 
the same value would make it appear as though millions of  
Americans had been lifted out of poverty without necessarily im-
proving their material well-being.145 Consider a single individual 
with no dependents and no cash income. The maximum Section 8 
voucher for a single person in New York City as of January 2018 
is $1,590,146 and the maximum monthly SNAP allotment for a 
one-person household in the lower forty-eight states for the Octo-
ber 2017–September 2018 year is $192.147  Replacing Section 8 
 
 142 See US Census Bureau, Measuring America: How the U.S. Census Bureau 
Measures Poverty (2017), archived at https://perma.cc/J9DA-MKTB. 
 143 The Census Bureau sets a slightly lower poverty threshold for individuals over age 
sixty-five. This apparently stems from a belief that older individuals have lower consump-
tion needs. For a critique of this view, see Mary Borrowman, Understanding Elderly Pov-
erty in the U.S.: Alternative Measures of Elderly Deprivation *12 (Schwartz Center for 
Economic Policy Analysis and Department of Economics, The New School for Social Re-
search Working Paper No 2012-3, Apr 2012), archived at https://perma.cc/NL6S-EEKY. 
 144 See US Census Bureau, How the Census Bureau Measures Poverty (Aug 16, 2018), 
archived at https://perma.cc/RB7W-GNKJ. 
 145 Since a UBI is a cash benefit, we assume that it would be included in the Census 
Bureau’s “Census money income” definition. See US Census Bureau, Income: About (Feb 
29, 2016), archived at https://perma.cc/JT8M-MKBB. 
 146 New York City Housing Authority, Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher Program: 
Voucher Payment Standards (VPS) (Jan 1, 2018), archived at https://perma.cc/3V49-2CKE. 
 147 Memorandum from Lizbeth Silbermann, Director of Program Development Divi-
sion, Food and Nutrition Service, US Department of Agriculture to All Regional Directors, 
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program, SNAP — Fiscal Year 2018 Cost-of-Living 
Adjustments *3 (July 28, 2017), archived at https://perma.cc/F4NN-AU8X. 
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and SNAP with a $500 per month UBI might make it look like 
this individual is no longer in deep poverty, because his countable 
income rises from $0 to $500. But if he loses Section 8 and SNAP 
benefits along the way, then this person might be substantially 
worse off than before. 
While we therefore think it is important not to accord talis-
manic significance to poverty thresholds, we believe that a basic 
income of $500 per person per month—approximately the thresh-
old for deep poverty for a single individual—is a sensible starting 
point for discussions of a UBI.148 We should note that since our 
proposed UBI would include children, our $500-per-person-per-
month suggestion would yield the same household benefit for a 
single parent with one child, or for a two-parent family with two 
children, as proposals by Murray, Yang, Stern, and others,149 who 
would set a UBI at approximately $1,000 per person per month 
but limit eligibility to adults. Our proposal, however, better pro-
tects single-parent families with children against the possibility 
that a UBI would leave them worse off compared to the current 
system. We discuss the inclusion of children at further length in 
Part III.B. 
Why $500? First, a UBI of $500 per person per month would 
make a measurable difference in the lives of millions of  
Americans. Indeed, studies in the United States have shown that 
unconditional cash transfers of even less than that amount can 
yield significant effects. A study of the Eastern Cherokee cash-
transfer arrangement noted above found that an annual transfer 
of $4,000 per adult ($333 per month) was associated with an extra 
year of educational attainment by age twenty-one for children in 
families receiving the transfer as well as a reduction in crime 
rates.150 A study of the Alaska Permanent Fund Dividend—again, 
 
 148 The amount should presumably adjust with changes in price levels and other eco-
nomic conditions, though we set aside for present purposes the question of what index to 
use. See generally Daniel Hemel, Indexing, Unchained, 83 L & Contemp Probs (forthcom-
ing 2020) (arguing that all of the available inflation indices—including unchained and 
chained versions of the Consumer Price Index—provide normatively unattractive bench-
marks for year-to-year adjustments in tax-and-transfer policy parameters). 
 149 See Murray, In Our Hands at 7 (cited in note 7); Stern with Kravitz, Raising the 
Floor at 201 (cited in note 9); Yang, The War on Normal People at 165–66 (cited in note 135). 
 150 See Akee, et al, 2 Am Econ J: Applied Econ at 90, 101–08 (cited in note 90). 
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approximately $2,000 per year—substantially reduced the likeli-
hood that mothers would give birth to low-birth-weight babies.151 
Second, a basic income of $500 per person per month—$6,000 
per year—would be financially feasible given the current size of 
the US economy. In a country with approximately 314 million cit-
izens and lawful permanent residents and a gross domestic prod-
uct of approximately $20.49 trillion,152 a basic income of $500 per 
person per month translates to a cost of roughly 9 percent of GDP, 
or about 7 percent after the various expenditure offsets discussed 
in Part III.F are taken into account.153 To put that in perspective, 
US general government spending as a percentage of GDP is now 
around 38 percent—or about 11 percentage points below the level 
in Norway and 12 percentage points below the level in Sweden.154 
We could thus afford a basic income of $500 per person per month 
while keeping our government spending-to-GDP ratio below  
Nordic levels. By contrast, a basic income of $1,000 per person per 
month would vault us almost to the top of the government  
spending-to-GDP ratio rankings, barely behind Finland (57 per-
cent) and France (57 percent), and ahead of Denmark (55 per-
cent).155 In the medium term, a basic income of $1,000 per person 
per month would be difficult to sustain unless the United States 
were willing to become one of the most heavily taxed nations, if 
not the most heavily taxed nation, in the world. 
 
 151 See Wankyo Chung, Hyungserk Ha, and Beomsoo Kim, Money Transfer and Birth 
Weight: Evidence from the Alaska Permanent Fund Dividend, 54 Econ Inq 576, 581–83 
(2016) (finding an 8–14 percent reduction in the incidence of low birth weight—defined as 
less than or equal to 2.5 kg—infants as a result of the dividend). 
 152 See US Census Bureau, QuickFacts: United States, archived at https:// 
perma.cc/3BQX-H8ZF (approximately 327 million US residents); D’Vera Cohn, 5 Key 
Facts About U.S. Lawful Immigrants (Pew Research Center, Aug 3, 2017), archived at 
https://perma.cc/NSX8-X8NB (approximately 13 million unauthorized immigrants and 
temporary lawful residents); GDP (Current US$) (World Bank), archived at 
https://perma.cc/TFL3-JN2D. 
 153 More than 2 million Americans are incarcerated, see Wendy Sawyer and Peter 
Wagner, Mass Incarceration: The Whole Pie 2019 (Prison Policy Initiative, Mar 19, 2019), 
archived at https://perma.cc/P3P3-XEEQ, and might (or might not) be excluded from a 
UBI on that basis. Whether to extend a UBI to people in prison is a challenging normative 
question that we do not tackle here. We thank André Washington for raising this point. 
 154 See General Government Spending: Total, % of GDP, 2015 (OECD), archived at 
https://perma.cc/EV7D-T96L. 
 155 See id. Note that our decision to include children under age eighteen has only a 
moderate impact on these magnitudes, as persons under eighteen years of age constitute 
less than a quarter of the US population. See QuickFacts (cited in note 152) (22.4 percent 
of population under eighteen). 
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Third, setting a basic income at $500 per person per month 
(or thereabouts) should allay the concerns of those who worry that 
a UBI will lead to a mass exodus from the workforce. It strains 
credulity to think that a substantial number of working-age 
American adults will leave their jobs to live on an income roughly 
equivalent to a $3-an-hour full-time wage.156 While this observa-
tion might seem to be in tension with the first, it is not. According 
to a Federal Reserve survey, four in ten US adults do not have the 
cash to cover a $400 emergency expense without borrowing from 
friends or family or running up a credit card balance.157 For them, 
$500 per month would not mean a life of leisure, but it could make 
the difference between, say, repairing a broken-down car and los-
ing a job due to lack of transportation. 
But while a basic income of $500 per month should not stoke 
the fears of those who think that a UBI might lead to mass indo-
lence, it also will not live up to the hopes of those who see a UBI 
as providing a safety net in an automation age.158 Average weekly 
earnings for US manufacturing workers as of February 2018 were 
about $900;159 a basic income of $500 per month will only slightly 
soften the blow if that manufacturing worker is replaced by a ro-
bot. Again, we hazard no prediction as to whether wide-scale tech-
nologically induced unemployment is on the horizon.160 We do be-
lieve, though, that the size of a basic income is a question best 
approached with a clear-eyed view of a UBI’s possibilities and its 
limits. 
Ultimately, the sizing of a UBI entails a number of difficult 
trade-offs and value judgments. These include the trade-off be-
tween expanding unconditional cash assistance and maintaining 
existing welfare state programs; the trade-off between more re-
distribution of wealth and greater deadweight loss from explicit 
 
 156 That is, $500 per month approximately four weeks per month and forty hours per 
week equals $3.125. 
 157 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Report on the Economic Well-
Being of U.S. Households in 2017 *21 (May 2018), archived at https://perma.cc/YTA8-2W6N. 
 158 See, for example, Scott Santens, It’s Time for Technology to Serve All Humankind 
with Unconditional Basic Income (Medium, Apr 13, 2018), archived at https://perma.cc/ 
2UFM-MASQ:  
If technological unemployment is the Gordian Knot of the 21st century, UBI is the 
sword that slices through it. By simply severing the connection between income 
and work through the unconditional provision of an income for life that’s always 
sufficient for basic needs, the fear of technological unemployment is eliminated. 
 159 US Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, The Employment Situation—
February 2018 *tbl B-8 (Mar 9, 2018), archived at https://perma.cc/8TUK-ML8W. 
 160 See text accompanying notes 37–44. 
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or implicit income-based taxes; the trade-off between the inter-
ests of the present and those of future generations that will bear 
the burden of deficit spending; and value judgments about how 
much redistribution is ethically justified. We suggest $500 per 
person per month as a starting point but not as an end to the dis-
cussion of amount. The size of any UBI inevitably will depend 
upon both the fiscal capacity and political will of the relevant ju-
risdiction; as fiscal capacity and political support (hopefully) 
grow, the UBI may increase in tandem. Size could be—and likely 
would be—adjusted on an ongoing basis, whereas other building 
blocks of a UBI may prove more difficult to refashion year to year. 
Accordingly, we shift our attention to those other elements while 
acknowledging that size will remain a significant decision point 
and source of disagreement. 
B. Eligibility: All Citizens and Lawful Permanent Residents 
Should Qualify 
Aside from size, a key aspect of any UBI is a specification of 
eligibility criteria. Just how “universal” should a universal basic 
income be? Proposals differ in their eligibility criteria in at least 
four respects: (i) whether they require workforce participation of 
some form; (ii) whether they apply to the elderly; (iii) whether 
they apply to children; and (iv) whether they apply to noncitizens. 
As explained below, we believe that (i) no work requirements 
should be imposed; (ii) seniors should be eligible; (iii) children 
should be eligible; and (iv) a UBI should extend to lawful perma-
nent residents in addition to US citizens. 
Start with workforce participation. President Richard 
Nixon’s Family Assistance Plan (FAP) would have required all 
able-bodied adults to pass a “work test” in order to receive cash 
aid. A woman whose youngest child was under the age of six could 
have satisfied that test by caring for the child. Most other adults 
would have been required—as a condition for receiving the FAP—
to register with a state employment agency and to accept training 
or employment opportunities that the agency deemed suitable.161 
The FAP also would have been limited to adults with children un-
der eighteen (or under twenty-one if the child was in school); 
 
 161 See Robert J. Lampman, Nixon’s Family Assistance Plan *20 (University of  
Wisconsin-Madison Institute for Research on Poverty Discussion Paper No 57-69, Nov 
1969), archived at https://perma.cc/7ZA6-3Z8S. 
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childless adults and adults with grown children would have been 
excluded entirely.162 
Most other UBI proposals define eligibility to include all 
working-age adults, 163  but some do not. Chris Hughes’s pro-
posal—which he acknowledges is not a truly “universal” UBI—
tracks the FAP in significant respects: adults (of any gender) 
would be eligible if they cared for a child under age six, but others 
would have to work, attend school, or enroll in vocational train-
ing.164 Dylan Matthews, a writer for the online publication Vox 
and a prominent voice in UBI debates, has suggested linking a 
UBI to participation in national service: individuals who serve in 
the military or participate in AmeriCorps- or Peace Corps–like 
programs for one to two years would become eligible for a lifetime 
UBI.165 An advantage of a basic income program along the lines 
suggested by Hughes and Matthews is that it might tap into 
widely shared views regarding deservingness: a basic income 
would not simply amount to getting paid for doing nothing. The 
disadvantages of work-linked transfer programs are detailed 
above—including the economic distortions stemming from subsi-
dies, the administrative costs associated with disability determi-
nations and work verification, and the autonomy objections 
rooted in resource egalitarian and libertarian thought. 
Regardless of how a UBI treats working-age adults (and we 
think that any program that calls itself “universal” must include 
generous eligibility criteria), designers also must consider how to 
treat the old and the young. The existence of Social Security’s 
OASI program complicates the treatment of the elderly. In light 
of OASI, we can anticipate at least two potential arguments for 
excluding senior citizens—one principled and one pragmatic. The 
principled argument is that a UBI would largely be duplicative of 
the basic income that OASI already provides: allowing seniors to 
continue receiving OASI while phasing out other welfare pro-
grams unfairly advantages seniors over other current 
 
 162 See id at *19–20. 
 163 See, for example, Murray, In Our Hands at 7 (cited in note 7); Stern with Kravitz, 
Raising the Floor at 201 (cited in note 9); Yang, The War on Normal People at 166 (cited 
in note 135). 
 164 See Hughes, Fair Shot at 111–14 (cited in note 8). 
 165 See French Elections, National Service, and Queens at War 30:45–32:40 (Vox: The 
Weeds, Apr 26, 2017), available at https://www.stitcher.com/podcast/voxs-the-weeds/e/ 
french-elections-national-service-and-queens-at-war-49967422 (visited Jan 25, 2020) 
(Perma archive unavailable).  
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beneficiaries of transfer programs. The pragmatic argument is 
that excluding the 52.7 million Americans who receive OASI ben-
efits from a UBI would reduce the cost of a new basic income pro-
gram significantly.166 Notably, senior citizens are excluded from 
the existing cash-transfer program most similar to a UBI—the 
federal EITC—unless they have a qualifying child in their house-
hold,167 presumably because policymakers view the EITC to be du-
plicative of OASI. 
We find the arguments for automatically excluding all senior 
citizens from a UBI to be unpersuasive. Social Security has not 
brought the problem of elder poverty to an end. The sixty-five-
and-older demographic has the lowest poverty rate of any age 
group, but still, 9.3 percent of senior citizens fell below the pov-
erty line in 2016.168 And while the average monthly Social Secu-
rity benefit for retired workers and their dependents as of Decem-
ber 2017—$1,404—would put an individual above the poverty 
line,169  some beneficiaries receive substantially less than that, 
and approximately 4 percent of senior citizens will never receive 
Social Security benefits.170 Excluding senior citizens whose OASI 
benefits are less than the UBI amount would seem arbitrary and 
would be difficult to justify. 
One potential solution—suggested by Murray—is to give sen-
ior citizens an either-or choice between OASI benefits and a 
UBI.171 While that approach would surely cut costs, it also could 
leave some seniors substantially worse off than under the status 
quo. The most recent data indicates that approximately 
 
 166 For the number of Americans receiving OASI benefits, see Social Security Admin-
istration, Social Security Beneficiary Statistics: Number of Beneficiaries Receiving Benefits 
on December 31, 1970–2018, archived at https://perma.cc/PM8Z-ZVDM. 
 167 See IRC § 32(c)(1)(A)(i), (ii)(II). 
 168 See US Census Bureau, Current Population Survey, 2016 and 2017 Annual Social 
and Economic Supplements: Table 3: People in Poverty by Selected Characteristics: 2015 
and 2016, archived at https://perma.cc/UU29-Z346. The figure was 18.0 percent for chil-
dren under the age of eighteen and 11.6 percent for adults ages eighteen to sixty-four. Id. 
 169 See Social Security Administration, Fast Facts & Figures About Social Security, 
2018 *16 (Sept 2018), archived at https://perma.cc/QNT9-R7X6. 
 170 This never-beneficiary population consists primarily of infrequent workers and 
late-arriving immigrants. See Kevin Whitman, Gayle L. Reznik, and Dave Shoffner, Who 
Never Receives Social Security Benefits?, 71 Soc Sec Bull 17, 20 (May 2011), archived at 
https://perma.cc/CR5Z-RF9S. 
 171 See Murray, In Our Hands at 109 (cited in note 7) (describing the “simplest solu-
tion” for transitioning to a UBI as offering a choice between the current system and a UBI). 
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4.8 million individuals over age sixty-five receive SNAP bene-
fits;172 about 2.4 million receive SSI benefits;173 and approximately 
500,000 live in Section 8–subsidized units.174 Eliminating these 
programs and replacing them with a UBI that many low-income 
senior citizens choose not to take because it is less than their 
OASI benefit could leave some seniors worse off than under the 
status quo.175 Moreover, requiring senior citizens to choose be-
tween OASI and a UBI would effectively impose a much higher 
marginal tax rate on OASI benefits than other income sources—
an outcome that will grate at seniors who see OASI benefits as 
something that they have “paid for” already.176 We suspect that 
many of those same individuals would view a choice between 
OASI benefits and a UBI as an unfair choice between something 
that they have earned and something that others receive  
automatically. 
Another option would be to include senior citizens within the 
UBI while also ending the tax-favored treatment of Social Secu-
rity benefits.177 Those two changes are nowhere near offsetting: 
extending a $500-a-month UBI to 52.7 million OASI recipients 
would cost about $316 billion a year, while ending the tax-favored 
treatment of Social Security benefits would save only around 
$38 billion a year.178 The combination of changes does, however, 
 
 172 See SNAP Helps Millions of Low-Income Seniors *1 (Center on Budget and Policy 
Priorities, Apr 26, 2017), archived at https://perma.cc/N9HZ-BYMR. 
 173 See Social Security Administration, SSI Annual Statistical Report, 2018 *21 tbl 3 
(Sept 2019), archived at https://perma.cc/8WH6-8L2S.  
 174 See Demographic Facts: Residents Living in Public Housing *1 (National Center 
for Health in Public Housing, 2016), archived at https://perma.cc/K8YX-AW6Z. 
 175 For example, the hypothetical household that the US Department of Agriculture 
uses to illustrate the SNAP special rules for the elderly and disabled—a two-person house-
hold receiving $500 per person in Social Security benefits and $200 of pension income, 
with $300 in excess medical expenses and $600 in shelter costs—would receive a SNAP 
benefit of $205 per month in fiscal year 2020. See US Department of Agriculture, Food 
and Nutrition Service, SNAP Special Rules for the Elderly or Disabled, archived at 
https://perma.cc/Z5PX-5WPL. A $500 per month UBI with an either-or choice between 
OASI benefits and the UBI would not affect the household’s cash income, so the loss of 
$205 in SNAP benefits would be effectively uncompensated. 
 176 See, for example, A. Gandara, Letter, Americans Who Paid into Social Security 
Deserve to Get Their Contributions Back (Las Vegas Rev-J, June 22, 2018), archived at 
https://perma.cc/JK8R-73K6 (“If you paid in, no matter your income, you should be able to 
collect.”). 
 177 See IRC § 86 (providing that 15–50 percent of social security benefits, depending 
on income, are excluded from taxable income). 
 178 See US Department of the Treasury, Office of Tax Analysis, Tax Expenditures *34 
tbl 3 (Oct 16, 2017), archived at https://perma.cc/24AG-TPH4 (fiscal year 2019 estimate). 
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neutralize the objection to treating OAS benefits differently from 
other income streams that might arise if senior citizens were put 
to an either-or choice. 
The treatment of children also has proven to be controversial 
among UBI proponents. To be sure, the notion that children 
should be beneficiaries of redistribution should be shared by al-
most all welfarists and resource egalitarians, and most libertar-
ian justifications for redistribution apply to children as well.179 
Reflecting these notions, children have historically been viewed 
as among the most deserving recipients of government aid, and 
most current social programs favor families with children. The 
minimal aid to childless adults provided by the EITC180—arguably 
the most UBI-like program in the United States—exemplifies this 
judgment. Moreover, as one of us has noted elsewhere, a UBI that 
excluded children and was funded through the elimination of ex-
isting cash and near-cash transfers would potentially make the 
problem of child poverty even graver than it already is.181 
What then, are the arguments against including children? 
Murray has argued against extending a UBI to children on the 
 
The Congressional Budget Office projects a slightly smaller yield ($34 billion in fiscal year 
2020). See Congressional Budget Office, Options for Reducing the Deficit: 2019 to 2028 
*242 (Dec 2018), archived at https://perma.cc/8UXW-K9JP. The discrepancy is sufficiently 
small that it will not substantially affect any of our big-picture estimates in Part III.F. 
 179 Some libertarian theorists, however, argue that children are not yet autonomous 
individuals whose consent is needed in a just society. For a fuller discussion of libertari-
anism and the treatment of children under a UBI, see Fleischer and Hemel, 2017 Wis L 
Rev at 1253–56 (cited in note 17). 
 180 See Elaine Maag, Who Benefits from Expanding the EITC or CTC? Understanding 
the Intersection of the EITC and CTC at the Household Level *4 (Urban Institute, July 30, 
2018), archived at https://perma.cc/3DS5-LLX2. 
 181 Consider how a single parent with two children fares under proposals for a basic 
income of $1,000 a month per adult as compared to the current system: 
[M]any families [living in poverty] receive more than $12,000 in federal benefits 
already. SNAP, which covers approximately 45 million Americans, provides a 
maximum benefit of $6,132 per year for a family of three and an average benefit 
of around $4,500. The maximum earned income tax credit (EITC) for a parent 
with two children is $5,572 per year, and the maximum child tax credit is $1,000 
per child per year. [Note: $2,000 per year following the December 2017 tax law] 
. . . For a single-parent family of three eligible for the average SNAP benefit, 
close to the maximum EITC, and [receiving] some combination of other federal 
“welfare” programs, . . . to eliminate these benefits and replace them with a 
$12,000-a-year UBI would actually lower the floor. 
Hemel, Book Review, Bringing the Basic Income Back to Earth (cited in note 43). In con-
trast, the same family would receive a total of $18,000 a year from a basic income of $500 
a month per person including children. 
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grounds that doing so would amount to a fertility incentive for 
low-income adults.182 The empirical literature on the responsive-
ness of childbearing decisions to fertility incentives yields mixed 
results,183 but even accepting the empirical premise that extend-
ing a UBI to children would encourage low-income parents to 
have more kids, it is not clear that we should consider that to be 
undesirable. For example, resource egalitarians might argue that 
adults with substantial material resources on account of inher-
itance or luck already have the luxury of choosing how many chil-
dren to have without worrying overly about resource constraints; 
why should the same not be extended to adults with less income 
or wealth?184 Welfarists, for their part, have been engaged in a ro-
bust decades-long debate about optimal population size—a debate 
that we relegate to the margins but that will shape the views of 
some as to whether fertility incentives embedded in a UBI are 
desirable or not.185 
 
 182 See Murray, In Our Hands at 44–47 (cited in note 7). 
 183 Compare, for example, Kevin Milligan, Subsidizing the Stork: New Evidence on 
Tax Incentives and Fertility, 87 Rev Econ & Stat 539, 541–43 (2005) (finding a strong effect 
on fertility when the Canadian province of Quebec introduced a policy that paid up to CAD 
$8,000 to families for having children), with Jeff Grogger and Stephen G. Bronars, The 
Effect of Welfare Payments on the Marriage and Fertility Behavior of Unwed Mothers: Re-
sults from a Twins Experiment, 109 J Pol Econ 529, 540–42 (2001) (finding smaller effects 
from fertility incentives embedded in US welfare policies). 
 184 Several caveats are in order. First, we assume that a UBI in the range of $500 to 
$1,000 per month that extends to children would offset some of the financial burden of 
having more kids, but it probably would not make childbirth profitable (in the sense of 
leaving the parent in a more comfortable financial position than if she did not have an 
additional child). Second, we are keenly aware of the fact that even high-income adults do 
not necessarily get to choose the number of children they have. A variety of factors too 
numerous to list exhaustively here—including but not limited to infertility, adoption re-
strictions, multiple births, and unplanned pregnancies among individuals who object to or 
lack access to abortion—can cause individuals to have fewer or more children than they 
would desire. 
 185 The “classical utilitarian” perspective posits that the social planner’s objective 
should be to maximize the sum of utilities across the population. That might suggest that 
we should encourage adults to have more children as long as the lives of those children 
would be sufficiently comfortable that their utility is positive. The “average utilitarian” 
perspective posits that the social planner should strive to maximize the average utility of 
members of the population. The implications of the average utilitarian perspective are 
ambiguous, though it too could militate in favor of a pro–population growth policy if each 
individual adds more to the available pool of resources than she consumes. See Douglas 
A. Wolf, et al, Fiscal Externalities of Becoming a Parent, 37 Population & Dev Rev 241, 
241–43, 249–51 (2011). A third perspective, “critical-level utilitarianism,” supports popu-
lation expansion up to the point that the utility of an additional member exceeds some 
threshold level α. Depending on a number of factors, critical-level utilitarianism may sup-
port policies that incentivize or disincentivize fertility. For an overview and analysis, see 
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Aside from fertility considerations, others have argued 
against extending a UBI to children on administrative grounds. 
For example, Stern writes: “[J]ust think of all the issues that 
come up when you try to get your mind around giving [a basic 
income] to a ten-year-old.”186  We find this argument puzzling. 
Just as the child tax credit is paid to the child’s parent rather 
than to the child, we anticipate that the UBI would go to the 
child’s guardian. Granted, in some cases, there will be questions 
about which adult should qualify as a particular child’s guardian, 
though such questions already arise in the child tax credit and 
EITC contexts.187 While in no sense have the child tax credit and 
the EITC fully resolved the question of whose child is whose, nei-
ther has the challenge of matching children to parents paralyzed 
either program. 
Because we find the arguments for including children to be 
much more persuasive than the arguments against, our view is 
that children should be included within a UBI. At that point, the 
tax system’s labyrinthine set of supports for families with chil-
dren (the child tax credit,188 the child and dependent care credit,189 
the exclusion for dependent care assistance programs,190 and the 
implicit subsidy for single parents embedded in the head-of-
household filing status191) all could be laid to rest. This is one more 
way in which a UBI could be used to achieve substantial simplifi-
cation of benefits.192 
 
generally Thomas I. Renström and Luca Spataro, The Optimum Growth Rate for Popula-
tion Under Critical-Level Utilitarianism, 24 J Population Econ 1181 (2011). 
 186 Stern with Kravitz, Raising the Floor at 204 (cited in note 9). 
 187 See, for example, Leslie Book, U.S. Refundable Credits: The Taxing Realities of 
Being Poor, 4 J Tax Admin 71, 86–87 (2018); Elaine Maag, H. Elizabeth Peters, and Sara 
Edelstein, Increasing Family Complexity and Volatility: The Difficulty in Determining 
Child Tax Benefits *6–8 (Tax Policy Center, Mar 3, 2016), archived at https:// 
perma.cc/XDM8-E3N3. 
 188 See IRC § 24. 
 189 See IRC § 21. 
 190 See IRC § 129. 
 191 See Jacob Goldin and Zachary Liscow, Beyond Head of Household: Rethinking the 
Taxation of Single Parents, 71 Tax L Rev 367, 373–74 (2018). 
 192 Replacing the various child-targeted tax provisions with a UBI also reduces, but 
does not entirely eliminate, the challenge of matching children with the most appropriate 
adult to receive the benefit on their behalf. The existing EITC generates incentives to shift 
qualifying children from one household to another so that the adult who would receive the 
largest credit from claiming the child does so. Since a UBI does not vary with earned in-
come in the same manner, a UBI reduces this incentive. And while intrafamily conflicts 
would still arise over which adult should be able to claim a child, an important advantage 
of rolling various existing cash and near-cash transfer programs together into a single UBI 
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A final—and perhaps the most controversial—eligibility 
question concerns the treatment of noncitizens. The welfarist ar-
gument for redistribution would seem to apply regardless of 
whether the transferee is a citizen: there is little reason to believe 
that the marginal utility of income is higher for US citizens than 
for lawful permanent residents (Green Card holders) or other im-
migrants at equivalent income levels. The resource egalitarian 
argument for equality of opportunity also brooks no obvious dis-
tinction on the basis of nationality. And many of the libertarian 
arguments for a UBI would seem to apply with similar force to 
noncitizens. Immigrants, too, are separate persons for purposes 
of Mack’s argument; the Lockean proviso is not nationality spe-
cific; and the public-good benefits of poverty alleviation (for exam-
ple, alleviation of the aesthetic and moral distress that poverty 
brings to the rest of society) would not seem to depend on whether 
the poor are citizens or not.193 
Even so, there are pragmatic (whether or not persuasive) ar-
guments for limiting a UBI’s scope. First, making the UBI avail-
able immediately to new arrivals—regardless of their legal sta-
tus—might encourage illegal immigration. Second, extending the 
UBI to immigrants might make it more politically difficult to lift 
restrictions on immigration, because now the fiscal cost of allow-
ing new immigrants to the country would be higher. Third, mak-
ing the UBI available to immigrants might have effects on who 
chooses to come here. Perhaps for these reasons, some cash assis-
tance programs (for example, SSI) and near-cash aid programs 
(for example, SNAP) already exclude most new adult arrivals.194 
 
is that families would not have to contend with different child attribution rules under 
different programs. So even while a UBI does not eliminate child attribution questions, it 
does serve to streamline those determinations. 
 193 Perhaps some individuals experience greater aesthetic or moral distress when 
they observe a fellow citizen in poverty than when they observe a non-US national in 
equivalent poverty. We do not share this intuition, though we think it illustrates one of 
the challenges for the classical liberal public-goods argument for a UBI: the justification 
for a UBI comes to depend upon potentially fickle public opinions rather than on a robust 
philosophical basis. See Fleischer and Hemel, 2017 Wis L Rev at 1226–28 (cited in note 17). 
 194 Lawful permanent residents who arrived in the United States after August 1996 
generally must work for ten years or must serve in the military before they become eligible 
for SNAP and SSI (though children under the age of eighteen are eligible for SNAP, as are 
various categories of refugees). See US Department of Agriculture, Food and Nutrition 
Service, SNAP Policy on Non-Citizen Eligibility (Sept 4, 2013), archived at 
https://perma.cc/N2K3-DXZW; Social Security Administration, Spotlight on SSI Benefits 
for Aliens—2019 Edition, archived at https://perma.cc/4PMQ-W3FK. 
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A reasonable compromise, we think, is to extend a UBI to 
lawful permanent residents but to exclude other noncitizens. 
Once the country has concluded that a person may remain here 
permanently, we see little reason to exclude that person from our 
community of concern. And because a lawful permanent resident 
must—by definition—come by that status lawfully, it seems un-
likely that the extension of a UBI to lawful permanent residents 
would encourage individuals to cross the border illegally or over-
stay a visa. The exclusion of undocumented immigrants—includ-
ing “Dreamers”—from a UBI may strike many readers as harsh, 
though we note that such individuals already cannot qualify for 
SNAP, Medicaid, DI, SSI, and many other cash and near-cash 
benefits.195 We think these concerns are best addressed through 
reforms to the immigration laws, though we acknowledge that 
this outcome is easier said than legislatively done.196 
C. Uniformity: Equal Benefits for All 
The claim that every citizen and lawful permanent resident 
should receive a UBI does not necessarily imply that all should 
receive the same amount. Here, we consider whether benefits 
should be uniform or whether they should vary on the basis of 
household size, assets, and geography. 
1. A UBI should be implemented on a per-person rather 
than a per-household basis. 
Some UBI proposals contemplate that each individual will re-
ceive the same amount; others envision an adjustment for house-
hold size (that is, a two-person household would receive less than 
 
 195 See Maria Santana, 5 Immigration Myths Debunked (CNNMoney, Nov 20, 2014), 
archived at https://perma.cc/UWR8-7L2K. Undocumented immigrant children are eligible 
to attend public schools; undocumented immigrants do receive emergency medical assis-
tance; and undocumented immigrants may receive a limited set of additional in-kind ben-
efits through, for example, the National School Lunch Program; Special Supplemental 
Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Children (WIC); and Head Start. See Tara 
Watson, Do Undocumented Immigrants Overuse Government Benefits? (EconoFact, Mar 
28, 2017), archived at https://perma.cc/SFA7-4VBX. 
 196 A separate question concerns the 9 million or so US citizens living abroad. See US 
Department of State, Bureau of Consular Affairs, Consular Affairs by the Numbers (Dec 
2018), archived at https://perma.cc/TFH7-3K2V. The decision to exclude those citizens 
abroad from a UBI might be justified on the grounds that many are eligible for substantial 
benefits in the countries in which they live, and so layering a UBI on top of that would 
amount to a sort of “double payment.” 
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double the amount that a single person receives, and a three- 
person household would receive less than 1.5 times the amount 
that a two-person household receives).197 While there is a plausi-
ble argument in favor of adjusting the UBI on the basis of house-
hold size, we ultimately conclude that the case for a per-person 
UBI is more compelling. 
The nub of the argument for a household size adjustment is 
that household size affects ability to pay. Having a roommate—or 
a spouse—generally reduces per-person housing costs. The bill for 
groceries to feed two people is generally less than double the bill 
for one. And so on. The square-root scale often used in studies of 
income inequality and poverty implicitly assumes that the cost of 
living for two people is 1.41 times the cost of living for a single 
person (that is, doubling up saves approximately 30 percent), and 
that the cost of living for four people is twice the cost of living for 
a single person (that is, “quadrupling up” saves 50 percent).198 
The arguments against a household size adjustment are sev-
eral. Consider a UBI in which individuals living alone receive a 
$12,000 UBI while married or cohabitating individuals receive 
$8,000 each ($16,000 per couple).199  This structure creates an 
$8,000 penalty for childless adults who wed.200 Welfarists might 
emphasize that household size adjustments distort decisions to 
marry and cohabitate. Resource egalitarians might argue that the 
neutrality principle suggests that society should not reward or 
penalize individuals for household formation choices. Libertari-
ans, too, might value the fact that a UBI is invariant to household 
size: a per-person rather than per-household UBI does less to 
 
 197 Compare Murray, In Our Hands at 8–9 (cited in note 7) (not adjusting for house-
hold size), with Jessica Wiederspan, Elizabeth Rhodes, and H. Luke Shaefer, Expanding 
the Discourse on Antipoverty Policy: Reconsidering a Negative Income Tax, 19 J Poverty 
218, 229 tbl 3 (2015) (adjusting for household size). Existing welfare programs generally 
adjust for household size, as did the early negative income tax proposals from the 1960s 
and 1970s. See, for example, Asimow and Klein, 8 Harv J Legis at 28–29 (cited in note 14); 
Popkin, 78 Yale L J at 403–11 (cited in note 14); Tobin, Pechman, and Mieszkowski, 77 
Yale L J at 4–5 (cited in note 14); Comment, 78 Yale L J at 276–77 (cited in note 14). 
 198 See What are Equivalence Scales? *2 (OECD Project on Income Distribution and 
Poverty), archived at https://perma.cc/7W3F-GMD4. 
 199 This is similar to one scenario suggested by Jessica Wiederspan and collaborators 
in which each household would receive a UBI equal to the federal poverty level. See  
Wiederspan, Rhodes, and Shaefer, 19 J Poverty at 222, 229–30 (cited in note 197). The 
federal poverty level as of 2017 was $12,752 for a single person household under age sixty-
five and $16,414 for a two-person household under age sixty-five. See Fontenot, Semega, 
and Kollar, Current Population Reports at *47 (cited in note 138). 
 200 The arithmetic is straightforward: $12,000 × 2 − $16,000 = $8,000. 
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intrude upon core decisions in an individual’s life.201 Readers with 
a range of philosophical commitments also may appreciate the in-
dependence that an individual UBI grants to household members; 
for example, a per-person UBI delivered as a biweekly check to 
each eligible adult may make it easier for a spouse to leave an 
abusive relationship.202 
Another argument against a downward adjustment for indi-
viduals living in larger households—one that sounds in a welfar-
ist register—builds on an important 1996 paper by Professor 
Louis Kaplow.203 Kaplow’s insight is that larger households likely 
enjoy economies of scale, and so may be better off than smaller 
households with the same per-person income, but that this does 
not necessarily mean that the marginal utility of income is lower 
for larger households because larger households have a greater 
ability to share resources.204 To illustrate: A two-person household 
likely needs only one microwave oven, one refrigerator, one wash-
ing machine, one Roku box, and so on. Thus, A and B, who each 
earn $50,000 and live together, may be better off than C, who 
earns $50,000 and lives alone, because A and B can share their 
microwave, refrigerator, washing machine, Roku box, etc., and 
spend more on other items. And we generally think that better-
off individuals have a lower marginal utility of income. Yet if A 
and B buy a new microwave, refrigerator, washing machine, or 
Roku box, both of them can use it, whereas if C buys a household 
item, only C benefits. Thus, it is not clear whether social welfare 
is increased by transferring $30 (roughly the cost of a Roku box) 
from A and B to C. C arguably “needs” the money more, but A and 
B arguably can make better use of it. 
 
 201 In separate work, one of us has argued that the principle of “marriage neutrality” 
carries limited normative force. See generally Daniel Hemel, Beyond the Marriage Tax 
Trilemma, 54 Wake Forest L Rev *101 (forthcoming 2020), archived at https:// 
perma.cc/MKJ9-5434. Insofar as “singles bonuses” or “marriage penalties” might be justi-
fied, however, they can be implemented through the tax system rather than through ad-
justments to the UBI. 
 202 Some may also believe symbolic reasons counsel in favor of casting the UBI as an 
individual benefit. As described in Part II, some of the strongest justifications for a UBI 
are rooted in concern for individuals as such. Consider libertarianism, under which a UBI 
shows respect for the separateness of persons, legitimates private property rights by en-
suring the Lockean proviso is met with respect to all, and provides a basis for all individ-
uals to consent to a system of private property rights. Styling the UBI as an individual 
benefit acknowledges the autonomy of all individuals. 
 203 Louis Kaplow, Optimal Distribution and the Family, 98 Scand J Econ 75 (1996). 
 204 See id at 89–90. 
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Administrative and compliance concerns also weigh against 
household-size adjustments. Living arrangements among low- 
income individuals are often transitory, with roommates, roman-
tic partners, and relatives moving in and out frequently yet irreg-
ularly. Constantly adjusting grant size to reflect these changes 
would impose a significant burden on individuals and on what-
ever agency implements the program.205 And beyond the adminis-
trative and compliance costs, a UBI dependent on fluctuating 
household size would hamper the ability of low-income individu-
als to plan for the future. Indeed, the fact that a UBI does not 
waver in size is one key advantage of a UBI over existing welfare 
programs that deliver benefits less reliably. 
Finally, insofar as policymakers decide to make the tax-and-
transfer system dependent upon household size, we think it is 
much easier to accomplish that objective through tax adjustments 
than through transfer adjustments. The IRS can (and does) col-
lect information on household size once a year, and the tax system 
adjusts for household size in a number of ways (for example, filing 
status). Implementing these adjustments through changes to bi-
weekly or monthly UBI payments strikes us as an unnecessarily 
complicated and costly endeavor. 
2. A UBI should not depend on assets. 
A UBI should not, in our view, depend on an asset test. This 
recommendation may surprise some. If the goal of a UBI is to re-
distribute from haves to have-nots, then an asset test initially ap-
pears to make sense.206 If A and B each have incomes of $3,000 a 
year, but A has $10,000 sitting in the bank while B has no 
 
 205 Indeed, the difficulty of applying household-size rules is one oft-cited problem with 
the federal EITC. See Robert Greenstein, John Wancheck, and Chuck Marr, Reducing 
Overpayments in the Earned Income Tax Credit *3 (Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, 
Jan 31, 2019), archived at https://perma.cc/6ND2-E4WP (citing the Treasury Depart-
ment’s estimate that “70 percent of EITC improper payments stem from issues related to 
the EITC’s [complicated] residency and relationship requirements”). 
 206 Many scholars make a similar argument in favor of taxing wealth in addition to 
income. See, for example, Lily L. Batchelder, What Should Society Expect from Heirs? The 
Case for a Comprehensive Inheritance Tax, 63 Tax L Rev 1, 58–59 (2009); Liam Murphy, 
Why Does Inequality Matter? Reflections on the Political Morality of Piketty’s Capital in 
the Twenty-First Century, 68 Tax L Rev 613, 628 (2015); David Shakow and Reed 
Shuldiner, A Comprehensive Wealth Tax, 53 Tax L Rev 499, 500 (2000). But see Miranda 
Perry Fleischer, Not So Fast: The Hidden Difficulties of Taxing Wealth, in Jack Knight 
and Melissa Schwartzberg, eds, Wealth: Nomos LVIII 261, 275–85 (NYU 2017) (discussing 
concerns such as valuation and constitutionality with administering a wealth tax). 
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savings, then A seems better able to fend for himself than B, and 
arguably should merit less assistance. 
Several considerations counsel against conditioning a UBI on 
assets, however. One is administrative: while we already have a 
well-developed third-party reporting apparatus for measuring in-
dividual and household income, our administrative technologies 
for appraising individual and household wealth are much less so-
phisticated. A second is liquidity related: illiquid assets may do 
relatively little to improve an individual’s ability to pay in the 
short term. Both the administrative and liquidity concerns can be 
allayed through an asset test that depends solely on easy-to-value 
liquid assets (for example, cash, checking and savings accounts, 
and stocks and bonds traded on active markets), but that, in turn, 
would incentivize individuals to transmute their wealth into less 
liquid forms (for example, life insurance policies and gold bars). 
Anecdotally, some welfare recipients report buying more house-
hold durables such as furniture (which is not counted in asset 
tests for most existing welfare programs) for precisely this pur-
pose.207 Some low-income individuals who wish to save might also 
eschew banks and instead simply stockpile cash if they knew that 
bank account balances would count against them for UBI pur-
poses. This incentive would only magnify the burdens that lower-
income individuals already face in obtaining traditional financial 
services. 
An asset test also would distort the choice between present-
period consumption and saving for the future.208 Such a test would 
amount to a new tax on capital income, likely at a regressive mar-
ginal rate (because higher-net-worth individuals who are well 
above the asset test threshold would face no marginal tax as a 
result).209 This strikes us as entirely backwards. Society arguably 
 
 207 See, for example, Matthew Desmond, Evicted: Poverty and Profit in the American 
City 217–18 (Crown 2016) (describing how one SSI recipient views using layaway to pur-
chase items like furniture and televisions as a logical alternative to savings since having 
more than $2,000 in her bank account results in a reduction to her benefits). 
 208 To be sure, the existing federal income tax does so already insofar as it includes 
capital income (interest, dividends, capital gains, etc.). But a number of federal tax provi-
sions offset this distortion by allowing households to save substantial sums in tax-free or 
essentially tax-free vehicles (for example, Roth and traditional IRAs, 401(k) plans, life-
insurance policies, Section 529 plans, and owner-occupied housing). 
 209 Decreasing one’s benefits as wealth rises is economically equivalent to imposing a 
tax on that wealth. Consider a UBI in which benefits decrease by 10 cents for each dollar 
of assets owned over $2,000. As long as Oliver’s assets remain under $2,000, he receives a 
UBI of, for example, $1,000 a month. But if Oliver manages to save some money and his 
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has an interest in encouraging savings among low-income house-
holds so that they can weather shocks such as a car breakdown or 
an unexpected medical bill.210 We see absolutely no reason, by con-
trast, why society should effectively discourage low-income house-
holds from accumulating savings through what amounts to a re-
gressive wealth tax. 
A final consideration is that asset levels often fluctuate dra-
matically for the poorest individuals and households. The amount 
in an individual’s checking account might increase temporarily on 
account of a prior landlord returning a security deposit, a tax re-
fund, a one-time bonus, student loans, or a range of other possible 
events. Low-income individuals and households may spend these 
funds quickly to repay debts or purchase durables.211 Looking at 
temporary infusions of cash could lead to a reduction in an indi-
vidual’s UBI unrelated to any actual change in ability to pay. 
Again, this “churn” in eligibility may interfere with the ability of 
individuals to plan their lives.212 
Our view on an asset test for a UBI should not be interpreted 
as a verdict on capital income and wealth taxes more generally. 
While we think that there are strong arguments in favor of a pro-
gressive consumption tax that effectively exempts capital income 
and imposes no tax on wealth, our case against an asset test does 
not depend upon that premise.213 The most straightforward way 
to tax capital income or wealth would be through the tax system—
not through an administratively messy mechanism that has the 
effect of taxing wealth at regressive rates. 
 
assets increase to $2,100, his monthly benefit decreases by $10. For every $100 of wealth, 
he has $10 less and the government has $10 more. This is the very definition of a wealth 
tax. Cliff-like limits are even worse, imposing the equivalent of wealth taxes that exceed 
100 percent. Consider a family that loses several hundred dollars of SNAP benefits each 
month because their countable assets climb above $2,250, the household “resource limit” 
to be eligible for SNAP in FY 2018. Memorandum from Silbermann, SNAP — Fiscal Year 
2018 at *1 (cited in note 147). A few dollars of increased wealth can lead to a loss of hun-
dreds of dollars’ worth of benefits. 
 210 See Do Limits on Family Assets Affect Participation in, Costs of TANF? (The Pew 
Charitable Trusts, July 7, 2016), archived at https://perma.cc/X4M9-6W45. See also  
Rebecca Vallas and Joe Valenti, Asset Limits Are a Barrier to Economic Security and Mo-
bility *3–4 (Center for American Progress, Sept 10, 2014), archived at https:// 
perma.cc/VHP9-X2E7. 
 211 See Do Limits on Family Assets Affect Participation in, Costs of TANF? at *3 (cited 
in note 210). 
 212 Id. 
 213 See generally, for example, Joseph Bankman and David A. Weisbach, The Superi-
ority of an Ideal Consumption Tax Over an Ideal Income Tax, 58 Stan L Rev 1413 (2006). 
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3. A UBI should not vary by location. 
A third dimension along which the size of a UBI might vary 
is geography: Should a UBI be adjusted for geographic differences 
in the cost of living? Our view is that the size of a UBI should be 
uniform regardless of where in the United States one lives, and 
we think that this view can be defended on welfarist, resource 
egalitarian, and libertarian grounds. It also comports with the 
overall approach throughout most of the Internal Revenue Code, 
which in general is geographically neutral.214 Federal policy is, 
however, somewhat inconsistent on this front: certain federal 
benefits—such as the Affordable Care Act premium tax credit215 
and Section 8 housing choice vouchers216—vary by location, as 
does the federal government’s pay scale.217 
The welfarist argument in favor of geographic adjustments is 
that location is an indicator of need. For example, according to 
research by scholars at MIT, a single adult in San Francisco needs 
more than $42,000218 to cover basic expenses such as food, medical 
care, housing, transportation, and taxes, whereas a single adult 
in Illinois’s Cook County (which encompasses Chicago) can scrape 
by on just over $28,000. 219  The higher cost of living in San  
Francisco might on first glance seem to justify a larger UBI for 
individuals living there. 
The welfarist response is at least twofold. First, where one 
lives is at least to some extent a matter of choice: the individual 
 
 214 The rate tables, personal exemption amount, and standard deduction have never 
varied based on location, and the EITC and child tax credit do not depend on geography 
either. Some provisions—such as the deduction for state and local taxes (SALT), see IRC 
§ 164—benefit taxpayers in certain jurisdictions more than others, but the SALT provision 
does not formally discriminate on the basis of location. Two notable exceptions are the Low 
Income Housing Tax Credit, see IRC § 42(d)(5)(B), and the newly enacted “opportunity 
zone” provision, see IRC § 1400Z-2, both of which grant favorable treatment to invest-
ments in certain census tracts. 
 215 See IRC § 36B (tying the credit amount to the premiums for health insurance on 
the state-established exchanges in the taxpayer’s state). 
 216 See US Department of Housing and Urban Development, Housing Choice Vouch-
ers Fact Sheet, archived at https://perma.cc/4LM5-DVPC (stating that housing choice 
voucher amounts are based on the cost of housing in the “local housing market”). 
 217 See US Office of Personnel Management, Pay & Leave: Salaries & Wages: 2018 
General Schedule (GS) Locality Pay Tables, archived at https://perma.cc/MUR3-X494 (list-
ing different pay tables for different geographic areas). 
 218 See Amy K. Glasmeier, Living Wage Calculation for San Francisco County,  
California (Living Wage Calculator), archived at https://perma.cc/8SNX-BYF7. 
 219 See Amy K. Glasmeier, Living Wage Calculation for Cook County, Illinois (Living 
Wage Calculator), archived at https://perma.cc/8ZM5-D2Z8. 
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who chooses to live in San Francisco may value mild winters and 
views of the Golden Gate Bridge more than the individual who 
chooses to live in Chicago. Insofar as location is a matter of choice, 
then the individual who lives in San Francisco is not necessarily 
needier than the Chicagoan but rather has different consumption 
priorities. To be sure, choice of location is also constrained by 
other factors. The average American lives only eighteen miles 
from her mother—suggesting that location is importantly a func-
tion of birthplace and family ties220—and interstate migration has 
been on the decline for several decades.221 A UBI, though, would 
plausibly lower barriers to migration by enabling more individu-
als to afford moving costs as well as childcare and eldercare costs 
associated with living away from extended families. 
Second, even if location is not freely chosen, the fact that the 
San Franciscan faces a higher cost of living than the Chicagoan 
does not necessarily mean that the San Franciscan’s marginal 
utility of income is higher as well. A San Franciscan earning 
$30,000 a year might be materially worse off than a Chicagoan 
earning the same amount, and for that reason the San Franciscan 
might prize an additional dollar somewhat more, but it is also the 
case that a dollar goes further in Chicago than in San Francisco. 
Thus, it is unclear whether the marginal utility of income is 
higher for the San Franciscan or the Chicagoan earning the same 
amount, and insofar as the welfarist case for redistribution is 
predicated upon differential marginal utilities of income, the ar-
gument for redistributing more to the San Franciscan is ambigu-
ous at best. Add in the administrative costs of locational adjust-
ments and the argument for a geographically differentiated UBI 
becomes rather weak. 
For the resource egalitarian, meanwhile, the case for geo-
graphic adjustments arguably depends upon whether location 
should be considered a matter of choice or of chance. If the former, 
then the neutrality principle would suggest that society should 
not grant a larger benefit to individuals with a taste for mild win-
ters and views of the Golden Gate Bridge—as expensive as those 
 
 220 See Quoctrung Bui and Claire Cain Miller, The Typical American Lives Only 18 
Miles from Mom (NY Times, Dec 23, 2015), archived at https://perma.cc/A4R7-RRY9. 
 221 See Raven Molloy, Christopher L. Smith, and Abigail Wozniak, Job Changing 
and the Decline in Long-Distance Migration in the United States, 54 Demography 631, 
633 fig 1 (2017). 
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tastes might be to satisfy.222 If the latter, then perhaps we should 
think of being born in the San Francisco Bay Area as a chance 
event that raises the amount of income that one needs in order to 
function as an equal citizen. On this view, individuals unlucky 
enough to be born into high cost-of-living areas might have a 
claim to a larger UBI. 
Yet even if location is a matter of chance rather than choice, 
the resource egalitarian argument for redistributing more to in-
dividuals in high cost-of-living areas is uncertain. The cost of liv-
ing tends to be higher in areas with greater employment opportu-
nities and higher wages.223 Should we think of the San Francisco 
Bay Area native as unlucky to have been born in a high cost-of-
living area, or lucky to have been born in an area with an unem-
ployment rate that is 1.1 percentage points below the national 
rate and average weekly wages that exceed the national average 
by more than 76 percent?224 Should redistribution be targeted at 
individuals who by chance land in areas with high wages and a 
high cost of living, or low wages and a low cost of living? The ques-
tion illustrates the reality that even if cost-of-living adjustments 
are attractive in theory, they are challenging to implement in 
practice.225 
From a libertarian perspective, the case for cost-of-living ad-
justments is especially weak. Cost-of-living adjustments effec-
tively reward localities that—through stringent zoning regula-
tions—drive up housing costs. 226  The idea of the federal 
government subsidizing exclusionary local regulations should be 
anathema to most libertarians. Cost-of-living adjustments also 
 
 222 For more on expensive tastes, see Alstott, 121 Harv L Rev at 478–85 (cited in note 
54); Fleischer, 91 BU L Rev at 630–31 (cited in note 54). 
 223 On the relationship between wages and cost of living across urban areas, see gen-
erally Wendell Cox, The Center for Opportunity Urbanism (COU) Standard of Living In-
dex, 3rd Annual Edition (Dec 2018), archived at https://perma.cc/R6GA-A9K8. 
 224 See US Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, San Francisco Area Eco-
nomic Summary *1 (Oct 2, 2019), archived at https://perma.cc/QAK3-93KA. 
 225 The Center for Opportunity Urbanism seeks to measure the standard of living 
across urban areas by adjusting the real average wage for the cost of living. San Jose, 
California—with high costs but also high wages—comes in first place in this ranking (in-
dicating that workers there can afford more material goods and services than workers 
elsewhere). See Cox, COU Standard of Living Index at *11 tbl 1 (cited in note 223). San 
Francisco places in the top third. The implication is that larger UBIs for individuals in 
high-cost-of-living areas might redistribute in the wrong direction (that is, from individu-
als in places where job prospects are bleak to individuals in places where high-wage em-
ployment opportunities are more plentiful). 
 226 See Edward L. Glaeser, Joseph Gyourko, and Raven E. Saks, Why Have Housing 
Prices Gone Up?, 95 Am Econ Rev 329, 332–33 (2005). 
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favor individuals with expensive geographic preferences relative 
to individuals who would prefer to spend less on housing and 
more on other goods and services. Libertarians who believe that 
individuals should determine on their own what trade-offs to 
make are likely to chafe at the notion that the government should 
give a larger amount to those who choose to live on the island of 
Manhattan rather than in Manhattan, Kansas. 
D. Assignability: Beneficiaries Should Have a Limited Ability 
to Borrow Against Future Payments 
One largely overlooked but critically important implementa-
tion issue concerns the assignability of future UBI benefits. 
Should individuals be allowed to post their future UBI benefits as 
collateral for a loan or to trade those benefits away in a reverse-
annuity transaction? To illustrate: Imagine that an individual 
faces a sudden and unexpected expense (for example, a bill for 
medical care or car repair) and lacks the cash on hand to make 
the payment. Should she be able to, say, borrow $5,800 today and 
assign her next twelve UBI payments to the lender (roughly the 
equivalent of borrowing at a 6.3 percent interest rate)?227 If so, fi-
nancial institutions presumably would offer individuals the op-
portunity to trade their rights to UBI benefits in the future for a 
lump sum today. The result would be that individuals could con-
vert periodic payments into something similar to the stakeholder 
grants suggested by Professors Ackerman and Alstott.228 
From a welfarist perspective, the question of assignability is 
especially challenging. On the one hand, welfarists might be con-
cerned about individuals taking out large loans early in life and 
then squandering their lump sums on unsuccessful investments 
or imprudent personal purchases. On the other hand, assignabil-
ity—and the loans that it would facilitate—could expand credit 
access for millions of Americans who might use the lump-sum 
amounts to, say, start a business or pay college tuition. And as 
compared to alternatives such as payday loans or large credit card 
balances, borrowing against future UBI payments might allow 
low-income individuals to secure significantly lower interest 
 
 227 We chose the $5,800 figure arbitrarily. Presumably, lenders would offer an amount 
less than the nominal sum of future payments to reflect (a) the time value of money and 
(b) the risk that the borrower will die before the loan is repaid. 
 228 See Ackerman and Alstott, The Stakeholder Society at 3–5 (cited in note 32). 
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rates.229 Predatory lending is a concern either way, but the mar-
ket for UBI assignment loans may be easier for the government to 
regulate because the government effectively controls the collateral. 
For resource egalitarians, the question of assignability seems 
somewhat more straightforward. The choice-chance principle ar-
guably suggests that if an individual freely chooses to trade UBI 
payments in the future for a lump sum today, society is under no 
obligation to bail that individual out if she later regrets the deci-
sion. The neutrality principle, moreover, suggests that the gov-
ernment should not intervene to favor those who choose to save 
over those who choose to borrow. 
For libertarians committed to the value of individual free-
dom, the idea of allowing UBI recipients to decide whether to as-
sign their future benefits might seem quite attractive. On the 
other hand, minimal-state libertarians who believe in a UBI as a 
way to ensure that no indigent individuals are “faultlessly” poor 
might wonder whether we hold individuals at fault for decisions 
they made years or decades in the past. Meanwhile, Friedman’s 
public-goods argument for a UBI leads us to ask whether nonin-
digent members of society will experience moral or aesthetic dis-
tress when they see their fellow citizens living in abject poverty if 
they know that those living in poverty had the option of a stable 
UBI and yet squandered it. 
Assignability also interacts with longevity in interesting and 
potentially significant ways. Presumably, financial institutions 
will make lump-sum offers based on their projections of the recip-
ient’s life span. The financial institution will stand to lose on in-
dividuals who live shorter-than-expected lives and gain on individ-
uals who live longer-than-expected lives. Within the reverse-
annuity risk pool, we will see a sort of redistribution from the long-
lived to the short-lived (similar to a whole life insurance risk pool, 
and the opposite of what occurs in a traditional-annuity risk pool). 
Some egalitarians may see this as desirable because it partially 
compensates the short-lived for their bad luck. Welfarists may be 
concerned because the marginal utility of an additional dollar is 
presumably higher the longer one will live, and in this respect re-
verse annuities amount to a transfer in the wrong direction. 
 
 229 To be sure, individuals could use their UBI benefits to make loan payments re-
gardless of whether UBI rights are assignable. The advantage of assignability is that the 
additional security would likely lead lenders to offer much lower interest rates than they 
would for unsecured loans. 
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We do not have a fully satisfactory answer to the assignabil-
ity question, but we offer a tentative suggestion: a rule that allows 
adults over the age of eighteen to assign benefits for a limited pe-
riod (for example, twelve months) in exchange for a loan. The one-
year allowance would go some way toward expanding credit ac-
cess for low-income individuals without generating the risk that 
some older Americans might be relegated to deep poverty on ac-
count of imprudent decisions that they made in their youth. UBI 
pilot programs can shed further light on this question by ran-
domly assigning recipients to treatment and control groups that 
either can or cannot assign their benefits and then comparing out-
comes. One year is an admittedly arbitrary figure, and further 
study might reveal evidence that weighs in favor of expanding or 
contracting that period. 
While our suggestions are tentative, our firmer conclusion is 
that assignability—though rarely discussed—will be central to 
UBI design.230 No matter the size, a freely assignable UBI will not 
eradicate poverty entirely because some individuals will assign 
their UBIs away. On the other hand, a UBI with a prohibition on 
assignment reproduces some of the same paternalism that UBI 
supporters often point to as a flaw of our current welfare state. 
Put differently: If the goal is to ensure a subsistence-level income 
for all Americans, then a freely assignable UBI will not accom-
plish that end.231 If the goal is to increase financial opportunities 
for all Americans and then to let them chart their own course 
through life, then free assignability would seem to be the better 
approach. The question of assignability brings to the foreground 






 230 A related question is whether to allow garnishment of a UBI for back taxes and 
child support. The arguments in favor of garnishment are straightforward: Why should 
an individual who already owes money to the federal government receive even more? And 
why should the federal government abide by a parent’s delinquency in supporting a child? 
At the same time, garnishment would mean that a UBI would not in fact lift all individuals 
out of deep poverty because some would see most or all of their UBI diverted. 
 231 For this reason, Professors Van Parijs and Vanderborght argue that beneficiaries 
should not be allowed to assign their UBIs. See Van Parijs and Vanderborght, Basic In-
come at 10 (cited in note 10). 
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E. Payment Mechanism: Direct Deposits on a Biweekly Basis 
via the Social Security Administration 
Once we have decided that the government ought to provide 
a basic income, the question arises: How? That is, how exactly will 
payments be made to recipients, how frequently, and by whom? 
Direct deposit to a bank account or debit card seems like the 
most straightforward method of payment, and just over 99 per-
cent of Social Security beneficiaries receive their payments via 
direct deposit already.232 The system is imperfect: the SSA’s Office 
of the Inspector General reports that direct deposit payments for 
nearly 7,200 beneficiaries—totaling almost $11 million—were 
misdirected from 2014 to 2016. 233  But for a program making 
roughly $1 trillion a year in payments to more than 60 million 
beneficiaries, the payment problems seem like mere hiccups.234 
Still, further innovations on top of the existing Social Secu-
rity payment system may be worthy of consideration. One possi-
bility is to encourage—or even require—parents to set up savings 
accounts for their children in order for the children to receive a 
basic income, with payments deposited directly to those accounts. 
Accounts could be structured such that parents can withdraw 
funds to pay expenses for their children until those children reach 
age eighteen, at which point the children (now adults) would have 
full control over their accounts.235 This could help to reduce the 
ranks of the “unbanked” (that is, the portion of the population 
that lacks access to accounts at financial institutions).236 A similar 
program in Mongolia, which distributes mineral and mining rev-
enues into accounts set up for children under eighteen,237  has 
 
 232 See Social Security Administration, Social Security Administration Beneficiaries: 
Social Security Direct Deposit and Check Statistics (Aug 2019), archived at 
https://perma.cc/65CM-3MR6. 
 233 See Social Security Administration, Office of the Inspector General, Unauthorized 
My Social Security Direct Deposit Changes in Calendar Years 2014 Through 2016 (Aug 
2017), archived at https://perma.cc/US6F-NDL3. 
 234 See Social Security Administration, Annual Statistical Supplement to the Social 
Security Bulletin, 2017 *2–3 (Mar 2018), archived at https://perma.cc/E83H-24F8. 
 235 Although beyond the scope of this Article, we recognize that this proposal would 
require additional rules to address the allocation of access to such accounts when parents 
do not live together. 
 236 On the causes and consequences of being “unbanked,” see Michael S. Barr, Bank-
ing the Poor, 21 Yale J Reg 121, 130–41 (2004). 
 237 See Leora Klapper, Can Universal Basic Income Boost Financial Inclusion and 
Transparency? (Brookings Institute: Future Development, June 15, 2017), archived at 
https://perma.cc/68YZ-WA2W. 
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contributed to greater financial inclusion in that country than in 
the United States on some dimensions. For example, 89 percent 
of Mongolian adults in the lower two quintiles of the income dis-
tribution had bank accounts in 2014, compared to 87 percent of 
American adults in the bottom two quintiles.238 The 2 percentage 
point difference between Mongolia and the United States may 
seem small, but the statistic is quite striking once one considers 
the wide gap in economic and financial development between the 
United States (per capita GDP of roughly $63,000) and Mongolia 
(per capita GDP of less than $4,200).239 
Others have suggested using blockchain technology to power 
a basic income program.240 A nonprofit organization called the 
People’s Currency Foundation already has sprung up with the 
goal of implementing a blockchain-based UBI.241 We confess to 
finding little in this idea to recommend itself, as a blockchain-
based UBI would seem to exclude the technologically unsophisti-
cated (and, moreover, the existing direct-deposit system for Social 
Security seems to work just fine). 
A somewhat more serious (in our view) question is whether 
payments should go to individuals whose tax liability far exceeds 
their UBI amount. For example, should Jeff Bezos receive a direct 
deposit into his bank account even while he withholds thousands 
of dollars from his paycheck and makes estimated tax payments 
of many millions? The answer matters partly for optics (will sup-
port for a UBI be stronger if everyone feels like a beneficiary, or 
will Americans view payments to Bezos et al. as a waste?) and 
partly for purposes of administrability. We consider the optical 
question at greater length in Part IV; from a perspective of ad-
ministrability, we anticipate that paying the same amount to 
every American will be less cumbersome than trying to adjust in-
dividual payments on the basis of income. 
The question of payment frequency has also divided support-
ers of unconditional, unrestricted cash transfers. Ackerman and 
Alstott have proposed a system whereby individuals would 
 
 238 See Asli Demirguc-Kunt, et al, The Global Findex Database 2014: Measuring  
Financial Inclusion Around the World *84 (World Bank Group Policy Research Working 
Paper No 7255, Apr 2015), archived at https://perma.cc/5Q3Q-KDEH. 
 239 GDP (Current US$) (cited in note 152) (2018 statistics). 
 240 See, for example, Alicia Naumoff, Why Universal Basic Income Should Be Paid in 
Bitcoin (Cointelegraph, Jan 19, 2017), archived at https://perma.cc/3KBD-88M7. 
 241 See About Mannabase (Mannabase), archived at https://perma.cc/GE3M-XN3P. 
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receive $80,000—paid out in four annual increments—upon en-
tering college or turning twenty-one, whichever comes first.242 
Others argue for monthly UBI payments—a suggestion in line 
with most current UBI proposals.243 Payments could be even more 
frequent than that; just as many banks pay interest daily,244 the 
government could make daily deposits to UBI recipients’ ac-
counts. 
In theory, payment frequency might be of little relevance if 
recipients can freely contract with financial institutions. For ex-
ample, one can annuitize a once-in-a-lifetime lump-sum amount 
in order to transform it into a stream of annual or monthly pay-
ments; conversely, one can borrow against a future stream of an-
nual or monthly payments in order to obtain a lump-sum amount 
today.245 There are, however, at least three aspects of the payment 
frequency issue that merit policymakers’ attention. 
The first is administrability. Transaction costs increase with 
payment frequency. Monitoring costs do as well. Workers who are 
paid via direct deposit once every two weeks bear a time cost 
when they check their bank accounts to ensure that the payment 
came through. Those costs would rise (or the vigilance of monitor-
ing would decline) if payments were made every day. 
A second aspect of the frequency question involves consump-
tion smoothing. The stresses of poverty—combined with limited 
access to credit and savings vehicles—potentially make it difficult 
for households to spread expenditures over a long payment cycle, 
with the consequence that spending may be concentrated toward 
the beginning of the cycle and households will go without ade-
quate nutrition or other necessities near the end. Substantiating 
this concern, economists have observed a “Food Stamp nutrition 
cycle,” with caloric intake declining by 10 to 15 percent over the 
 
 242 Ackerman and Alstott, The Stakeholder Society at 51–52 (cited in note 32). 
 243 Most traditional cash and near-cash transfer programs (such as SNAP, WIC, 
TANF, and Social Security) are paid out monthly. See generally, for example, US Depart-
ment of Agriculture, Food and Nutrition Service, Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Pro-
gram (SNAP): Monthly Issuance Schedule for All States and Territories, archived at 
https://perma.cc/Z83C-LN6P. Cash transfers implemented through the federal tax system 
tend to be distributed annually. Efforts to facilitate more frequent payments to EITC re-
cipients have so far floundered. For a discussion, see generally Steve Holt, Periodic Pay-
ment of the Earned Income Tax Credit Revisited (Brookings Metropolitan Policy Program, 
Dec 2015), archived at https://perma.cc/CHN4-5C3H. 
 244 See, for example, Learn About Savings Accounts (Ally Bank, Aug 1, 2016), archived 
at https://perma.cc/D92D-EPU9. 
 245 See Fleischer and Hemel, 2017 Wis L Rev at 1241–44 (cited in note 17). 
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course of each month.246 There is also some evidence that stores 
respond to this pattern by raising prices on the day that SNAP 
beneficiaries receive payments.247 These findings have led to an 
emerging view in food-policy circles that more frequent payments 
(for example, on a biweekly or semimonthly basis) would improve 
outcomes for beneficiaries by allowing them to smooth their  
consumption more easily. 248  The counterargument to the  
consumption-smoothing case for more frequent payments is that 
a longer window between disbursals operates as a “forced sav-
ings” mechanism: beneficiaries effectively “save up” for signifi-
cant durable-goods expenses (for example, cars and washing ma-
chines).249 Low-income households—especially those with limited 
access to banks or other financial institutions—may otherwise 
find it difficult to save for larger expenditures.250 
A third aspect of the frequency question is the interaction be-
tween payment frequency and longevity. As noted above in our 
discussion of assignability, one-time payments tend to favor 
shorter-lived individuals while more frequent payments tend to 
favor longer-lived individuals.251 That is, if payments are made 
each period that one is alive, then longer-lived individuals will 
receive more over their lifetimes. If one believes that premature 
death is an element of inequality that the government ought to 
 
 246 Jesse M. Shapiro, Is There a Daily Discount Rate? Evidence from the Food Stamp 
Nutrition Cycle, 89 J Pub Econ 303, 307–08 (2005). See also Karen S. Hamrick and  
Margaret Andrews, SNAP Participants’ Eating Patterns over the Benefit Month: A Time 
Use Perspective, 11 PLOS ONE 1, 14 fig 2 (2016) (finding that the probability of not eating 
on a given day rises as more time elapses from the receipt of benefits for SNAP recipients). 
 247 See Justine Hastings and Ebonya Washington, The First of the Month Effect: Con-
sumer Behavior and Store Responses, 2 Am Econ J: Econ Pol 142, 156–59 (2010). 
 248 See, for example, United States Department of Agriculture, Economic Research 
Service, Informing Food and Nutrition Assistance Policy: 10 Years of Research at ERS 30 
(Dec 2007); Tommy Tobin, Semi-Monthly Benefit Transfers Are a Simple Way to Improve 
Food Stamps (Forbes, Apr 23, 2018), archived at https://perma.cc/4WEN-6PVJ. 
 249 For a discussion, see Damon Jones, Information, Preferences, and Public Benefit 
Participation: Experimental Evidence from the Advance EITC and 401(k) Savings, 2 Am 
Econ J: Applied Econ 147, 149–52 (2010). 
 250 According to Bureau of Labor Statistics data, more than 56 percent of private- 
sector businesses pay their employees biweekly or twice a month, and only about 11 per-
cent pay their employees less frequently than biweekly/semimonthly. See Matt Burgess, 
How Frequently Do Private Businesses Pay Workers, 3 Beyond the Numbers: Pay & Bene-
fits (May 2014), archived at https://perma.cc/3QWZ-MJSF. If there were widespread de-
mand among employees for less frequent payment, then presumably employers would 
economize on transaction costs by reducing payment frequency. However, insofar as pay-
ment frequency concerns arise from stresses and constraints unique to lower-income 
households, aggregate payroll data is arguably of limited utility. 
 251 See text following note 229. 
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offset through cash payments, then perhaps that is an argument 
for one-time payments. 
The prevalence of biweekly or semimonthly payment sched-
ules in the private-sector employment context seems to indicate 
that individuals prefer relatively regular payment rather than 
“forced savings” brought about by payment infrequency. If there 
were widespread demand among employees for less frequent pay-
ment, then presumably employers would economize on transac-
tion costs by reducing payment frequency. Our own tentative 
view is that the government should likely follow the judgment of 
the majority of employers who have concluded that disbursals 
every other week or twice a month strike a reasonable balance 
between administrability and consumption smoothing. We 
acknowledge, though, that technological advances that lead to 
further reductions in transaction costs might reconfigure that 
balance. As for the forced savings counterargument, our hope is 
that a UBI via direct deposit will expand financial access, allow-
ing low-income individuals to utilize savings mechanisms (for ex-
ample, certificates of deposit) that are far superior to payment 
delay. 
A final question in the design of a payment mechanism is the 
question of who should administer the program. While others 
have suggested that the IRS may be the agency best suited to dis-
burse UBI payments,252 our view is that the SSA is a more natural 
fit—for three reasons. First, the SSA already makes monthly pay-
ments to more than 67 million beneficiaries, or over one-fifth of 
the total US population.253 For it, carrying out a UBI would mean 
scaling up an existing endeavor. The IRS, by contrast, only inter-
acts with most taxpayers annually. Second, the American public 
appears to have a much more favorable view of the SSA than of 
the IRS. In the most recent Pew Research Center survey that 
asked respondents about their views of both agencies, the share 
of respondents saying that they had a favorable view of the SSA 
exceeded the share with an unfavorable view by 18 percentage 
points. The comparable figure for the IRS was −10 percentage 
 
 252 See, for example, Michael Munger, One and One-Half Cheers for a Basic Income 
Guarantee: We Could Do Worse, and Already Have, 19 Indep Rev 503, 506 (2015) (arguing 
that using the IRS to implement a UBI will result in little new bureaucracy or rulemaking 
due to existing infrastructure). 
 253 See Social Security Administration, Monthly Statistical Snapshot, July 2018 *1 
tbl 1, archived at https://perma.cc/BJG5-7MLZ. 
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points (that is, the share with an unfavorable view exceeded the 
share with a favorable impression).254 Third, at least in recent 
years, members of Congress have sought to vilify the IRS for a 
range of alleged infractions and starved the agency of cash.255 
While ultimately a basic income will need to be funded by taxes 
that the IRS collects, it would seem wise in the near term to shield 
a UBI from the toxicity of tax politics as much as possible. Task-
ing the SSA rather than the IRS with carrying out a UBI is a step 
in that direction. 
F. Funding Mechanism: Consolidate Cash and Near-Cash 
Transfers While Adding a Broadbased Surtax 
The previous Section asked how a UBI should be paid; a 
harder question is how a UBI should be paid for. Vox’s Dylan  
Matthews has argued that “[w]hether or not basic income is a 
good idea depends entirely on how you pay for it,”256 and while we 
think that the success of a UBI depends on more than that, we 
certainly agree that the “how you pay for it” question is key. As of 
mid-2018, the total population of the United States was approxi-
mately 327 million,257 and if we exclude the approximately 11 mil-
lion unauthorized immigrants and 2 million temporary lawful 
permanent residents,258 that leaves 314 million citizens and law-
ful permanent residents living in the country. Multiplying $6,000 
per year by 314 million gives us a total annual cost for a UBI of 
$1.884 trillion. Clearly, a UBI would be expensive. 
One way to offset that cost would be to discontinue some or 
all existing cash and near-cash transfer programs. Setting aside 
programs administered by the SSA (to which we will return mo-
mentarily), the primary federally funded cash and near-cash 
transfer programs include SNAP ($70 billion in 2018), TANF 
($17 billion), the Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for 
Women, Infants, and Children (WIC) ($5 billion), unemployment 
insurance ($32 billion), and Section 8 rental assistance 
 
 254 See Beyond Distrust: How Americans View Their Government *58–59 (Pew Re-
search Center, Nov 23, 2015), archived at https://perma.cc/J3FV-NTHX. 
 255 See Leandra Lederman, IRS Reform: Politics as Usual?, 7 Colum J Tax L 36, 48–
55 (2016). 
 256 Dylan Matthews, A Basic Income Really Could End Poverty Forever (Vox, July 17, 
2017), archived at https://perma.cc/7UW2-EDLB. 
 257 See QuickFacts (cited in note 152); Cohn, 5 Key Facts About U.S. Lawful Immi-
grants (cited in note 152); GDP (Current US$) (cited in note 152). 
 258 See Cohn, 5 Key Facts About U.S. Lawful Immigrants (cited in note 152). 
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($34 billion).259 The EITC and child tax credit will cost a combined 
$196 billion in 2018.260 So far, that sums to $354 billion, leaving a 
funding gap of $1.530 trillion remaining to be filled. 
Potential elimination of the OASI, DI, and SSI programs run 
by the SSA raises especially difficult questions. At the end of 
2017, the average monthly OASI benefit for retired workers was 
$1,404;261 for disabled workers under DI, it was $1,197;262 and for 
SSI recipients, it was $542.263 The estimated costs of these pro-
grams in 2018 was $848 billion for OASI, $147 billion for DI, and 
$56 billion for SSI.264 Eliminating OASI, DI, and SSI would gen-
erate $1.056 trillion, bringing us two-thirds of the way toward 
closing the remaining funding gap. At the same time, replacing 
these programs with a $500 per month UBI would leave millions 
of elderly and disabled Americans worse off—especially if it comes 
with the elimination of other programs (for example, SNAP and 
Section 8) from which many low-income elderly and disabled in-
dividuals also benefit. Requiring seniors to choose between a UBI 
and OASI benefits—as proposed by Murray—would reduce the 
cost of a UBI by roughly $240 billion,265 but would be vulnerable 
to the political and philosophical objections noted above.266 
For now, we set aside further discussion of the interaction 
between a UBI and Social Security’s OASI program. Social Secu-
rity (and OASI in particular) is often considered to be the “third 
rail of American politics”;267 if a UBI is pitched as a competitor to 
OASI, we are pessimistic about basic income’s political prospects. 
 
 259 See Congressional Budget Office, Spending Projections, by Budget Account: Up-
dated April 2018 Baseline, archived at https://perma.cc/3D3H-2CU7. 
 260 See Congressional Budget Office, Revenue Projections, by Budget Category: Up-
dated April 2018 Baseline, archived at https://perma.cc/N5DT-4V5H. 
 261 Fast Facts About Social Security at *16 (cited in note 169). 
 262 Id. 
 263 Id at *25. 
 264 Congressional Budget Office, Spending Projections, by Budget Account (cited in 
note 259). 
 265 See Murray, In Our Hands at 109 (cited in note 7). As of the end of 2017, approxi-
mately 40 million OASI beneficiaries received benefits of $500 or more per month. See 
Social Security Administration, Retired Worker Beneficiaries in Current Payment Status 
at the End of December 2017, Distributed by Benefit Level, Sex, and Age Group (Jan 8, 
2018), archived at https://perma.cc/YP3X-3BHM. Presumably, these individuals would 
choose to continue receiving OASI benefits and forgo a UBI. The $240 billion figure is 
40 million multiplied by a $6,000-per-year UBI. 
 266 See text accompanying notes 166–178. 
 267 Rick Shenkman, When Did Social Security Become the Third Rail of American 
Politics? (History News Network, Mar 6, 2005), archived at https://perma.cc/NW9P-3G35. 
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With respect to DI and SSI, we can anticipate welfarist, egalitar-
ian, and libertarian reactions. Welfarists might argue that even 
if disability determinations are imperfect, DI and SSI eligibility 
are still rough proxies for ability to pay. Transfers to the disabled 
(or, more precisely, transfers to individuals whom the SSA has 
determined to be disabled) still will—on balance—move money 
from individuals with lower marginal utility of income to individ-
uals with higher marginal utility of income. Some egalitarians 
(such as Professor Anderson) might argue that even if everyone 
ought to receive a basic income, disabled individuals ought to re-
ceive something more, because they require more resources in or-
der to exercise equivalent freedoms.268 Libertarians, we expect, 
will be the most hostile toward maintaining DI and SSI because 
they (1) are likely the most skeptical about the informational 
value of government disability determinations and (2) are most 
concerned about the increase in taxes that will be necessary to 
close the UBI funding gap if DI and SSI are preserved. 
A split-the-difference approach might be to reduce but not 
eliminate DI and SSI benefits. For purposes of our running tally, 
we will assume that benefits are reduced by one-third—an arbi-
trary fraction that we choose because we think that one of the 
three theories that form our philosophical foundation for a UBI 
would seem to suggest that those programs be eliminated en-
tirely. (We understand that a real-world UBI might strike the bal-
ance differently.) That reduces the UBI funding gap by a further 
$68 billion. Adding in the previously discussed change to the tax 
treatment of Social Security benefits brings us $38 billion more.269 
Of course, that still leaves us with a long way to go. 
One option is to scale back federal funding for health care. 
The dollars at stake are significant: $383 billion for Medicaid, 
$18 billion for the Children’s Health Insurance Program 
(CHIP),270 $47 billion for Affordable Care Act premium tax cred-
its, and more than $700 billion for Medicare.271  And the basic 
 
 268 See Anderson, A Basic Income for All (cited in note 95) (“Disabled people typically 
require more resources to achieve equivalent freedoms—to move around, to get access to 
information, and so forth—than those who are not disabled.”). See also note 123. 
 269 See text accompanying notes 177–178. 
 270 See Congressional Budget Office, Spending Projections, by Budget Account (cited 
in note 259). 
 271 See id; Juliette Cubanski, Tricia Neuman, and Meredith Freed, Issue Brief, The 
Facts on Medicare Spending and Financing *1 (Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation, Aug 
2019), archived at https://perma.cc/9JCU-MZBA. 
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resource-egalitarian and libertarian arguments in favor of unre-
stricted cash transfers—that individuals should have the oppor-
tunity to choose for themselves how that money is spent—would 
seem to apply to health care just as much as SNAP. On the other 
hand, there is perhaps a plausible argument that the government 
enjoys informational and scale advantages vis-à-vis the free mar-
ket in the provision of health coverage, which may be why most 
other advanced economies have chosen to channel health insur-
ance through the public sector.272 Moreover, in some states, the 
average premium for an individual health insurance plan would 
eat up the entire $500 per month UBI.273 For many Medicaid re-
cipients and other beneficiaries of federally subsidized health in-
surance, eliminating those subsidies and pouring the savings into 
a UBI would be of little help at all. We will therefore proceed on 
the assumption that these programs will remain in place. If they 
were eliminated in order to make fiscal room for a UBI, the fund-
ing challenge would be significantly less daunting. 
All this leaves us with a $1.424 trillion funding gap. At least 
some of that money is likely to come from an increase in income 
taxes.274 To be sure, some could come from other sorts of taxes, 
such as a carbon tax. In fact, two prominent Republicans have 
recently called for a carbon tax coupled with a rebate that is es-
sentially a UBI.275 Yet, a carbon tax set at the social cost of carbon 
 
 272 See David M. Cutler, Health Care and the Public Sector, in Alan J. Auerbach and 
Martin Feldstein, eds, 4 Handbook of Public Economics 2143, 2167–69 (Elsevier 2002) 
(discussing different justifications for public and private provision of health insurance and 
noting that countries with public health insurance tend to spend less on it). 
 273 See, for example, Catherine Ho, California Health Insurance Premiums to Rise an 
Average of Nearly 9% in 2019 (SF Chron, July 19, 2018), archived at https:// 
perma.cc/5Q2T-7MGZ (noting that the average premium for an individual plan without 
subsidies in California is $500 per month). 
 274 Andy Stern has suggested using a value-added tax (VAT) of 5 percent to 10 percent 
to offset some of a UBI’s cost. See Stern with Kravitz, Raising the Floor at 212–13 (cited 
in note 9). But a VAT does not avoid the trade-off between a larger UBI and higher income 
taxes because a VAT is the rough economic equivalent of an additional tax on labor income. 
See Gilbert E. Metcalf, Value-Added Taxation: A Tax Whose Time Has Come?, 9 J Econ 
Perspectives 121, 131–32 (1995). Proposals for a UBI funded by a wealth tax also do not 
avoid this basic trade-off because a wealth tax is the economic equivalent of a tax on the 
risk-free component of capital income. See Deborah H. Schenk, Saving the Income Tax 
with a Wealth Tax, 53 Tax L Rev 423, 435–41 (2000). 
 275 See John Schwartz, ‘A Conservative Climate Solution’: Republican Group Calls for 
Carbon Tax (NY Times, Feb 7, 2017), archived at https://perma.cc/R45S-XMHG (discuss-
ing a proposal by James A. Baker III and George P. Shultz—both former Republican sec-
retaries of state—to tax fossil fuels and then give consumers a “carbon dividend”). This 
proposal demonstrates that one potential advantage of a carbon tax–funded UBI is that it 
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would offset only a small portion of a UBI’s costs. US energy- 
related carbon emissions amounted to 5.27 billion metric tons in 
2018; a carbon tax of approximately $36 per metric ton would—
holding emissions constant—raise $190 billion per year.276 This is 
almost certainly an overestimate because the whole point of a car-
bon tax, aside from raising revenue, is to reduce carbon output. 
In any event, it would still leave us with a funding gap of 
$1.234 trillion. 
Total income reported on individual income tax returns for 
tax year 2017 (filing year 2018), the most recent year for which 
comprehensive data are available, was approximately 
$11.170 trillion. 277  We add US corporate pretax profits of 
$2.044 trillion, as measured in the first quarter of 2018.278 That 
yields an individual and corporate income tax base of $13.214 tril-
lion. A crude way to think about the tax increase that would be 
necessary in order to offset the cost of a UBI is to imagine a flat 
surtax on all income (individual as well as corporate). Dividing 
the $1.234 trillion funding gap that remains after the imposition 
of a carbon tax by the $13.214 trillion base amount yields a rate 
of approximately 9.3 percent. Each additional $100 billion in cost 
savings would translate to a 0.75 percentage point reduction in 
the requisite tax. We should add that the 9.3 percent figure is al-
most certainly an underestimate, as it does not yet take into ac-
count the behavioral effects of higher taxes.279 
 
may be able to garner bipartisan support. More recently, several chapters of the College 
Republicans have endorsed such a proposal. See Lisa Friedman, College Republicans Pro-
pose an Unusual Idea from the Right: A Carbon Tax (NY Times, Mar 6, 2018), archived at 
https://perma.cc/EW2U-BEHZ (reporting that Republican student groups at twenty-three 
universities joined together to form the coalition “Students for Carbon Dividends” to raise 
support for a carbon tax). 
 276 For the emissions figure, see US Energy Information Administration, What Are 
U.S. Energy-Related Carbon Dioxide Emissions by Source and Sector? (May 15, 2019) ar-
chived at https://perma.cc/Q5E8-HUN5 (2018 figures). The $36 per ton figure reflects the 
$31 per ton figure in William D. Nordhaus, Revisiting the Social Cost of Carbon, 114 Pro-
ceedings Natl Acad Sci 1518, 1520 (2017). Professor Nordhaus’s figure is stated in 2010 
dollars, so we update to reflect inflation between 2010 and 2018. See CPI Inflation Calcu-
lator at *4 (cited in note 16). 
 277 See Internal Revenue Service, Individual Income Tax Returns, 2017 *20 fig A 
(2019), archived at https://perma.cc/VH4H-US2G. 
 278 See National Income: Corporate Profits Before Tax (Without IVA and CCAdj) (Fed-
eral Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Sept 26, 2019), online at https://fred.stlouisfed.org/ 
series/A053RC1Q027SBEA (visited Jan 25, 2020) (Perma archive unavailable). 
 279 See Norton Francis, et al, Tax Policy Center’s Briefing Book: A Citizen’s Guide to 
the Fascinating (Though Often Complex) Elements of the Federal Tax System *45 (Urban 
Institute, 2018), archived at https://perma.cc/X6H8-TVDE. 
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Eliminating a variety of tax expenditures—such as the exclu-
sion of employer-sponsored health insurance, the home mortgage 
interest deduction, the 20 percent deduction for pass-through in-
come, and stepped-up basis at death280—could generate additional 
revenues that would offset a UBI’s cost. The Joint Committee on 
Taxation’s expenditure estimates associated with those provi-
sions for fiscal year 2019 sum to $290.9 billion ($172.8 billion for 
health insurance, $33.9 billion for mortgage interest, $50.2 bil-
lion for pass-throughs, and $34.0 billion for stepped-up basis).281 
Eliminating those expenditures and using the revenue to offset 
the cost of a UBI would, very roughly speaking,282 reduce the size 
of the surtax needed to fund a $500 per month basic income from 
9.3 percent to 7.1 percent. We should emphasize, however, that 
eliminating tax expenditures does not allow lawmakers to avoid 
the trade-off between a larger UBI and higher tax rates. Elimi-
nating the abovementioned tax expenditures would still cause 
millions of taxpayers to pay higher effective tax rates.  
Nor can that essential trade-off between a larger UBI and 
higher taxes be avoided by adding income-based phaseouts to a 
UBI. As noted above,283 an income-based phaseout is simply a sur-
tax in sheep’s clothing. Consider a hypothetical UBI of $10,000 
that phased out at a rate of 25 cents per dollar of income above 
$20,000. For every additional $100 of income, a taxpayer sees her 
UBI drop by $25. This is economically equivalent to a tax of 
25 percent.284 The only difference is that a phaseout applies only 
to that subsection of taxpayers in the phaseout range.285 
 
 280 See IRC §§ 106, 163(h), 199A, 1014. 
 281 Joint Committee on Taxation, Estimates of Federal Tax Expenditures for Fiscal 
Years 2017–2021 *37 (mortgage interest), *38 (pass-through income and stepped-up ba-
sis), *42 (employer-sponsored health insurance) (May 25, 2018), archived at https:// 
perma.cc/NNU3-2UAD. 
 282 We caution that tax expenditure estimates are not the same as revenue estimates, 
though they tend to be quite close. See Yair Listokin, Tax Expenditure Estimates Approx-
imate Revenue Estimates, 145 Tax Notes 701, 704–05 (2014). 
 283 See Part I.B. 
 284 In fact, existing welfare programs contain this type of implicit tax. When a tax-
payer loses SNAP benefits of $24 because her income increases by $100, that is equivalent 
to a 24 percent tax. See Congressional Budget Office, Effective Marginal Tax Rates for 
Low- and Moderate-Income Workers in 2016 *3 (Nov 2015), archived at https:// 
perma.cc/S3X3-9YMH (discussing the phaseout of benefits and its impact on marginal tax 
rates). 
 285 In this hypothetical, once a taxpayer’s income exceeds $40,000, her UBI is fully 
phased out ($40,000 × 25 percent = $10,000) and she faces no additional implicit tax due 
to the phaseout. 
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Ultimately, whether a UBI is funded through an explicit sur-
tax on income or through a surtax that is partly redescribed as a 
“phaseout,” we think that policymakers should draw from more 
than a century of experience in the design of income taxes in the 
United States. A few key lessons emerge. First, there is no need 
to construct an entirely new definition of income for the taxes 
used to fund a UBI. The additional surtax can be layered onto the 
existing tax structure, given that Congress, the courts, and the 
IRS over the years have developed a rich set of standards and 
rules that aim to measure ability to pay while accommodating 
other policy concerns.286 Although this may seem obvious to those 
well-versed in tax policy, nontax welfare programs routinely use 
alternative definitions of income when imposing phaseouts. 287 
Given that several other UBI proposals incorporate taxes cast as 
phaseouts based on “income” without defining income, we think 
it important to clarify this point. Second, there is no need for a 
new agency to collect the funds that go toward a UBI: the task 
falls firmly within the IRS’s wheelhouse. 
Third, cliff effects should be avoided. For instance, the cur-
rent structure of the EITC causes taxpayers to lose their entire 
credit when their investment income crosses the $3,600 thresh-
old.288 This structure—which in some cases imposes an implicit 
 
 286 Indeed, as Professor John Brooks illustrates, the Code already offers several defi-
nitions of income from which to choose, including gross income, adjusted gross income, 
taxable income, alternative minimum taxable income, and various definitions of “modified 
adjusted gross income.” See Brooks, 71 Tax L Rev at 253 n 2 (cited in note 19). 
 287 California’s TANF program, CalWORKs, requires recipients to include in income 
free rent or utilities, bills paid by others, and “contribution[s] from persons, organizations, 
or assistance agencies”; many of these transfers would likely count as excludable gifts for 
income tax purposes. California Department of Social Services, Health and Human Ser-
vices Agency, Manual of Policies and Procedures: Eligibility and Assistance Standards 
*376 (definition of income for benefit-eligibility determination includes contributions from 
others), *404–05 (inclusion of housing and utilities paid by others in income), archived at 
https://perma.cc/W3G4-DBUM. See also IRC § 102(a) (“Gross income does not include the 
value of property acquired by gift.”). Further, Section 8 requires the inclusion of child sup-
port and alimony payments, 24 CFR § 5.609(b)(7), even though the former have long been 
excluded from gross income and the latter are now excluded as well. See IRC § 71(a) 
(providing that alimony is included in gross income), repealed by the Tax Cuts and Jobs 
Act § 11051, Pub L No 115-97, 131 Stat 2054, 2089 (2017). This divergence is also true on 
the deduction side; for example, many programs allow deductions for “excess” shelter 
costs. See, for example, US Department of Agriculture, Food and Nutrition Service, SNAP 
Eligibility: Frequently Asked Questions, archived at https://perma.cc/CC89-UGJD. 
 288 See Internal Revenue Service, 2019 EITC Income Limits, Maximum Credit 
Amounts and Tax Law Updates (July 10, 2019), archived at https://perma.cc/7E7R-S94L. 
The threshold is adjusted annually for inflation. 
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marginal tax rate of over 655,000 percent on the 3,601st dollar of 
investment income—is almost certainly not the best way to de-
sign a tax system.289 Unfortunately, some current UBI proposals 
contain such effects. Consider Chris Hughes’s proposal to give 
$500 per month ($6,000 per year) to every adult earning less than 
$50,000 a year “who is working in some way”—which, according 
to Hughes, should include college students as well as individuals 
who care for young children or care for aging or disabled adults.290 
Hughes’s scheme is economically equivalent to a phaseout-free 
basic income for working individuals of $6,000 per year, combined 
with an additional tax of $6,000 once income reaches $50,000. The 
result is a strange (and likely quite distortionary) cliff effect at 
the 50,001st dollar of income: a marginal rate of 600,000 percent 
on that dollar. 
Fourth, policymakers should be cognizant of the marriage in-
centives potentially embedded in phaseouts and surtaxes and 
should avoid arrangements that severely penalize marriage. 
Hughes’s phaseout, for example, would also impose a harsh mar-
riage penalty: for example, two single individuals each earning 
$26,000 would lose a combined $12,000 per year by marrying.291 
More sophisticated UBI phaseouts often embed marriage penal-
ties as well. For example, Jessica Wiederspan and collaborators 
at the University of Michigan School of Social Work have modeled 
proposals that would set a UBI at 75 percent, 100 percent, or 
133 percent of the federal poverty level, with a phaseout rate of 
33 percent or 50 percent.292 All of these setups would involve steep 
marriage penalties because the poverty level is a function of 
household size. For example, with a UBI at 100 percent of the 
poverty level and a phaseout rate of 33 percent, two adults 
 
 289 One single dollar of extra income—specifically, the 3,601st dollar—causes one to 
lose one’s entire EITC, which can be as high as $6,557. On cliff effects more generally and 
the EITC-investment income cliff in particular, see Manoj Viswanathan, The Hidden Costs 
of Cliff Effects in the Internal Revenue Code, 164 U Pa L Rev 931, 936–39 (2016). 
 290 Hughes, Fair Shot at 92–93 (cited in note 8). 
 291 See Felix Salmon, Book Review, Chris Hughes Made Millions at Facebook. Now 
He Has a Plan to End Poverty (NY Times, Feb 25, 2018), archived at https://perma.cc/ 
YMD2-3J34, reviewing Hughes, Fair Shot (cited in note 8) (noting the “nasty marriage 
penalty” implicit in Hughes’s proposal). 
 292 See Wiederspan, et al, 19 J Poverty at 229 tbl 3 (cited in note 197). 
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earning $20,000 per year would face a marriage penalty of $9,090 
if they wed.293 
Fifth and finally, policymakers should seek to avoid sky-high 
marginal rates. A surtax in the 7 to 10 percentage point range, 
spread across all taxpayers, would put the top marginal rate on 
individuals only slightly above where it stood before 2018 and 
would leave the rate on corporations well below pre-2018 levels.294 
One consequence of a low, yet universal surtax of, say, 10 percent 
is that as a practical matter, one’s UBI is not fully offset by addi-
tional taxes until one’s income is $60,000. Put another way, our 
UBI would not phase out until $60,000 of income. 
One advantage of rolling together various cash and near-cash 
transfer programs and imposing a single surtax is that it allows 
policymakers to avoid some of the perverse incentives generated 
by the status quo. For example, the combination of the EITC and 
SNAP phaseouts and the 10 percent federal income tax bracket 
results in marginal tax rates above 50 percent for some low- 
income households.295 Those same phaseouts plus Medicaid eligi-
bility criteria can generate substantial marriage penalties for 
some couples as well.296 With fewer moving pieces, policymakers 
can structure a UBI and any accompanying phaseout or surtax to 
minimize these potential pitfalls. 
Our UBI will, inevitably, produce winners and losers. The 
overwhelming majority of low-income individuals and families 
would be winners. A UBI of $500 per person per month—$2,000 
per month for a four-member household—would more than com-
pensate for the loss of SNAP benefits (up to $192 per month for a 
single person and up to $640 per month for a four-person 
 
 293 This calculation is based on a federal poverty level of $12,752 for a single individ-
ual and $16,414 for a two-person household. 2 × ($12,752 – 33 percent × $20,000) − 
($16,414 – 33 percent × $40,000) = $9,090. 
 294 The December 2017 tax law reduced the top marginal tax rate on individuals by 
3.8 percentage points and the rate on corporations by 14 percentage points. The 3.8 per-
centage point reduction for individuals was a function of a 2.6 percentage point cut in the 
statutory rate plus the elimination of the Pease phaseout, which had added up to 1.2 per-
centage points. See Michael Kitces, Individual Tax Planning Under the Tax Cuts and Jobs 
Act of 2017 (Kitces, Dec 18, 2017), archived at https://perma.cc/MLA2-RHDD. 
 295 See Congressional Budget Office, Effective Marginal Tax Rates at *3 (cited in 
note 284). 
 296 See W. Bradford Wilcox, Joseph P. Price, and Angela Rachidi, Marriage, Penalized: 
Does Social-Welfare Policy Affect Family Formation? *15 (AEI Institute for Family Stud-
ies, July 26, 2016), archived at https://perma.cc/296M-NU6L. 
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household)297 and/or the EITC (the equivalent of up to $44.08 per 
month for a single person and up to $485.67 per month for a two-
adult, two-child household). 298  Throwing the refundable child 
credit (the equivalent of $233.33 per month for a two-child house-
hold) into the mix does not change this calculus.299 Even those 
who also qualify for WIC (average monthly benefit of roughly $41 
per person) on top of SNAP and the EITC will almost always pre-
fer the UBI.300 For those somewhat higher up the income ladder, 
the benefit from a UBI will more than offset the cost of the addi-
tional surtax until income reaches at least $60,000 for a single 
individual and at least $240,000 for a four-member household. 
To be sure, there will be a relatively small number of low-
income individuals and families who will receive less under our 
proposal than under the status quo—in particular, some Section 8 
voucher recipients living in high-rent areas and some families in 
states such as Alaska and New Hampshire where TANF benefits 
are especially generous.301 Our view is that a more even distribu-
tion of benefits among low-income individuals and families is 
preferable to the status quo, in which programs such as Section 8 
provide substantial benefits to a very small portion of low-income 
families but leave others languishing on long waiting lists.302 We 
also believe that a $500-per-month UBI that, as explained above, 
is not recaptured by increased taxes until one’s income is $60,000 
is preferable to a larger UBI that is phased out at a lower income 
(such as Murray’s proposal). While the latter may better target 
certain very poor individuals, such frameworks necessitate re-
gressive tax structures that import many of the existing work dis-
incentives into the UBI context. Likewise, the fact that our pro-
posal replaces most of the existing welfare state instead of adding 
to it renders it economically feasible and will cause fewer 
 
 297 See Memorandum from Silbermann, SNAP — Fiscal Year 2018 at *3 (cited in 
note 147). 
 298 See 2019 EITC Income Limits (cited in note 288). 
 299 See IRC § 24(a), (d), (h)(5). 
 300 See US Department of Agriculture, Food and Nutrition Service, WIC Program: 
Average Monthly Benefit per Person *2 (Mar 8, 2019), archived at https://perma.cc/XGW3 
-GAVT. The comparison should also include the effect of the new income surtax, the effect 
of which will be modest when income is modest. 
 301 See Ashley Burnside and Ife Floyd, TANF Benefits Remain Low Despite Recent 
Increases in Some States *13 appx tbl 1 (Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, Jan 22, 
2019), archived at https://perma.cc/JD9B-WMM7. 
 302 See, for example, Max Nesterak, Section Wait: Federal Housing Vouchers Hard to 
Get, Hard to Use (Minn Public Radio, July 18, 2018), archived at https:// 
perma.cc/3EQA-E33X. 
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economic distortions. Almost any intervention that unsettles the 
existing public-assistance landscape will leave some people worse 
off, and choosing among assistance programs requires making 
hard trade-offs. But the upside of our proposal—a strong safety net 
with fewer holes and distortions—seems to us to be well worth it. 
IV.  THE OUTWARD FAÇADE OF A UBI 
So far we have deferred discussion of whether a UBI should 
be truly “universal” or whether benefits should phase out after 
income exceeds a certain threshold. We have deferred that discus-
sion primarily because the question is semantic: As illustrated in 
Part I.B, the exact same scheme can be described as (a) a UBI 
with no phaseout that is funded by a surtax on income, (b) a UBI 
that phases out, or (c) a negative income tax. The different fram-
ings may affect the political popularity of the proposal; they do 
not (or at least, need not) affect program design. 
As a practical matter, we think that the easiest way to imple-
ment a UBI would be for the SSA to make uniform biweekly or 
semimonthly payments via direct deposit to each eligible individ-
ual’s account and for the offsetting surtax to be integrated into 
the existing individual income tax system. There would be no 
need for the SSA to track the income of 314 million citizens and 
lawful permanent residents on a biweekly basis to ensure that 
they remain below the phaseout threshold; if you are a US citizen 
or a Green Card holder, you will be entitled to receive $250 twice 
a month regardless of how much other income you make. 
As an optical matter, the advantage of this arrangement is 
that it effectively frames a UBI as a universal program, rather 
than as a form of “welfare” that goes only to the poor. Basic in-
come supporters hope that this “universal” framing will make a 
UBI as popular as OASI (which reaches most seniors) and Medi-
care (which reaches every US citizen over sixty-five and every 
lawful permanent resident over that age who has resided in the 
United States for the past five years).303 The disadvantage is that 
some may react negatively to the notion of the über-rich receiving 
government payments. Financial journalist Felix Salmon reflects 
this view in a recent critique of basic income proposals, writing 
that: 
 
 303 For Medicare eligibility requirements, see 42 CFR § 406.20. 
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UBI is a pretty inefficient way of giving poor people money. 
Think about it this way: Just 40 percent of a UBI’s expendi-
ture would go to the bottom 40 percent of the population, and 
a mere 10 percent would go to the 10 percent who need it 
most. What would happen to the rest of the money? 
 Study after study has shown that when you give money 
to the homeless and the very poor, they don’t spend it on fri-
volities like booze and tobacco: In fact, rates of drinking and 
smoking invariably go down rather than up. On the other 
hand, if you gave me an extra $1,500 per month, no strings 
attached, I’m sure a significant chunk of that would end up 
in my wine fridge. That might be popular with my local wine 
merchants, but as a means of redistributing society’s wealth 
in the interests of fairness and equality, it does leave some-
thing to be desired.304 
In one sense, Salmon—despite being one of the smartest and 
most perceptive commentators on economic policy today—has 
been fooled by the framing of a UBI into thinking that high- 
income individuals like himself would be receiving “extra” money. 
Salmon reportedly earned more than $400,000 in 2017;305 if the 
income tax rate is raised by 7 percent to 10 percent in order to 
offset the cost of a UBI, Salmon will have tens of thousands of 
dollars less each year to spend on his wine collection, even though 
he will receive a UBI via direct deposit every two weeks. 
In theory, a UBI could be implemented such that Salmon and 
other high-income individuals do not receive any payment. Either 
we could track each individual’s income throughout the year and 
withhold payment from high-income individuals, or we could 
switch to an annual payment cycle and implement a UBI as a 
negative income tax. The former approach would raise adminis-
trative costs substantially. 306  The latter tack would make it 
harder for individuals to smooth consumption throughout the 
year. The “negative income tax” framing suffers from the 
 
 304 Felix Salmon, Universal Basic Income Is Not the Solution to Poverty (Slate, July 
10, 2018), archived at https://perma.cc/4BT2-7PNL. 
 305 See Silvia Killingsworth, Felix Salmon, “Fusion Money,” and Floating Upward 
(The Awl, Jan 31, 2018), archived at https://perma.cc/4NNW-QJ6H. 
 306 Experience with the advance EITC and the high administrative costs of current 
means-tested programs demonstrate these challenges. See note 243 (discussing difficulties 
with distributing EITC payments throughout the year). 
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additional disadvantage of including two words that do not elicit 
warm reactions: “negative” and “tax.” 
If resistance remains fierce to the notion of the rich “receiv-
ing” a basic income, we could add an extra line to the individual 
income tax return on which high-income individuals “pay back” 
their UBI. This would be similar to the phaseout of personal ex-
emptions prior to the December 2017 tax law307 and the income-
based limitation on the child tax credit under the current Code.308 
By relying on phaseouts rather than raising rates, lawmakers 
complicate the tax-filing process to achieve economically equiva-
lent but less transparent results. Perhaps there are benefits of 
this approach from a political perspective; as a matter of policy, 
we see nothing to recommend it. 
Finally, a UBI could be framed as a new “tax credit” rather 
than a new benefit without changing any of its essential features. 
There is some evidence to suggest that individuals react more pos-
itively to cash transfers that are described as “tax credits” rather 
than as spending programs.309 The difference is merely semantic: 
some tax credits are paid out more frequently than annually and 
administered in tandem with agencies other than the IRS.310 Fur-
ther survey experiments can shed light on whether reframing 
would foment greater support; for present purposes, the key point 
is that whether a UBI is framed as a new tax credit or a new pub-
lic benefit is a piece of the façade rather than an element of deep 
structure. 
CONCLUSION 
We have argued in favor of a universal basic income of $500 
per month ($6,000 per year) that would be paid to every US citi-
zen and lawful permanent resident via direct deposit in biweekly 
installments, administered by the SSA, and funded by the consol-
idation of some (but not necessarily all) existing cash and near-
cash transfer programs as well as a modest increase in taxes. Up 
 
 307 See IRC § 151(d)(3) (phaseout of personal exemptions). 
 308 See IRC § 24(b) (income-based limitation on the child tax credit); IRC § 24(h)(1)–
(3) (income-based limits applicable for 2018–2025). 
 309 See Conor Clarke and Edward Fox, Note, Perceptions of Taxing and Spending: A 
Survey Experiment, 124 Yale L J 1252, 1277–78 (2015). 
 310 See, for example, IRC § 36B(b) (monthly payment of Affordable Care Act premium 
assistance credits); IRC § 36B(e)(3) (significant regulatory authority over premium tax 
credits allocated to Secretary of Health and Human Services). 
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until now, we have considered a UBI as a sharp break from the 
status quo. Migration toward a UBI could occur more gradually, 
however. While our focus is on a UBI as an alternative to the sta-
tus quo, our analysis also suggests ways in which existing trans-
fer programs could improve incrementally, even if the goal of a 
UBI remains distant. 
First, as noted above, many existing transfers come with se-
vere restrictions on use. SNAP benefits cannot be used to buy toi-
let paper or Tylenol.311 Section 8 vouchers generally cannot be 
used to rent apartments with shared kitchens.312 Welfarist, re-
source egalitarian, and libertarian approaches all support 
changes to these rules that would allow recipients to exert more 
control over the use of their benefits. One move in a desirable di-
rection would be to consolidate SNAP, TANF, and Section 8 into 
a single program that provides recipients with debit-like cards 
and allows them to spend their benefits without micromanaging 
their choices. 
Second, many existing transfers are conditional upon work. 
For example, a parent cannot claim the child tax credit unless she 
receives at least $2,500 per year in earned income, and the full 
$1,400 refundable credit is available only if the parent earns at 
least $11,833.313 Denying support to the individuals and families 
that need it most makes little sense from a welfarist, egalitarian, 
or libertarian perspective. Changes to the child tax credit and 
EITC that extend benefits to those at the very bottom would not 
bring us all the way to a UBI, but they would put us somewhat 
closer to that ideal.314 
Third, as noted above, the tangle of phaseouts for existing 
cash and near-cash transfer programs can generate high mar-
ginal tax rates at the bottom of the income distribution that dis-
courage low-income adults from working.315 We have argued that 
a shift to a UBI could address this problem by replacing all of 
 
 311 See US Department of Agriculture, Food and Nutrition Service, Supplemental Nu-
trition Assistance Program (SNAP): What Can SNAP Buy? (Sept 4, 2013), archived at 
https://perma.cc/YB7M-24XR. 
 312 See 24 CFR § 982.401(d)(2)(i). 
 313 See IRC § 24(d), (h)(5)–(6). The refundable portion of the tax credit is limited to 
15 percent of earned income in excess of $2,500. $(11,833 − 2,500) × 15 percent = $1,400. 
 314 See Benjamin M. Leff, EITC for All: A Universal Basic Income Compromise Pro-
posal *20–30 (unpublished manuscript, 2019) (on file with authors); Dylan Matthews, A 
California Child Allowance (Medium: Economic Security Project, Aug 22, 2017), archived 
at https://perma.cc/NVT9-U4BV. 
 315 See text accompanying note 295. 
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those phaseouts with a single surtax at a modest rate. Yet even 
without going all the way to a UBI, policymakers could “pop” 
these bubble rates by consolidating cash and near-cash transfers 
into one program with a less-punishing phaseout structure. 
Such modesty may prove unnecessary, however, if voters and 
politicians from multiple points on the ideological spectrum can 
coalesce around a national basic income program. If and when 
that happens, the design questions canvassed in this Article will 
take on central significance. We do not claim to have found all the 
answers yet. We do believe, though, that goals of ending extreme 
poverty and empowering low-income individuals can be advanced 
through greater scholarly attention to a UBI’s nuts and bolts. 
